What next?
It might not be out of place to suggest that the unprovoked attacks on our border posts by NATO gunships are amongst several symptoms of the broader disconnect between Pakistani and American perspectives on the Afghan endgame. The equation is rendered more complicated by the existence of a subterranean disconnect between the US military high command and the civilian authorities. Reportedly Ambassador Munter’s proposal for a formal apology by President Obama, backed by the State Department, was overruled by the Pentagon forcing the President’s hand who is understandably averse to being exposed to charges of appeasement in an election year.
Reports to the effect that the generals in Washington remain convinced of the feasibility of military resolution of the Afghan conflict continue to surface. The seeming contradictions in Hillary Clinton’s public statements reflect this dichotomy. During the past few months, her pronouncements have attempted to cater to the hard line outlook of the military and the more conciliatory approach of the diplomats. Some regional specialists, including former State Department official Vali Nasr, have analysed the attacks in the context of the military trying to shape the Administration’s agenda in Afghanistan. Nasr has depicted the situation as the proverbial tail wagging the dog. We need to remain alive to this possibility in fashioning our long-term response to the Mohmand catastrophe.
It is essential that we should not allow anger to determine our perspective on our future interaction with the international community So far our response has been proportionate to the recent provocations, Mohmand being the latest. The decision to suspend NATO shipments, vacation of the Shamsi Airbase, retaliation in self-defence and boycott of the Bonn Conference are unexceptionable given the growing intensity of the provocations, starting with the Raymond Davis affair. For the first time since 9/11 Pakistan has injected some balance in what was largely seen as an unequal if not a one-sided partnership in a loosely defined cause. How are we going to proceed from here?
Those propagating that the issue be formally tabled before the Security Council are clearly unfamiliar with its operational mechanics. Examples abound of how the Council abdicated its responsibilities even in instances of outright aggression. Two cases would suffice: the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the US-led occupation of Iraq. In both instances, the Secretary General of the UN had declared these actions illegal yet the Security Council did nothing because the offending states wielded veto powers. The attack on the Mohmand posts, clearly unwarranted, would run against three vetoes, US, UK and France. In fact, the initiative would most likely be killed in the informal consultative stage which precedes formal debate in the Council. What will Pakistan gain from this? The dissemination of our concerns to all UN members as a Security Council document was practical and feasible. Going beyond that would be counter-productive.
Some quarters have suggested that Pakistan should not have boycotted the Bonn conference. Again, it must be remembered that such high-profile and propaganda-laden events are not an effective means of resolving complex international issues. In fact, the Declarations adopted at these moots are agreed to in advance and no real negotiations occur during the event itself. Our participation would have been largely symbolic and in any case our views on the recent events are widely known. Their articulation at the Conference would not have yielded any additional impact. The message that our absence conveyed would be far more pertinent in driving home the point that Pakistan is no longer willing to be taken for granted.
The key point now is how Pakistan uses its current position in exploring a balanced and durable solution to the conflict in Afghanistan. Pakistan and the US now need to engage in a sustained diplomatic process to ensure conceptual clarity on key aspects of the Afghan end game. This engagement should first agree on the minimum precept that military solution is no longer feasible and that at some approximate future date, on the realization of certain conditions i.e. Taliban agreement to join the peace process in right earnest, hostilities from both sides will have to cease. This should be followed by understandings on the character and composition of the future Afghan government, the question of continued US military presence in Afghanistan post 2014 and the level and quantum of Indian involvement in Afghan security beyond that date, amongst others.
Both countries would need to approach these vexing issues with an open mind. Pakistan would need to appreciate that the US has legitimate strategic and economic interests in this region while the latter must try to understand that whatever happens in Afghanistan has a direct and immediate bearing on our security and stability. A middle ground would need to be located which enables enmeshing of the legitimate concerns of both parties and their respective Afghan allies.
These understandings should then be moved outwards to elicit the support of other regional states and the wider community of nations.
The writer is Pakistan’s former Ambassador to the United Nations and European Union. He can be contacted at [email protected]
