To understand the current predicament the US-Pakistan relations is in, the evolution of the US Af-Pak strategy since President Obama took office needs to be reviewed. Obama’s assessment of the US Afghan policy went through a metamorphosis of sorts and ended up being an evaluation of the entire US foreign policy. At the time it was assumed that the new policy would break from the Bush era focus on a primarily kinetic approach, and tilt more toward a diplomatic surge and a search for political solutions based on a regional emphasis.
The challenges in formulating the Af-Pak policy revolved around:
• Is the coalition mustering a counter-insurgency (COIN) or counter-terrorist campaign in the region?
• Is the goal to eradicate Al-Qaeda only or the Taliban and other jihadist groups (LeT) in the region as well?
• If safe havens in the tribal areas of Pakistan are eliminated, will that change the situation in Afghanistan and if so, at what cost?
• What can and cannot be achieved in the short and long-term by altering the regional balance of power?
The strategy that finally emerged represented the competing institutional influences that shape American foreign policy. Obama had to balance domestic economic realities with the perception of appearing weak on national security threats, a leverage he did not want to offer to the Republican Party. Additionally, he also wanted to fulfill his campaign promises of pulling troops out of Iraq and focusing on Afghanistan. Specifically, the new strategy opted for sending 30,000 more troops while setting a timeline for an exit to begin by July 2011.
At the time of the unveiling of the new policy, in December 2009 PoliTact noted:
“One could say that the President is attempting a phased approach designed to bring about a dramatic change in the region. More specifically his policy involves the following:
• Give the military what it needs now, setting the stage for an adjustment, if necessary; if this policy doesn’t work, the administration will change course.
• Sending more troops is largely symbolic. The real emphasis focuses on diplomacy to persuade Pakistan and Afghanistan to get serious about extremists. This will help the US develop a position of strength for any subsequent peace negotiations. However, which group of extremists to target other than Al-Qaeda (the Afghan Taliban, the Pakistan Taliban, the Kashmiri jihadists, or the Haqqani network) is an issue which complicates the position of the various stakeholders, and which also fails to fully take into account the role that regional tussles involving Iran, Saudi Arabia and India, play in the Afghan war.”
Tensions between political and military strategies for the Afghan conflict have continued and have also bedeviled the US, Pakistan and Afghanistan relations. The focus of the reconciliation process was initially to isolate Al-Qaeda from its supporting network amid questions of how this can best be achieved: through the use of force or a political approach. The civilian causalities caused by the drone attacks in FATA and nightly Special Forces raids in Afghanistan have been a constant source of irritation.
As the nascent political reconciliation began to unfold, Pakistan and Afghanistan complained that they were being kept out of the loop. When the two countries appeared to work out things bilaterally, the concern on the US side rose. Then came the accusation that Pakistan was trying to sabotage the peace talks because it felt it was being short-changed, especially as it relates to Pakistan’s strategic interests in Afghanistan vis-à-vis India.
The major frustration between Pakistan and the US at this stage boils down to whether the Afghan conflict will require a predominately military or a political solution, and Pakistan’s role in either scenario. The country has protested recently that although the US is pushing for political reconciliation in Afghanistan, it wants military operations on Pakistan’s side.
From the American perspective, the recent high profile attacks in Kabul and the assassination of senior political personalities, such as Burhanuddin Rabbani, creates the damning perception that the Af-Pak strategy has failed to secure the country and lead it towards a credible peace process. In other words, the conditions are not ripe for the US to exit, or to leave the country in the hands of trained Afghan Security Forces. The reason for this, according to US and NATO, is that Pakistan has been unsuccessful in eliminating safe havens in FATA and in North Waziristan, and has supported groups such as Haqqani network. On the other hand, Pakistan disagrees and claims that as long as Afghanistan remains unstable, FATA will follow suit, and it cannot perpetually conduct military operations while creating many new enemies.
Nonetheless, the death of Osama bin Laden and other head honchos recently, including Anwal al-Awlaki in Yemen, are the examples of success stories. Former Saudi intelligence chief, Prince Turki al-Faisal recently commented that President Obama should have used Osama’s death as an opportunity. Speaking at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) early this month, he stated, “It would have been the perfect moment to declare victory and withdraw from Afghanistan … and not to continue with this endless fight.”
The degree of connection and cooperation between Al-Qaeda and other organisations such as the Haqqani network and Quetta Shurra, remain hot research topics at prominent think tanks. However, by continuing the military approach against these groups, US risks mission creep that can cause further fissures between US and its allies while rendering a fatal blow to the budding peace process. This is perhaps what Hina Rabbani Khar inferred to in her UN address when she stated that the clarity on the (American) strategic roadmap would not only increase operational coherence but would assist achieving the shared objectives between US and Pakistan.
The writer is the chief analyst for PoliTact (www.PoliTact.com and http:twitter.com/politact) and can be reached at aansar@politact.com.