Who is talking to the Taliban? The Americans say they are talking to the key Taliban figures with the British watching from the sidelines. The Germans say they are talking to the representatives of the Taliban leader, Mullah Omar. The Afghans say they are talking to the same people and the Pakistanis are accused of supporting the Haqqani network. No one is comparing notes.
But is talking to the Taliban likely to lead to a durable political settlement? The Taliban have often said that constructive talks cannot take place until the “occupiers” have left their country (or at least made a commitment to do so). The Taliban are not even bothered about commenting on the other conditions laid down by US Secretary of State Clinton for talks, namely that they lay down their arms, cut off any links with Al Qaeda and accept the Afghan Constitution, since these can only be negotiated during a genuine process.
The Taliban are not of course the only stakeholders that matter. There is the position of the neighbours, near and far to consider.
India’s inroads (quite literally) to the tune of millions of dollars raises serious security concerns for Pakistan. Both Russia and China have longstanding historical links with Afghanistan and Pakistan and are watching closely who is talking to whom. Both have an interest in end state discussions. Then there is Iran. It has a historical interest in the Shia Tajik/Hazaras of Afghanistan. It is alert to Pakistan’s closeness to Saudi Arabia. Iran is keen to provide its shoulder to Pakistan in time of need in the hope that it might translate into mutual benefit and it has closely watched Pakistan’s worsening relationship with the US since the start of the year.
Iran knows well what it is like to be at the receiving end of US displeasure. Its ‘I told you so’ need not be spelt out to Pakistan which is reeling from the US turnaround just when the most important discussions for a political settlement to end a 10 year war are underway. Iran knows well that Pakistan needs its gas pipeline and Iran has had evidence of Pakistani goodwill towards it through cooperation on Jundollah, a terrorist group operating along the Baloch corridor on the Iran-Pakistan border. Thus, it would like to wean Pakistan away from its arch rival Saudi Arabia.
Saudi Arabia in 2011 finds itself in un-chartered waters. The Arab spring has thrown it like nothing else ever has in100 years. At the heart of its concerns are instability from possible uprisings in its own country and a strengthened Iran.
The Saudis who have long used money to achieve foreign policy objectives are hoping to buy influence in countries like Egypt by offering loans and grants to the new government after the elections. The Saudis have come to the realisation that consequences of the Arab spring must be contained or ‘accommodated’. However, the Arab spring has brought with it something far more devastating for the Kingdom: the exposure of the West to its decades of foreign policy blunders of supporting undemocratic governments and unelected despots. It no longer wants to be on the wrong side of history.
For the second time in the same year, Saudi Arabia has found itself in un-chartered waters. Its personal relationship with the US which even stood the brunt of the 9/11 attacks when the majority of the attackers were found to be Saudi citizens, is no more. The relationship has changed from a personal almost family relationship to a state-to-state relationship.
Saudi Arabia would like a key place at the negotiating table on Afghanistan’s political settlement. It was one of only 3 countries that recognised the Taliban as a government in 1996. The Saudis started exporting its austere brand of Islam to Afghanistan as long ago as the 1980s when it spent millions of dollars glorifying jihad in a tripartite partnership with the US and Pakistan. The Saudis still believe that they have strategic interests in the region.
In this scenario, the US insists that Pakistan should not be playing double games; but its bullying “do more” rhetoric is not the best way to achieve its objectives. Nor should the US make the grave miscalculation of using the aid card. It needs to be reminded that nation states work on the basis of what is in their national interest. In the meantime, it should not continue to remain deaf to Pakistan’s legitimate security concerns in post-US Afghanistan. Carrots and sticks can only work when the media is not used to up the ante and paint half truths through smoke and mirrors. It might also help if red lines were redrawn. That said even the US might find itself a helpless bystander if the crisis of confidence in the Zardari government continues alongside the growing violence in Karachi which may yet see the country slide into unmanageable chaos.
Arguably, Pakistan has the most to lose from a war without end. It should consider seizing the initiative to lead the discussions with Afghanistan rather than reacting to events. With so many players on the chessboard, Afghanistan is again in the dubious position of being seen as a buffer between empires. To ensure that no state is playing one off against the other, everyone should be invited to the negotiating table to give peace a chance. This means the US, NATO, Russia, China, Saudi Arabia, Iran, India, Pakistan and Afghanistan – 9 participants in total.
The High Peace Council under the chairmanship of Professor Rabbani is a good start for exploratory talks from the Afghan perspective. However in a changing world, where institutions are less important than people, the plenary perspective must bring on board all 9 stakeholders under the chairmanship of a neutral convenor. The sooner this is done, the better chance there is for the US to have an honourable exit out of Afghanistan and a better chance that Afghanistan will not descend into civil war after 2014.
The writer is a barrister based in London who has written and worked on rehabilitating Taliban soldiers. She may be contacted at [email protected]
