Troubled, to say the least
Harmonious civil-military interaction holds the key to political stability in Pakistan. The civilian government has always found it difficult to keep a balance between the imperatives of democratic politics and the need of keeping the top brass of the military satisfied and happy. The civilian government has to pursue its political agenda in a manner that the generals are not alienated.
The domain of interaction between the civil and the military can be divided into three broad categories. First, there are policy areas that are of no interest to the military. These include the day-to-day administrative and civilian management affairs that do not impinge on military’s interest. Second, the shared decision making on foreign policy and security issues, defence budget and the military’s perks and privileges and related matters. Any unilateral decision making by the civilian government on these issues causes resentment in the military. They are, however, open to dialogue on these issues and accommodate the civilians. Third, the military top brass resist any civilian interference in their internal service affairs, discipline, promotions, posting and transfers, military intelligence services and disbursement of defence budget and their economic and business interests. This is a flexible relationship that varies from issue to issue and also depends on the political and societal context of the issue under consideration.
The present civilian government made amateurish attempt in 2008 to place the ISI under the interior ministry. Within hours, this decision was reversed. In 2009, President Zardari made an offer of no-first use of nuclear weapons to India in total disregard to the shared civilian-military decision of not committing on this issue. Zardari was unable to follow-up on his statement.
The civil-military relations stabilised as the two sides adopted accommodative disposition towards each other. Gradually, the military top command and the ISI took virtual control of Pakistan’s foreign policy towards India, Afghanistan and the United States as well as the operational side of countering terrorism. The military already enjoyed primacy in the nuclear policy. However, the military needed civilian leadership because it wanted the civilian government to own and support its efforts to counter terrorism protect Pakistan’s interests at the global level.
It appears strange that at a time when the federal government faces a difficult internal political situation and the economy is faltering, it could risk adventurism in its relations with the military. The military top brass took a strong exception to the reports that the presidency indirectly sought the support of the US military top command for dissuading the Pakistan military from staging a coup in the immediate aftermath of the killing of Osama bin Laden in the raid by American security personnel in Abbottabad on May 2, 2011. What perturbed the military most were the proposals in the memo for curbing the role of the military and regulating its counter terrorism role.
To register their resentment, the army and the navy chiefs did not attend the president’s dinner in honour of the visiting President of Turkmenistan (The air force chief and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff committee were out of the country) on November 14. The army chief held a meeting with the President on November 15. The army chief met with both president and the prime minister of November 16.
The president and the federal government are expected to adopt some corrective administrative measures. However, the military’s distrust of the civilian federal government, especially the presidency, is likely to persist. This will have negative ramifications for the civilian government and democracy in the long run. In order to pacify the top brass the civilian government may have to yield more space to the military that will further reduce the former’s role in foreign policy and security domains. There was no likelihood of military takeover after the Abbottabad raid. The raid exposed the weakness of the air force and the army because they could not make any military move while American helicopters stayed in Pakistan’s airspace for over an hour and the raid was conducted in the vicinity of army installations. The military was busy in damage control. At that time the military needed the support of the civilian government which was available. One wonders why some senior civilian leaders dreaded a coup?
It is not clear that the proposals for controlling the military and revamping the security and counter-terrorism arrangements in the memo were the brainchild of Mansoor Ijaz, known for shrewd manipulation or were partly or totally suggested by the Pakistani diplomat in question. Though it would be difficult to link these proposals directly to the president, the episode is an embarrassment for the Pakistani government and the president.
Any person who understands the dynamics of civil-military relations in Pakistan knows that the present federal government cannot implement any of the offers projected in the memo to control the military.
The military top brass are perturbed but they are not expected to remove the federal government because the direct assumption of power does not appear to be on their agenda, although they jealously guard their professional and corporate interests from the sidelines. The direct assumption of power exposes them to a lot of opposition within and outside Pakistan. Further, the military is committed to counter-terrorism that requires civilian support rather than overwhelming civilian political order.
The memo issue has got entangled into Pakistan’s highly partisan politics, reducing the prospects of a dispassionate and professional investigation of the issue. The political parties opposed to the PPP are using this incident as yet another opportunity to pull down the government.
The PML(N) pursues contradictory policies. On the one hand, it wants to knock out the federal government and President Zardari and it is now using the memo issue to accuse the key officials of high treason. On the other hand, it wants to control the role of generals in politics. How can the military be contained if the political forces are divided and have declared war on each other?
No civilian government can assert its role over the military through political adventurism or by seeking external support. It needs to put its economic and political house in order to create a credible civilian alternative to military rule that enjoys widespread popular support.
Civilian primacy cannot be guaranteed without changing Pakistan’s internal and external security profile, ensuring peace in and around Pakistan, and strengthening of the civilian order by political coherence, economic rehabilitation and popular legitimacy.
The writer is an independent political and defence analyst.