Bonn 2011

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The road ahead

The Bonn Conference is being convened at a time when all eyes are fixed on December 2014, the final date for withdrawal of all combat troops from Afghanistan. What everyone expects from the conference is that it would hammer out a realistic scheme to ensure peace and stability post 2014. As things stand few see a light at the end of the tunnel. This is in grim contrast to the spectacular Bonn Conference a decade back which raised hopes of stability and prosperity in Afghanistan while making concrete moves towards the direction, like establishing an interim government under Karazi and a roadmap for the pursuit of the goals. The dominant narrative in Afghanistan is that the Americans are leaving, the government is weak and the Taliban are still strong. Despite all the Nato claims of considerable success in the South, assassination of key Afghan officials and high profile hit-and-run guerilla activities continue incessantly demoralising the Afghans and heightening concerns in the region.

Washington had hoped that by the time the Bonn Conference is held the US would be able to bring an effective section of the Taliban to the talks. More development in the direction was being expected after the UN removed 14 Taliban leaders from an international blacklist. Among the factors that stopped the breakthrough was a deterioration of relations with Pakistan which culminated after the killing of 24 Pakistani troops in Mohmand Agency.

Islamabad’s absence from Bonn would hurt not only the peace process in Afghanistan but also Pakistan’s own vital interests. The country faces an existential threat from the militants and has intensified military operations in a number of tribal agencies over the last several weeks. Pakistan’s participation would have ensured that its protest against the Mohmand killings was effectively registered and its interests were not jeopardised when post-2014 arrangements were being formulated. The US has to realise that anything seen to be harming Pakistan’s interest would force the weak and embattled government in Islamabad to go for a revision of the existing terms of business with the US, Nato, ISAF and the UN. It is in the best interests of both Washington and Islamabad to bring down the level of confrontation and improve relations.