In just one year, relations between the US and Turkey have moved from tension to cooperation. This was the focus of remarks by a Turkish journalist speaking at the opening session at the second convention of the Turkic-American Alliance. After reviewing the differences in the bilateral relationship, then and now, he asked rather pointedly, “What happened to account for this change and where will it lead us?”
The journalist recalled that when he had appeared at the group’s founding conference, in 2010, relations were at an all-time low. Turkey had broken with Israel over its blockade of Gaza. And the US was none too happy with Turkey’s efforts to negotiate a compromise that might ease international concerns with Iran’s nuclear program. In reaction, Congress and the Administration had been harshly critical of Turkish “meddling” and Turkey’s new “anti-Israel” bent. Today, in contrast, relations seem warmer than ever.
What happened to account for this change? In short, it was the “Arab Spring”, and the difficulties the US has had finding its way through the maze created by the region’s new political realities. What were constants have now become variables changing the Arab World’s landscape.
All this has occurred at a difficult time for the US. Despite its economic and military dominance, the ability of the US to manoeuvre in this changing environment has been hampered by several factors. Foremost has been the damage done by the Bush Administration’s reckless war in Iraq which created deep resentment across the Arab World and emboldened Iran. Add to that the failure of the Bush Administration to act to halt Israel’s four bloody wars against Lebanon (2006) and the Palestinians (West Bank in 2002 and Gaza in 2006 and 2009), which only deepened Arab anger. And finally, despite President Obama’s intention to change direction, Israeli intransigence and the deep partisan split in Washington have repeatedly frustrated his efforts.
As a result, at the onset of the Arab Spring, US policy in the Middle East was adrift. One by one allies had fallen or were at risk, and Washington found itself in a bind. The Administration could talk about supporting popular revolts, but it knew all too well that should the revolts succeed the resulting transformation would only complicate further the US’s already difficult situation in the Arab World. Furthermore, Washington’s “unshakable” bond with Israel, had, in effect, “taken it out of the game”.
It was at this point that Syria exploded.
Like the US, Turkey was also caught off-guard by the unfolding Arab Spring. They, too, initially meandered in response to developments in Egypt and Libya. But with their southern neighbour boiling over, Turkey made a determined effort to intervene: first urging reform, then negotiations, then demanding an end to the bloodshed, before finally embracing the opposition, giving up on the Assad regime, and announcing far-reaching sanctions against their one-time ally.
The US now appears to be deferring to Turkey as an invaluable ally in handling Syria for one important reason. As a result of its demonstrated support for Palestinians, Turkey has earned “street cred” in the Arab World, while the US has none. Turkey can meet with the Arab League as a partner, the U.S. cannot, and Turkey can endorse the Syrian opposition in a way that the US cannot.
But several cautionary notes are in order. Turkey cannot overplay its hand in Syria. It is neither the “leader of the Arabs”, nor does it, I believe, intend to play that role. It is true, as our recent polling demonstrates that Turkey’s standing is quite high across the Arab region. But that is not an invitation for Turkey to reassert a new “Ottomanism”.
Secondly, Turkey must be careful not to allow either hubris or external pressure to force it to get dragged too deeply into a Syrian quagmire. Some Syrian oppositionists may want Turkey to militarily intervene in Syria, but that might prove to be a fatal mistake. It would exacerbate an already bloody conflict causing even more unrest and would compromise Turkey’s hard won regional credibility. The wiser course would be for Turkey to resist these pressures and to continue to work in concert with the Arab League to insist that the Syrian regime enter into negotiations leading to broad reform and an orderly transfer of power.
The writer is President of the Arab-American Institute.
