The trilateral summit of Pakistan, Afghanistan and Turkey concluded in Istanbul on a positive note with the three countries signing agreements and MoUs for cooperation in different areas and expressing willingness to join hands to build a combined partnership to ensure peace and security in the region. Though the summit went well in pinning expectations and raising hopes for the future of this area, and the upcoming December 5 Bonn Conference in Germany was being considered to be a culminating event towards formulating a final strategy for the post-withdrawal Afghanistan, yet the November 26 US-NATO attack on Pakistan’s Salala check post in Waziristan put at risk the peace process in the entire South Asia.
It was not a quick air assault that claimed 24 Pakistani soldiers, which could be chalked down to logistical mistakes, but it was an attack that lasted almost two hours. While the jets and helicopters pounded the installations, Pakistan army contacted their NATO counterparts. They asked for a ceasefire but it continued. Islamabad made a strong protest to the US, NATO and Afghanistan, and told the world that the NATO chief’s ‘regret’ was not enough. Analysts believed that this attack “can have grave consequences.” The Guardian observed that it was “the costliest strategic mistake the United States has made in the war in Afghanistan.”
Reports say the already scheduled official visits of high-level Pakistan military delegations to the US have been cancelled while Washington too has been told that its military officials are also not welcome in Pakistan, at least for now. Prime Minister Gilani said Pakistan would reassess its arrangements with NATO and ISAF, and “its relationship with the US can only continue with mutual respect and mutual interest”. However, those who plead for adopting a pragmatic approach opine that our national stakes in the situation as it tends to evolve are so critical that the recent DCC decisions, though quite tough as they appear to be, are essentially symbolic in nature and may not seriously impact the emerging Afghan endgame scenario.
“While the government swung into action on the diplomatic front, in private it was hinting that the incident did not spell the end of Pak-US relations as has been predicted in the aftermath of the NATO attacks.” That’s why the need for holding thorough investigations into the incident has been doubled as the NATO commanders must be worried about their own image and of their organisation’s viability as an international policeman. Back home their people are fed up with fighting a lost war in a distant area and their politicians agreed to bring home their troops without delay. But probably NATO generals and lobbies that benefit from wars collaterally, want to keep fighting in league with the native Afghan commanders.
No wonder then most of the tension on the Pak-Afghan border is the making of Afghan commanders. If the recently held Loya Jirga voted for foreign military bases, it is what the Afghan commanders wanted which the Loya Jirga readily conceded. Therefore, the government is rightly advised that “there must be a well-conceived, concerted plan to muster international support for Pakistan’s position, especially now that Kabul-New Delhi axis is working strenuously to shift the blame of coalition’s impending failure to Pakistan.” Otherwise, the Istanbul initiative would not work in its true letter and spirit.
F Z KHAN
Islamabad