Most of the grievous ills that Pakistan faces today are the outcome of its disastrous Afghan policy. These include attacks by terrorist networks, the consequent instability and its devastating impact on the economy and people’s livelihood.
Despite an element of hostility prevailing between Afghanistan and Pakistan since 1947, overtures were made by the Shah of Iran in mid 1970’s to normalise relations between the two countries. The attempts were however overtaken by three cataclysmic events that closely followed one another. Bhutto was removed by Zia-ul-Haq in a military coup in 1977, followed by the assassination of President Daud Khan as a result of the Saur revolution in 1978 and the overthrow of the Shah of Iran by Ayatollah Khominei in 1979.
Soon after the Saur revolutionaries took control of Afghanistan, Zia-ul-Haq started to look for an opportunity for intervention in the neighbouring country. An excuse was invented for the action he was meditating. It was maintained that the Soviet Union planned to attack Pakistan next. As later events proved, the communist state was already facing insurmountable domestic problems. By the late 1970s it had turned into a giant with clay feet. The Soviet state which was on way to implode was in no position to attack Pakistan.
The best way was to let the Afghan people deal with the situation that they faced. In the absence of outside interference, the Soviet troops could have helped the Afghans to bring the situation gradually under control. The local resistance would have forced the government to modify some of its unpopular policies. Thus, Afghanistan could have started the journey towards becoming a modern and secular country.
This however did not suit Zia-ul-Haq. Having overthrown an elected government, he was badly in need of bringing the military regime out of the isolation it faced. Only acting as America’s pawn in the region could do the job. He persuaded the US to assist him in organising and training religious zealots from all over the world and letting them loose on the Soviet and Afghan troops. The plan suited the US also. As the Carter Administration’s National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski put it, the policy would drag the Soviet Union into the “Afghan trap”. On July 3, 1979, President Jimmy Carter signed the first directive for secret aid to the opponents of the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul.
As a result of Zia-ul-Haq’s Afghan policy, millions of Afghan refugees poured into Pakistan. They brought all types of lethal weapons with them. Heroin coming from the factories set up inside Afghanistan to finance the ‘jihad’ gutted the Pakistani market before it spread to the rest of the world. To summarise, the policy had disastrous consequences for Pakistani society. Attempts to extricate Pakistan from Afghanistan by Mohammad Khan Junejo led to his dismissal in 1988.
With the end of the Cold War, every country in the world with the exception of Pakistan undertook a re-evaluation of its foreign policy. There was a consensus now that the best way to have a friendly government in the neighbourhood was through a policy of peace and economic and trade ties based on the principle of mutual benefit. What the military establishment now wanted was strategic depth in Afghanistan rather than ordinary friendly relations. The goal could only be achieved by installing a government in Kabul fully under the control of the security agencies.
Finally concluding that none among the present ‘jihadi’ groups was willing to act as a complete stooge, a decision was made to launch a brand new group comprising madrassah students from Pakistan. This led to the creation of the Taliban who were provided tactical help to occupy Kabul. As the US had withdrawn from the region, billions of rupees of tax payers’ money was spent on training, equipping and launching the new band of ruthless killers. Meanwhile, a new dimension was added to the policy. Terrorist camps were set up to train jihadis to be launched in Kashmir.
The US remained unconcerned about what was happening in Afghanistan till Al-Qaeda started hurting it. After Nine Eleven, the US could tolerate the organisation which had set up headquarters in Afghanistan no longer. This led to the “with us or with them” ultimatum. Thanks to its Afghan policy, Pakistan stood isolated in the world community.
After Nine Eleven, a new turn was given to the policy on terrorism. Musharraf launched a full fledged attack on the Al-Qaeda in Pakistan, arresting scores of its top leaders and important functionaries. Contacts were however retained with the Afghan Taliban leadership which were treated as a strategic asset. The Haqqanis in particular were allowed to use sanctuaries in North Waziristan.
No action was taken against local terrorists till some of them launched attacks to kill Musharraf. Even when action was taken subsequently, it remained fully targeted on the concerned groups. The terrorist organisations banned under international pressure but considered useful in Indian Occupied Kahmir were allowed to work under different names. Some of the banned groups subsequently trained their guns on their erstwhile motivators and financiers besides launching attacks on innocent civilians.
And now the moral. Use of terrorism as a foreign policy instrument has harmed Pakistan more than anyone else. The terrorists have killed thousands of innocent Pakistanis and ruined its economy. They have killed more Pakistani troops than Indian soldiers. What is more, they have estranged neighbours that include not only Afghanistan and India but also China and Iran. A time has come when a foreign policy should be formulated by the civilian government rather than the security establishment.
The writer is a former academic and a political analyst.