The political tension between Pakistan and the United States is now easing because both sides have realised that they need to talk to each other through diplomatic channels on the contentious issues. The US has toned down its blame discourse and Pakistan has become more active at the diplomatic level. However, the scars caused by American public denunciation of Pakistan and Pakistan’s refusal to accept US interpretation of the terrorist attack in Kabul in September 2011 will not be easily removed.
Each side was blowing its trumpet without bothering to know how far its tune is being appreciated by the other side. The US campaign of Pakistan’s alleged connections with the Haqqani group did not convince Pakistan to reformulate its counter-terrorism strategies to US satisfaction. Pakistan responded by recounting its contribution for countering terrorism in the region and its human and material losses since September 2001. The US was not impressed by the Pakistani narrative.
The reason for the poor communication between Pakistan and the US is the inability of their top leaders to address each other’s concerns and problems. The US leadership refused to recognise the peculiar problems and concerns of Pakistan with reference to terrorism-related issues in the tribal areas, from across the Afghan border and in mainland Pakistan. The US insisted only on military action by Pakistan against the Haqqani group in North Waziristan. Pakistan’s civilian and military leaders were unable or unwilling to tackle the charge that Pakistan is a “safe-haven” for some terrorist groups and it pursues a selective approach for countering terrorism. They preferred to talk about their contribution to countering terrorism in the past.
One negative fallout of American propaganda against Pakistan is that India came out with criticism about Pakistan’s alleged ties with militant groups, although India did not insist on this issue. The Afghanistan government was more blunt and non-diplomatic in blaming Pakistan for the increased Taliban activity in Afghanistan. President Hamid Karzai directly accused Pakistan of sponsoring and controlling the Taliban that threaten Afghanistan. Its high officials claimed that the plan to kill Burhanuddin Rabbani was prepared by the Taliban in Quetta.
During the days of Musharraf, the Afghan government, including Hamid Karzai, campaigned against Pakistan. Later, the Afghan government moderated its stand and worked to improve relations with Pakistan. Now, encouraged by American tirade, the Afghan government returned to its old strategy of blaming Pakistan for its internal failures.
The problem with Afghan presidency and the Kabul government is that both are heavily dominated by Tajik and Uzbek (minority ethnic groups) and the Pashtuns that constitute almost half of Afghanistan’s population are underrepresented in all institutions of the state. The Tajik and Uzbek officials are opposed to a meaningful dialogue with the Taliban because any accommodation with the Taliban i.e. the Pashtuns will reduce Tajik and Uzbek domination of the power structure in Kabul. They are not therefore enthusiastic about accommodation with the Taliban. They would like to revive trouble with Pakistan so that attention shifts from dialogue to problems with Pakistan.
Blaming Pakistan for some trouble in Afghanistan could have been a credible charge if the Kabul government had a firm control of Afghanistan. But it is well-known that the Afghan government faces strong resistance from the Afghan Taliban that control several districts. Their power and confidence is on the rise as the Americans leave Afghanistan. All this cannot be blamed on Pakistan. The domestic sources of the Taliban challenges must be recognised by the Kabul government.
If extremism and terrorism is to be tacked in the region, Afghanistan, Pakistan and the US will have to work together. There is a need to take a holistic view of cross-border movement of the Taliban and other groups. This movement is two-way. If Afghanistan faces threats from the groups coming from Pakistani tribal areas, Pakistan’s security checkposts on the border and adjoining villages are attacked by the Taliban from Afghanistan.
It should be clear by now that unilateralism or public denunciation will not force Pakistan to engage in countering terrorism as demanded by Afghanistan and the US. They will have to work together to accommodate each other’s concerns. Pakistan is no less threatened by terrorism than Afghanistan. Looking at the recent Afghan and American statements, they do not seem to attach any importance to Pakistan’s security concerns. Rather they view Pakistan as a source of terrorism.
While hot and cold exchanges continue between Pakistan on the one hand and the US and Afghanistan on the other, Pakistan should undertake non-emotional and professional analysis of the future direction of extremism and terrorism in the region and its implications for Pakistani state and society ten years down the road. The underlying assumption is that most terrorist groups would continue with their violent activities even after the exit of the US. These groups are motivated by power agenda and narrow literalist vision of Islam combined with tribal traditions.
The Pakistan military has been in the tribal areas since 2003 and it has been conducting regular security operations since 2009. However, with the exception of South Waziristan, no tribal agency is fully under its control. In Kurram, despite various attempts, the security forces are unable to ensure security on the road linking this agency with Peshawar.
The key question is if the stalemate in the tribal areas represents the military’s incapacity to dislodge the Taliban and other militant groups or is it a policy of keeping pressure on the militants but not overwhelming them completely? If the latter is true, what are the goals of letting the militant groups survive?
Pakistan has up to the end 2014 to take full control of all tribal areas. Once US/NATO troops leave and there is internal strife in Afghanistan, Pakistani Taliban and other groups will join hands with their Afghan counterparts to fight the Kabul government. Pakistan will lose tribal areas completely to militancy that will also embolden their allied militant groups in mainland Pakistan.
If Pakistan wants to insulate itself from the negative fallout of post-2014 strife in Afghanistan rather than become a party to it, its security establishment must first establish its primacy in the tribal areas. It will have to prove that it can bring all groups and areas under its effective fold rather than tolerating them with the hope that some militant groups will play Pakistan’s game when it is free-for-all in Afghanistan.
The writer is an independent political and defence analyst.
Professor Askari’s analysis well taken, it is my understanding that things got out of hand in the heat of blame-game. Either side did not carefully evaluate the pros and cons of such fallout. Foreign-policy making and handling sensitive issues is a complicated task and requires cooperation, and understanding of each other’s point of view, and rational calculations. Second, it also appears that the Pakistan’s Foreign Office or the State Department was not in the loop and the matters were being handled by the military’s top brass on both sides. Both sides should have carefully evaluated this role of the people in uniform. The militaries are not trained to conduct diplomatic business but to handle the matters in the battlefield through tactical maneuvers. Art of diplomacy and battlefield tactics are all together different things and employ different language and infrastructures.
The last point raised by Professor Askari, though well explained, is more complicated. Yes! it will be quite a task to handle the affairs in the post 2014 period. The Pakistan military is already thinly spread-out and fatigued given such a long deployment and also in the most hostile environment and difficult terrain. Adding to this long deployment are the fiscal worries and fiscal missteps by Islamabad and strategic partnership of Afghanistan and India. On the whole the author did an excellent job explaining the current scenario and forecast for tomorrow, though social scientist are not trained to make prediction or policy prescriptions other than a few normative suggestions
Instead of trying to re invent the wheel, why can't Pakistan stop using terror outfits as its peoxies? Everything revolves around it. Pakistan leadership thinks that it can do anything and get away with it with denials. Each and every allegations has taken its toll and Pakistan's image takes a beating. Many Pakistanis dont want to know that Afgans dread Pakistanis as much as they hate the Americans. Pakistanis take it for granted that Afganistan is their own backyard and they own it and under influence of this notion Pakistan is committing blunders. It is time for Pakistan to leave Afagnistan alone and respect its sovreingty. Relationship between countries are not necessarily the Master-slave relations like Pakistan has with US or China.
Professor Hassan Askari's analysis on post 2014 truly alarming. Pakistan's military establishment must take this into account and take effective steps to worrying about others. Pakistan need just think about its own national interests. The military and civil government should take effective measures in countering terrorism by any means and the national interests must be protected through by the national institutions not through any extremist organization or group. The military establishment must eliminate extremism and terrorism in all respect!
Professor has broadly described the situation after recent pressure tactics of US onto Pakistan with the option left with Pakistan to deal the situation i.e. to legitimize all of our tribal areas by bringing them in the strong control of our security forces, but he didnt gave a holistic view of the current situation in which Pakistan keep a hand on Taliban and invites US to negotiate with them through it, and even after US withdrawl, Pakistan has to bang on Taliban for securing its strategic interests in Afghanistan. So, this all makes the situation a bit complex. In my view point, instead of bringing FATA into firm military or govt control, Pakistan shoud imediately start negotiations with the insurgents, as it was declared in APC as well, although we have to differentiate between good and bad insurgents at the moment, however, by giving tribal elders the control of their agencies, we can head towards a peaceful and secure FATA with much of the concentration then left for the post US game in Afghanistan.
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