Pak-US stand-off

The belief that a close relationship with the US automatically assures a strong international standing for Pakistan has been a dominant and abiding theme of our foreign policy. Accrual of substantial benefits during such periods conditioned this outlook.

In the ’50s when we chose to side with the West in its ideological conflict with the Soviet Union, Pakistan received considerable American assistance which was used wisely to bolster its defences and to embark on a path of planned industrial development which became the envy of the developing world. In those heady days, Pakistan occupied a place of respect in the comity of nations and was hailed as a model third world country. The fact that states like South Korea drew inspiration from the Pakistani experience looks incredulous when squared against the current state of development of the two countries.

The Indo-China border conflict of 1962 in which the US extended unconditional support to India, including military assistance, oblivious to Pakistan’s sensitivities, followed by suspension of all military aid in the wake of the 1965 war awakened this country’s leadership to the limits of the relationship. Pioneered by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Pakistan embarked upon a sustained process of normalisation and strengthening of ties with China which is today regarded as an “all weather friend” This wise correction in policy did not, however, subdue the quest for a strategic relationship with the United States, understandably so, given the latter’s formidable military and economic strength.

Another opportunity presented itself in the ’80 when the two countries joined hands to confront the Soviet menace arising from its occupation of Afghanistan. The several questions raised today over the merit of our involvement in that conflict overlook the prevailing consensus that the Soviet invasion represented the first leg of a pincer advance through Pakistan to the warm waters of the Persian Gulf, a historic Russian strategic objective. Pakistan once again basked in the glory of international acclaim even when, internally, it was being visibly transformed into a regressive state. Consequently, the belief that being in America’s good books constituted the ultimate test of diplomatic success gained wider currency amongst our policy makers.

Once the task of ousting the Soviets from Afghanistan was accomplished, the Americans, consistent with their penchant for declaring quick victories, packed and left, leaving us to pick up the pieces of which we were, as subsequent events proved, quite incapable. What followed, Pressler et al, is too well known to require repetition but the tangible outcome of this estrangement was another steep fall in our international standing. Whether by default or design, stemming probably from our own behavior, the international community, barring a handful of close friends with whom we shared common interests, tended to measure our worth through the US prism.

Pakistan regained its stature and relevance on the world stage when it agreed to join the so-called war on terror in September 2001. Largely ignored till then Islamabad became a must stop for world leaders. I was in Brussels at the time engaged in a laborious effort to gain a few concessions from the European Union for our exports. The negotiations were going nowhere. The bilateral dialogue between Pakistan and the Union had been downgraded to the Additional Secretary level.

Suddenly the picture changed completely. Within days of our decision to participate in the US-led coalition, the troika Prime Ministers along with the President of the European Commission visited Islamabad to pledge support. In a landmark decision Pakistan was given GSP Plus trade concessions, the first ever to a non-LDC country. The Paris Club restructured our debts providing substantial relief to our beleaguered economy. Based on numerous interactions with EU officials one has not the slightest doubt of the US authorship of these dividends. In fact, the then FM of a European country had acknowledged that Colin Powell “is breathing down our necks to help Pakistan.”

During the previous two occasions the Pak-US partnership had largely succeeded in realising the declared objectives before the break occurred. In the ’50s, our alliance with the US had helped contain Soviet power while in the ’80s it was instrumental in forcing Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. In the present instance, the partnership seems to be falling apart much before achieving its goals.

In the US perspective the solution seems to lie not merely in the destruction of Al-Qaeda but also the decimation and subjugation of its supposed ally, the Taliban, and their exclusion from the future power structure in Afghanistan. For us this would translate into a state of chronic instability with its inevitable fallout on our territory while we are still struggling to recover from the debilitating impact of the first Afghan engagement (assuming that strategic depth is no longer in the reckoning).

The premature falling out between US and Pakistan midway through a joint enterprise represents a stark deviation from the past pattern which makes it so dangerous and its consequences unpredictable. What lessons should Pakistan draw from this occurrence will be discussed next week.

The writer is Pakistan’s former Ambassador to the United Nations and European Union. He can be contacted at [email protected]