Haqqani killed Rabbani?

What is a wicked problem? This is how it goes: A wicked problem is very difficult or almost impossible to solve because it frustrates policymakers by presenting contradictory and changing requirements. It involves complex interdependencies: tackling one aspect of the problem can create others. Add to that the fact that information will always be incomplete and a wicked problem becomes a problem from hell.

What challenges does it throw up for solvers? One, no course of action can be based on a definitive formulation because a wicked problem successfully eludes one; two, courses of action cannot be correct and incorrect or true and false but only relatively better or worse; three, every attempt is a one-shot experiment which may or may not work. Four, and most importantly, stakeholders will have different frames for understanding and solving the problem.

Welcome to Afghanistan!

Mullah Omar came up with a three-pronged Eid message: Taliban are Afghanistan-specific (we are not Al-Qaeda); Taliban are prepared to negotiate on certain conditions and amenable to sharing power (we want to add value to our 10-year struggle and don’t envisage a return to the nineties); neighbouring countries must not interfere in Afghanistan’s internal affairs and we will respect their sovereignty (Afghanistan will not be used to attack any other state).

This is followed by two successive attacks, one in Maydan Wardag, the other in Kabul’s Green Zone. America insists both attacks were mounted by the Haqqani Network. The leader of the group, Sirajuddin Haqqani, spoke with Reuters and said he would be happy to talk to America if such talks were conducted within the larger ambit of Washington’s dialogue with the Taliban.

And then, just as things seemed to be moving ahead, despite two spectacular attacks, someone killed former Afghanistan president Burhanuddin Rabbani, a Tajik, and chairman of the Afghan government-backed body High Peace Council. The Taliban spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid reportedly first claimed responsibility, then denied it, then claimed responsibility again and finally clammed up. The Taliban are now saying that they are investigating the killing.

A Taliban statement said: “Our position on this issue is that we can’t talk about it and all the media reports that claim responsibility are groundless. Right now we don’t want to talk.”

On the surface, if one accepts Omar’s Eid message as well as Siraj’s interview, the Taliban, despite reservations against Rabbani, should have no reason to kill the latter. Not only does the killing strengthen the hands of hardliners in Afghanistan and those in Washington opposed to a dialogue – just yet – with the Taliban, it also creates bad blood between Kabul and Islamabad. The Tajiks are already pointing a finger at the Inter-Services Intelligence and alleging that Pakistan wants to get the Taliban into Kabul to the exclusion of all other entities.

One line of reasoning is that the operation might have been conducted without the knowledge of Omar and other senior Taliban leaders by a group closely affiliated with the ISI. This argument relies on the theory that Pakistan does not want talks because it cannot control them. It also realises that a section of the Taliban wants to negotiate and does not trust Pakistan.

What does this argument lead to? Yes, the Haqqani Network. This neatly dovetails with American allegations, now openly voiced by US Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen and Defence Secretary Leon Panetta, that the Haqqani Network is an ISI proxy. In other words, the issue is not just the presence of the Network on Pakistani soil (North Waziristan) but relates to its activities as allegedly choreographed by the ISI. Pakistan has denied all these allegations and also condemned Rabbani’s killing.

But this will not be enough. Many Pakistanis see in these developments a conspiracy against Pakistan – i.e., the US has an agenda against Pakistan and it is creating a situation whereby it can justify reshaping Pakistan. This argument on the Pakistani side then asks the obvious question: why and how Rabbani would be killed at a moment when Kabul was looking to Pakistan to facilitate a dialogue with the Taliban? Rabbani had come to Pakistan early January this year and while his 3-day visit was overshadowed by the assassination of Punjab governor Salmaan Taseer, he met with the president and the prime minister and also talked in detail with the army chief.

If it is accepted that Pakistan does not want talks and would go to the extent of getting Rabbani killed to sabotage them, then one has to ask the question of what is the endgame for Pakistan. It is not enough to say that Pakistan wants a complete return to Afghanistan of the Taliban. By the looks of it even the Taliban do not envisage such a scenario. It makes no sense for Pakistan to end up holding the baby and be isolated from all sides, including the Taliban. The Haqqanis may be a powerful group but their influence does not go beyond the Loya Paktia area. It would be a terrible strategy for Pakistan to put its eggs in the Haqqani basket and use them to hatch chickens that will come home to roost. It has enough of them already.

Talking to The Guardian, Ahmed Rashid said that “There is no doubt that there is a very serious conspiracy by those opposed to peace talks. They are trying to sabotage them [talks] before they take off.” He is spot-on in insisting that a political settlement through a dialogue with the Taliban is the only way out of Afghanistan’s wicked problem.

But who is “they”? While it is alleged that the ISI is opposed to talks, despite Pakistan’s insistence that it favours talks, it is a more known fact that both former General Patraeus, now Director CIA, and former Afghan Interior Minister Amrullah Saleh, among others, are opposed to talking with the Taliban. Both think that the opposition can be bludgeoned. So, the issue of “they” is very important.

If, as some diplomats think, the accusation for the act will fall on the Haqqanis, then we seem to have a very neat narrative to take the alleged Pakistan-Haqqanis saga to a denouement. Unless Pakistan and Afghanistan can get together to control the fallout from Rabbani’s killing, the event could prove a watershed. Not only would it set the entire talks plan back, it would also ratchet up tensions between Pakistan and the United States.

Stop press:

In prepared remarks to a US Senate panel, Admiral Mike Mullen, who steps down this month as chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, directly accused the Pakistan Army and Inter-Services Intelligence of supporting the Haqqani Network and planning its operations. This is what he said:

“With ISI support, Haqqani operatives planned and conducted (a September 11) truck bomb attack, as well as the assault on our embassy. We also have credible intelligence that they were behind the June 28 attack against the Inter-Continental Hotel in Kabul and a host of other smaller but effective operations.

“In choosing to use violent extremism as an instrument of policy, the government of Pakistan – and most especially the Pakistani Army and the ISI – jeopardize not only the prospect of our strategic partnership, but also Pakistan’s opportunity to be a respected nation with legitimate regional influence.”

Mullen’s remarks do not just constitute coercive signalling but a clear movement towards putting Pakistan on notice. Mullen’s directness about evidence also indicates the Americans might have shared something with General Pasha. This now requires a comprehensive response from Pakistan to disprove what Mullen has said if indeed what is being said are allegations.

The writer is Contributing Editor, The Friday Times.