One incident; many perspectives
Over the past two weeks, the sizeable community of analysts in this country has been grappling with the question as to what was the real cause behind the NATO attacks on the two Pakistani border posts in the Mohmand agency. Before proceeding further, it needs to be mentioned that in this context NATO is being depicted synonymously with the United States. While in the interest of technical accuracy, the attacks are being attributed to NATO but in commentaries, written or verbal, the protagonists leave no doubt that by NATO they mean the Americans.
Just to refresh our memories, there are two distinct military commands in Afghanistan: the US’ and NATO’s. Whilst the two coordinate their military activities closely, it is not clear whether these can be treated as the same entity. For someone who lived in France during the era of General Charles de Gaulle, the synonymy does not come too easily yet since the conventional wisdom in this country believes otherwise we will shape this piece on that premise.
The Pakistani military has been clear and consistent in its rendition of the events i.e. that there was no Taliban activity in the neighbourhood and, despite instant contact with NATO command after the first round of firing, a second and more lethal attack was launched causing twenty four deaths. The whole incident was, therefore, deliberate and pre-planned. Within Pakistan, this version enjoys broad acceptance. Consensus, however, is missing on the real reason behind this disaster.
Three strands of thought are detectable. A relatively small group believes that judgment should be withheld till the completion of the promised American inquiry of the incident and the announcement of its findings. This view apparently puts its trust in the fairness of the investigation and by that token would be prepared to accept the outcome at its face value. This viewpoint has just a handful of takers.
Another view, with much larger subscription, is convinced that the attacks are a manifestation of a devious plan to transfer Afghanistan’s instability into Pakistan as part of America’s long term objective of neutralising its military and removing its nuclear assets. The logic in support of this version takes an interesting path. Such attacks, the argument goes, will unleash popular outrage forcing the government and the establishment to take stringent countermeasures which would be unsustainable either because these would lead to direct conflict with the Americans or invite debilitating multiple sanctions. In either case, the Pakistani military would be the major victim and the main loser. At an appropriate moment, the Indian threat would be activated putting the army in a nut cracker. The radicalisation and destabilisation of the state which this sequence of events would trigger would then enable the United States, if possible with Security Council backing, to take out our nuclear assets rendering Pakistan perfectly amenable to American dictates in the region.
The Memogate saga is cited as supplementary evidence in support of this claim in that it is seen as an insidious attempt to create an unbridgeable chasm between the civilian and military leadership in Pakistan forcing the latter to openly take charge of the country. The stage would then be set to take the cleverly organised campaign of maligning the Pakistan army to its logical conclusion.
The third group advocates a slightly more modest and practical motive for the attacks. According to this view, these were a test-run to gauge Pakistani reaction to a future onslaught against the Taliban sanctuaries in Waziristan consistent with the thinking of American generals that a military solution is both desirable and feasible: Af-Pak at its telling best, the relevance of Pakistan being defined in Washington’s calculus purely in terms of its utility in furthering American objectives in Afghanistan.
Had our response been anaemic, the argument continues, a full scale attack on the sanctuaries would have followed. Pakistan’s robust reaction has pre-empted this eventuality.
It would require stunning powers of clairvoyance to accurately depict the real cause of the attacks on our border posts. A diplomatic analyst can draw conclusions from hard evidence alone with the rest falling in the realm of speculation and conjecture The hard evidence so far available has two components; the unprovoked aerial attacks on our posts and an uncharacteristically strong reaction from Pakistan. The intensity of the response, unknown in the annals of Pak-US relationship which has had its share of past disruptions, lends credence to the prognosis that it was dictated by severe apprehension on our part in regard to US intentions. To what extent this apprehension was justified would depend on whether the United States chooses diplomacy or continued war in pursuit of its interests in this part of the world.
For Pakistan, dialogue offers the only rational option with the view to convincing the Americans of the futility of further conflict. This would likely be facilitated by Pakistan shedding some of the delusional concepts that have, for long, characterised our approach to Afghanistan.
The writer is Pakistan’s former Ambassador to the United Nations and European Union. He can be contacted at shaukatumer@hotmail.com