In the immediate wake of Admiral Mullen’s blistering comments against Pakistan, most analysts (particularly in the electronic media) had made dire predictions of the imminence of punitive American reprisals in North Waziristan. In my last article on September 28, I had avoided a definitive answer as the complexity of the situation argued against a categorical conclusion.
Subsequently, in light of Pakistan’s firm reaction ruling out armed action against the Haqqanis, the Obama Administration backed off. The American President attributed Mullen’s outburst to his deep sense of frustration over his failure to persuade his Pakistani counterpart to act against the network rather than to hard evidence. Other voices in the administration also downplayed the possibility of military confrontation with Pakistan while praising its contribution in decimating Al-Qaeda. Reportedly assurances in regard to the continuation of the civilian component of the package, $1 billion for this financial year, have also been received from American officials.
Can it now be safely assumed that the storm has passed and that statecraft will henceforth be the dominant tool for exploring a way out of the Afghan quagmire?
One would answer in the same vein as one did to the question posed last week: it is too early to reach a definite conclusion. An attempt to objectively analyse the situation offers the only permissible option.
It would be unwise to assume that United States’ strategic objectives in the region have changed in the light of the outcome of the recent standoff. Long term goals of great powers are not affected by tactical setbacks. To believe that Admiral Mullen made such severe remarks against a crucial partner on the most daunting foreign policy issue facing his country, entirely on his own, requires a leap of faith which is alien to the business of diplomacy. One would tend to read in Mullen’s statement a calculated attempt to test Pakistan’s resolve. When this approach ran into a wall of national unity the context of the statement was conveniently changed. The fact that the Admiral lost a lot of face was inconsequential since he was on the verge of retirement. Making a scapegoat of an outgoing official is an acceptable tool of the trade.
While distancing himself from Mullen’s remarks, White House spokesman Jay Carney did not disown the message these contained. Replying to a question he said “The administration’s view is that the continuing safe havens that the Haqqani network enjoys in Pakistan and the links between the Pakistani military and the network are troubling and we want action taken against them.” In his radio address, a few days later, President Obama repeated this warning.
Ambassador Grossman will be in Pakistan soon. The scene will shift from public bluster to closed door deliberations but the message apparently will not change namely that the Haqqanis represent a dire threat to peace in Afghanistan and that it is in the common interest of both countries to act against them.
For the last several years, the people of this country have lived in mortal fear of the suicide bomber. The Haqqanis are Afghans and will one day return to their country. Their interest lies in carving out a niche for themselves in the future power structures of Afghanistan. Why provoke them to turn their guns at us to wreak further havoc on an already pulverised nation? Is the current brigade of suicide bombers not enough as to require the addition of another contingent of a deadlier variety?
The United States has a legitimate interest in ensuring that pursuant to its departure Afghanistan does not become a breeding ground for international terrorism. This need not necessarily have to be achieved by killing every Afghan who resists the occupation of his homeland. Pakistan is equally within its right to demand that a regime intrinsically hostile to its interests should not be handed power to the exclusion of other Afghan groups. The answer clearly lies in negotiating a dispensation which is broadly representative of all segments of the Afghan nation. A coalition of disparate groups each counterbalancing the other offers the sole hope of bringing some stability to that country.
Meanwhile, Pakistan should use whatever influence it has to restrain armed groups from attacking American and ISAF personnel from hideouts within its territory. This restraint should be reciprocated from the Afghan side.
This would not be a neat and clean solution. A country that has suffered 30 years of continuous conflict does not offer easy solutions .Imperfections are bound to arise but the effort should not be disallowed for this reason alone.
The central assumption of this proposition is that after having seen the failure of war all sides will genuinely cooperate to achieve a stable Afghanistan which is able to manage its affairs with a measure of independence. However, if that country is seen either as the pivot of a new imperial project or as the hinterland for strategic depth, the Af-Pak region should brace itself for a prolonged period of disruption and conflict.
The writer is Pakistan’s former Ambassador to the United Nations and European Union. He can be contacted at [email protected]
