A series of most unfortunate events
The Supreme Court finally taking cognizance of Memogate and constituting an inquiry commission headed by a former FIA head has thrown a spanner in the works. This might prove to be the proverbial last straw for the Zardari government.
Normally calm and composed, Babar Awan – flanked by PPP stalwarts like Firdous Ashiq Awan, Qamar-uz-Zaman Kaira and Khursheed Shah – returning from a hurriedly called meeting at the presidency immediately after the Supreme Court’s issuing of the edict pressed the panic button. He declared that after sending three prime ministers from Sindh in a casket back to Sindh, the stage was being set to dispatch the fourth casket; the casket being that of the president this time.
Babar’s severe denouncement of the apex court can be interpreted as a strategic decision by the PPP to play the Sindh card. It betrays a certain sense of desperation about the state of affairs. The PPP-led government feels cornered from all sides. Obviously, it perceives that Zardari is the real target while Haqqani is merely a decoy.
As if Memogate was not enough, the possibility of re-opening of the Swiss cases against Mr Zardari as a result of the Supreme Court rejecting the government’s review petition against declaring the NRO null and void hangs like the sword of Damocles over the president’s head.
An overtly confident Nawaz Sharif personally appearing and speaking in favour of his petition on Memogate and the court’s severe edict leave little room for optimism for the government. The chief justice’s ‘advice’ to Sharif to invoke the example of former president Richard Nixon who after being indicted in the Watergate scandal was ultimately forced to resign was a clear hint that the president should not take his immunity under the constitution for granted.
The Supreme Court’s direction to the parliamentary committee on national security to forward all details of the memo issue to the commission which has been given a time frame of three weeks to submit its report renders the parliament’s role in probing the matter as secondary. In this context, Nawaz Sharif’s remarks at the Faisalabad rally on 20 November that the present government has rendered the parliament irrelevant and toothless assume special significance.
Perennial conspiracy theorists suspect an emerging alliance between the ubiquitous military and intelligence establishment, the courts and the opposition to undo Zardari. In hindsight, Shahbaz Sharif chanting “Go Zardari go” at the top of his voice at the Lahore rally on 28 October was not without a purpose, they contend.
There is a definite method to the madness. The PML(N) panicking in the face of Imran Khan’s meteoric rise and its own dismal performance in the Punjab now seems in a hurry to see the back of Zardari even if it means sleeping with the enemy.
Now it is well known that the ISI chief General Shuja Pasha specially flew in to London for a one-on-one with whistleblower Mansoor Ijaz on 20 October. Armed with documentary evidence provided to him by Mansoor Ijaz, he was apparently convinced of Haqqani and his backers’ role in composing and getting the memo delivered to the then US Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Mike Mullen.
The incriminating evidence coupled with Imran’s juggernaut probably induced the Sharifs to make peace with the establishment – their erstwhile nemesis. Obviously if elections were held sometimes in the end of 2012 or early 2013, this would further decimate the PML(N) in its citadel.
The PTI needs time to reorganise itself and to co-opt better candidates in its folds. It also wants younger voters which it considers its support base to register. Hence, it is the Sharifs who are in a hurry and not Imran.
Some analysts have contended that the recent NATO attack on a military checkpost in the Mohmand agency gunning down 26 Pakistani troops was a US ploy to divert attention from Memogate in order to bail out the beleaguered civilian government. The theory seems far-fetched, and even if true has not worked.
Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General Ashfaq Kayani has belatedly announced suspension of the “command and chain system” and has directed the ranks and cadres of the military to give a befitting response to any foreign aggression. We are told now that the decision was taken at a crucial meeting of the COAS with his military commanders a day after the NATO strike.
The question that begs an answer is that why was there such inordinate delay in announcing this important decision. On Tuesday, the Director General Military Operation (DGMO) Major General Ashfaq Nadeem held a high level briefing for media persons at the GHQ in the presence of the Chief of General Staff, General Waheed Arshad. This was an appropriate forum to disclose such vital information to the media.
On the contrary, responding to a volley of questions, General Nadeem admitted that a military response to an unprovoked and deliberate NATO-ISAF attack was not a choice “owing to technological disparity”. He also disclosed that the NATO-ISAF intruders violated the SOPs of coordination despite opening of all communications channels. The DGMO admitted that the scrambling of air force was possible but was deliberately not done as it would have meant “escalating the scale of the incident”.
Now we are told a different story by the ISPR. According to the latest information, a befitting response could not be given owing to breakdown of the communication system as a result of the NATO strike and was not a strategic decision as declared by the DGMO.
There is a lot of confusion surrounding this issue and this flip-flopping is not going to help dispel it. The ISPR needs to come up with a cohesive response so it can deal with the situation and all the info flying around out there. For instance, the Wall Street Journal reported that the Pakistan army had given permission to NATO to conduct operations in the border region attacked. Reports like these need to be refuted and a clear picture needs to be given, which Major General Nadeem failed to do.
Obviously, Major General Nadeem strictly sticking to his brief had its limitations. That is why in response to a barrage of questions from media persons, he gave the perfunctory response that the answer was beyond his brief. On one or two occasions, the CGS attempted to answer questions regarding lack of response from the military, but he too for obvious reasons was restrained.
Had General Kayani been present at the briefing, he could have given the correct picture. And the ISPR would not have to issue a response the day after to clear the air. Although media persons had been told that the COAS would be present to answer their questions, for some inexplicable reason he did not attend the briefing.
The writer is Editor, Pakistan Today