‘The assumption that it (Pakistan) has no choice but to obey America may turn out to be a dire strategic error.’ – Simon Tisdall in The Guardian, November 27, 2011
In the early hours of the first day of the Islamic New Year US/NATO forces struck a clearly demarcated Pakistani Checkpost in the Mohmand Agency of Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal areas. Two officers of the Pakistan Army and 22 soldiers were killed with another 13 seriously injured.
The strikes, which Pakistani officials said had involved both helicopters and fighter jets, took place at two military posts in Salala, a village in Pakistan’s Mohmand tribal region near the border with Kunar province in Afghanistan.
Commenting on the incident in The Guardian of November 27 Simon Tisdall wrote – “but Washington should treat it with deadly seriousness all the same, for this latest outrage is another fateful signpost on the road to a potential security and geostrategic disaster that may ultimately make Afghanistan look like a sideshow – since 2001, Pakistan has struggled under a plethora of imperious American demands, demarches and impositions that are at once politically indefensible and contrary to the perceived national interest …the belief that weak, impoverished, divided Pakistan has no alternative but to slavishly obey its master’s voice could turn out to be one of the seminal strategic miscalculations of the 21st century”.
Pakistan’s response to the attack on its troops came after the Army Chief had consulted and briefed senior commanders and the nations’ highest decision making body – the Defence Committee of the Cabinet (DCC) – had met and considered response options. The statement issued by the DCC on the NATO/ISAF attack on border posts, 26 November 2011 was clear and unambiguous:
“The DCC noted that strong protests had been lodged with the United States and at NATO Headquarters in Brussels conveying in the strongest possible terms Pakistan’s condemnation of these attacks which constituted breach of sovereignty, were violative of international law and had gravely dented the fundamental basis of Pakistan’s cooperation with NATO/ISAF against militancy and terror. NATO/ISAF attacks were also violative of their mandate which was confined to Afghanistan. Pakistan had clearly conveyed to US/NATO its red lines which constituted an integral element of Pakistan’s cooperation that was based on a partnership approach. The attack on Pakistan Army border posts is totally unacceptable and warrants an effective national response.
In accordance with the resolution of the Joint Session of the Parliament of 14 May 2011, the DCC decided to close with immediate effect the NATO/ISAF logistics supply lines. The DCC also decided to ask the US to vacate the Shamsi Airbase within 15 days.
The DCC decided that the government will revisit and undertake a complete review of all programmes, activities and cooperative arrangements with US/NATO, including diplomatic, political, and military and intelligence. The Prime Minister will take the Parliament into confidence on the whole range of measures regarding matters relating to Pakistan’s future cooperation with US/NATO/ISAF, in the near future.”
Pakistanis cannot help but recall earlier incidents – the attacks in September 2010, the Raymond Davis fiasco, the Osama raid, recent media articles targeting the Pakistan military and ISI and of course the most recent event now being called ‘Memogate’. Wayne Madsen, reported that “Pakistan is next on the target list of nations that will soon be feeling the military muscle of the United States… unlike other Muslim nations that have been subjected to the US military intervention, including Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, Yemen, and Libya, Pakistan’s ultimate prize for the West is its nuclear weapons arsenal…” Another media piece dubbed Pakistan the ‘ally from hell’.
Much will depend on how the US and NATO decide to proceed in this matter. There is outrage and anger in Pakistan as Pakistanis watch heart rending scenes of grief at the funerals of those killed. Pakistanis are used to burying their dead and the Pakistan military is paying a heavy price but to be killed by those you consider allies and that too in your own territory is not acceptable. Close air support, the supposed reason for the attack, is provided to extricate ground troops from an undesirable situation or to take out a high value target identified by ground troops or other means or to push forward an attack as part of a coordinated plan. You do not call for air support against small arms fire or flares assuming that there was a fire fight at all. Ground operations in the vicinity of allied or friendly forces are always coordinated in advance. Air attacks are always on clearly identified targets. Friendly fire can kill own troops in the fog of ongoing battles but not in an isolated case where the rugged terrain actually makes checkposts stand out and act as reference points – especially check posts established to control cross border movement. An investigation may lead to the answers but what has been done cannot be undone.
Spearhead Research is a private centre for research and consultancy on security, headed by Jehangir Karamat. Spearhead analyses are the result of a collaborative effort and not attributable to a single individual.