In its first formal response to the November 26 NATO-ISAF helicopters’ violation of Pakistani territory and attack on two border posts killing 24 troops and injuring another 15, the General Headquarters (GHQ) on Tuesday came up with its analysis and conclusion of the situation holding the NATO-ISAF responsible for the incident and said “all options” were under review, though Director General of Military Operations (DGMO) Major General Ishfaq Nadeem Ahmad admitted that a military response was, however, not a choice because of technological disparity.
Firming up the military position that the attack was “not unintended”, the DGMO explained to the journalists, invited for a briefing at the GHQ, the chain of events and the follow up actions he had initiated when he was informed about the attack. The analysis of the incident, the DGMO presented, suggested that the NATO-ISAF had by design violated the SOPs of coordination despite his activating all channels of communication as the helicopters had intruded into Pakistani territory and opened fire on the posts.
However, he did not share with the journalists as to what possible objective(s) the NATO-ISAF wanted to achieve and what message was wrapped for Pakistan in this “intended” attack on two border posts. But he appeared confident showing the resolve of the army that this time the political and diplomatic responses would make a difference. “We will give our input and recommendations to the government and the prime minister will make a statement,” General Ishfaq said, keeping the options Pakistan could use a secret. Chief of Army Staff General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani was expected to join the briefing and personally answer the questions but he did not come and Chief of General Staff (CGS) Lt General Waheed Arshad was present to respond, mostly off-the-record, to the questions the DGMO did not consider as falling in his domain or not to be answered for strategic reasons.
The DGMO did not agree to a question when asked as to why the air force had not been scrambled when the attack continued for about two hours and said: “Scrambling air force in a hazy and developing situation would have escalated the scale of the incident.” His contention was that scrambling air force would mean declaring war and “we can’t fight with the NATO-ISAF with technological disparity… the government (political) response is the best and it has to be a whole of government and a whole of national approach”. He mentioned the decisions taken by the Defence Committee of the Cabinet (DCC) and said the response of the government regarding vacation of Shamsi airbase was adequate. He shared with the journalists the conclusion the GHQ had reached – it was an unprovoked military aggression, it was intended and the claim that it was unintended defied military logic, the NATO-ISAF did know about the attack, all procedures of communication and coordination were violated and our troops fought and used all weapons.
Explaining the chain of events, he said the communication line with the Volcano checkpost broke down a few minutes after the attack and when the NATO-ISAF Regional Command (E) was informed about the incident, he (the DGMO) was told that the helicopters had been pulled back. “When, after knowing about the activity on Volcano post, our company commander ordered the Boulder checkpost to send reinforcement, this communication was intercepted and the helicopters again moved in and this time attacked the Boulder checkpost,” he said.
He said what made the army consider that it was an intended attack was that there were no villages in the areas of these checkposts where the militants could be suspected to have been hiding. “They (NATO-ISAF) knew that these were Pakistani checkposts and if they took the communication between the company commander and the Boulder checkpost (asking for reinforcement) as that of militants, it defied military logic as both communications could be distinguished,” he said, adding that it was also conveyed to General Allen, the commander of the RC (E), that no fire was carried out from the Pakistani side of the border and the attack was unprovoked. About a joint enquiry into this incident, the DGMO said three such incidents (June 10, 2008, September 30, 2010 and July 17, 2011) had taken place in the past and the joint enquiries remained inconclusive because of disagreement. He said the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) had gathered information about an impending attack from the Afghan side and it was conveyed to the NATO-ISAF but they did not share any information with Pakistan.
Admitting that it was a “marginal” violation of Pakistan’s territory, the DGMO, however, did not commit that the air force would be scrambled in case such an incident again took place but said: “The response did not lie in military domain.” This suggested that any decision to intercept the violation of the country’s territory from the western side had to be a political one.
“The positions of the posts were already conveyed to the ISAF through map references,” he said, adding that the area where the attacks were carried out was already cleared of the militants by Pakistani forces and there was not any cross-border movement of terrorists from Pakistan to Afghan territory. He said army deployment on the western border was not against the NATO-ISAF rather it was against the militants.