There has always been a debate in Pakistan, and at international forums, about keeping and financing a bigger army in Pakistan, which the time has proved, in real terms, a strategic asset of the country vis a vis nuclear deterrence. The Musharraf administration cut its size and since then, despite the need of adding more troops up to corps level, no extra recruitments have been made. The deployments were made only after thinning out troops from the crucially volatile eastern border where the threat of Indian assault has always remained.
Every country tactically keeps its reserve troops at striking positions, but Pakistan, keeping the financial constraints in mind, has not filled the gaps created by huge deployment of over one hundred thousand troops along its western borders.
This was what the military establishment perhaps contributed to the national exchequer – Gen Kayani claims to have refused using the funds which were given to Pakistan under the Kerry-Lugar bill and asked the government to divert it to the public development. The over 70 billion dollars expenditures Pakistan so far suffered in the war against terror were never compensated by the allied countries.
But look at the size and number of troops Kabul has resorted to induct in the Afghan National Army, Afghan National Police and Afghan intelligence agency RAAM.
The number of all three has now reached 300,000 with only 2% Afghan Pashtun representation. In addition to that, Afghanistan is reportedly raising another 350,000 army, besides four lashkars of locals (50,000 each) and the process of their recruitment, induction and training has already been started, mostly in collaboration with their Indian counterparts.
It is startling to know that a separate corps containing 80,000 troops had been raised in India during the last five years, which has reportedly been imparted training by the British and Israeli instructors near the Nepal borders and deployed in four phases in Afghanistan. These troops are either in uniform or in plain clothes working at different tasks, including the training of Fazlullah-like Pakistan’s most wanted terrorist leaders, who have been provided safe havens in Kunar, right under the nose of NATO and ISAF, Kabul and governor of Kunar province.
The idea is that the Americans would not directly attack on ground, instead the anti-Qaddafi squads-like trained armed men would make incursions into the Pakistan territory and the TTP would join them in case Pakistan does not bow to the pressure.
The question is why Afghanistan, which is not able to properly feed its people, which has no security stake in the presence of NATO-ISAF-Indian troops, has opted to keep such a bigger number of troops and for what when the war is within the country and not with any neighbouring country? It is feared that this would be used against Pakistan and at later stage against Iran.
The question is: Is the US idea of Afghan National Army economically sustainable?
ESCHMALL SARDAR
Peshawar