Foreign friends?

External input has been a factor for far too long

Pakistan’s politics drifts from crisis to crisis. The federal government continuously embroils itself into crises on a more or less regular basis; one crisis is hardly over when it stumbles into another one. One of the latest crises is the Memo episode that can be described as a self-inflicted injury by an ill-advised and adventurist handling of a domestic political issue. The federal government’s self-articulated paranoia of being pushed out of power by the military and the desire to use of external linkages for protecting its power interests have pushed it into an embarrassing situation. This has provided the PML(N) yet another reason to continue with its campaign to pull down the federal government and oust President Asif Ali Zardari.

While the civilian government and the military/intelligence establishment are investigating the matter to separate facts from fiction, some political leaders have accused the federal government of high treason by making definite offers to retrench the military’s role to American satisfaction in return for American support for the power interests of the PPP.

However, a review of Pakistan’s political history shows that in the past the government or other political parties have sought external support to fulfill their domestic or foreign policy agendas beyond their domestic capacity.

When politics becomes a desperate struggle for power, the competing players do not mind seeking external support to override the domestic political adversary. Military and economic assistance from other states makes the recipient state vulnerable to the influence of the donor state. At times, other leaders or states manifest varying degrees of interest in Pakistan and they use their diplomatic clout or personal contacts to help Pakistan to deal with a difficult domestic situation.

The input from other states or leaders has played a role in Pakistan’s domestic politics. It has influenced policy choices but these inputs or support are ‘one’ factor rather than the sole determinant of policy. Foreign input does not always work. The designation of foreign entity making the input as friend or devil depends on the interests of the domestic players. When the interests of some domestic player are served the foreign input is described as a friendly gesture. Others view this as a blatant intervention in domestic affairs.

In Pakistan, there are numerous instances of foreign input to policy making or exploration of external support for pursuing a domestic politics or foreign policy agenda. In 1954-55, Pakistan joined the US-sponsored regional alliance system and strengthened its bilateral security ties with the United States in order to obtain weapons and economic assistance to contest India. Pakistan was not motivated by a strong desire to fight the Soviet Union or Communism. It was promoting its domestic and foreign policy agenda with external support because it did not have enough domestic resources to withstand military and economic pressures from India. The US exercised reasonable diplomatic clout over Pakistan during the heydays of this relationship.

In early October 1958, President Iskander Mirza informed the US ambassador to Pakistan that he would assume all powers on October 8 by scrapping the constitution. The joint Iskander Mirza-Ayub Khan military coup took place one-day ahead ie, October 7, 1958. The US administration endorsed the assumption of power by the military within four days through a letter from President Eisenhower. On October 23, US Defence Secretary came to Karachi to reiterate American support.

The instances of looking towards foreign allies for help are many, although these hopes did not always materialise. In the last phase of the India-Pakistan War, December 1971, the military regime of General Yahya khan waited in vain for the American 7th Fleet to come to the Bay of Bengal to rescue Pakistan from the extremely difficult military situation in what was then East Pakistan. Pakistan’s official circles were also disappointed because the Chinese did not make any military move on Sino-Indian border to ease Indian military pressure on Pakistan.

The discreet role of other states can be seen in many difficult situations in Pakistan. In May-June 1977, the ambassadors of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Libya and the UAE attempted to moderate the political conflict between Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and the opposition alliance, the PNA. Their intervention contributed to the resumption of the dialogue between the two sides but General Zia-ul-Haq removed the Bhutto government on July 5 before the protracted dialogue could produce some credible political understanding.

The military government of General Zia-ul-Haq got a lease of long life when it joined hands with the US and other Western states to challenge Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan (1979-1989). General Pervez Musharraf’s military government obtained economic, military and diplomatic support from the US and other Western countries by joining their effort in September 2001 to eliminate terrorism sponsored or supported by the Al-Qaeda and the Taliban based in Afghanistan. These military regimes would not have lasted for such a long period without external support.

During the period of civilian rule (1988-1999), Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif often cultivated American ambassador in Islamabad whenever the rumors of dismissal of the government circulated in Islamabad.

Nawaz Sharif travelled to Washington for a special meeting with President Clinton on July 4, 1999, for seeking his support for bringing an end to the Kargil War (May-July 1999). He agreed to a withdrawal of troops without getting a commitment from India for ceasefire. (India was not represented in the Sharif-Clinton meeting).

Towards the end of September 1999, Shahbaz Sharif visited Washington to solicit support for the elected government of Nawaz Shairf against the possibility of a military takeover. The US administration issued a statement in support of the civilian government and against military intervention. However, this did not avert the October 12 coup by the Army led by General Pervez Musharraf.

It is also well-known that the departure of Nawaz Sharif and Shahbaz Sharif and their families in December 2000 for Saudi Arabia after Nawaz Sharif’s conviction in the “hijacking” case was facilitated by the Saudi royal family and Saad Harrari, a former prime minister of Lebanon.

The habit of seeking external support for coping with internal problem and the role of external states or leaders in Pakistan’s internal affairs has come in the open in a very dramatic manner by the Memo issue.

If the federal government and the major opposition parties continue to pursue a “now-or-never” political struggle against each other and cannot put their economic and political house in order, the military will stay powerful and external input will continue to be a factor in domestic politics.

The writer is an independent political and defence analyst.