The MV Tasman Spirit, a 1979 vintage, Japanese-built, Malta-registered and Greek-owned crude oil tanker, chartered by the Pakistan National Shipping Corporation (PNSC) on behalf of the National Oil refinery in Korangi, got grounded at precisely 1257 hours on 27 July 2003 while rounding the bend of the Karachi port outer channel to proceed to its assigned berth. This grounding sparked off an unfortunate sequence of events, whose impact continues to resonate way beyond our shores. It also gave rise to unbridled speculation as to the actual cause of grounding, the effectiveness of the clean-up efforts and the level of compensation expected to be forthcoming.
The vessel, though decrepit and single-hulled, was still classified as seaworthy. It was under the guidance of an experienced pilot. Admitted that the weather was rough, the ebb tide severe, but then again so many other similar deep draught vessels have successfully negotiated the Karachi harbour channel under nearly similar conditions. What went wrong this time around?
THE BARE FACTS: The MV Tasman Spirit, laden with 67, 535 metric tons of Iranian light crude oil from Kharg Island, arrived at the Karachi outer anchorage at 1300 hours on 26 July 2003.
A KPT pilot boarded the vessel at 1047 hours the next day, though the ship’s entry was delayed till 1219 owing to the non-availability of tugs. Precisely 38 minutes later, while negotiating the bend to get to the inner channel, the ship’s bottom touched the ground between buoys S6 and S7, with the latter buoy about 100 metres away on the starboard bow. Its crude oil cargo started seeping from the resulting crack on the starboard side. An attempt was immediately made with the help of three tugs to re-float the vessel without much success. After two further attempts, using 5 tugs this time, around the time of the next two successive high waters, the operation was finally abandoned for good.
At the request of the owner, another Greek-flag motor tanker Endeavour II belonging to the same parent company, was directed to proceed to Karachi for assistance. An agreement was also concluded thereafter with Tsavliris Russ on 30 July for undertaking salvage operations.
When MT Endeavour II arrived at Karachi on 31 July, it was found to be unsuitable for directly off-loading the oil from the stricken tanker owing to its size (being much larger than the Tasman Spirit itself). A small motor tanker chartered by the salvors – Fair Jolly of 8061 deadweight tonnage (DWT) – arrived at the Karachi harbour on August 5 and was immediately employed in lighterage operation, transferring almost 28,000 metric tonnes of oil from Tasman Spirit to Endeavour II which was berthed in harbour. Despite the Tasman Spirit literally breaking into two on the night of August 13, the Fair Jolly kept doing a fine job till August 23, when it fractured its hull during a particularly nasty spell of weather. On being rendered un-seaworthy, a replacement was called for, and the Romanian flag motor tanker Sea Angel (6376 DWT) arrived in Karachi on August 28. The Sea Angel got into action the same day and assisted by smaller local tankers /oil barges – PNS Gwadar, Fillgo-IV, Taeli and Al-Waqas- managed to off-load another 9,000 metric tonnes of oil till September 9, after which no further progress was thought possible because of the increasingly precipitous conditions.
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT: This was admittedly the single greatest maritime environmental disaster to have struck our coast. From a trickle when the vessel grounded to virtually a flood when it was on the verge of breaking into two, nearly 30,000 metric tonnes of oil found its way unimpeded to the Clifton coast and even into the Keamari groyne backwaters as well as the harbour itself. Let alone the sea, even the air got polluted due to evaporation, particularly after the major spillage on August 13, directly impacting the residents of Shireen Jinnah Colony, DHA, Seaview and Clifton as well as the picnickers and the vendors. Adverse effects were also noticeable in the phytoplankton and zooplankton biomass, with around 600 kilogrammes of dead fish discovered on Clifton beach on August 14, an unseemly Independence Day gift. Apart from mangrove forests, which are natural fish hatcheries, their seedlings and propagules were also extensively damaged.
FACTORS IN PLAY: Who exactly was responsible for all this? The major factors in play need to be analysed to see how and to what extent they could have and did affect the ultimate outcome. The first factor was the weather. Wind of about Force 7, occasionally gusting to around 35 kts, was from the south east instead of the usual south west, with a 2 to 3 metres swell from the South West. The effect of the southeasterly gusting wind was to turn the vessel’s bow towards the starboard. Moreover, by the time the vessel reached the bend in the channel, a strong ebb tide had set in, which, coupled with the southwesterly swell, would tend to drive the vessel south of the track. Then there is the well-known hydrodynamic phenomenon called the ‘Squat Effect’ which causes a vessel moving quickly through shallow water to ‘squat’ lower in the water than would normally be expected. The conditions prevailing were known and an experienced pilot/master would not have faced much problem adjusting to them.
The PNSC has also come in for a bit of flak for chartering a tanker that, apart from being un-seaworthy, was also single – hulled. The PNSC’s counter-argument is that it had been induced to enter into the charter by virtue of the owner’s misrepresentation. Class NK, the Classification Society with which the Tasman Spirit was entered, has however confirmed that the vessel was very much in class by the time the charter was concluded. It still appears that the ship’s main engine wasn’t exactly in prime condition and its response seemed to be sluggish. The fact remains that sufficient power was available, if used judiciously, to keep the vessel from harm’s way. As far as the single hull issue is concerned, it wasn’t outlawed at the time and let’s face it… such a vessel was cheaper to charter, on paper at least. Few of us are foresighted enough to think about likely consequences. Moreover, the single hull aspect didn’t really contribute to the grounding as such, but to its aftermath.
An enigma which still persists pertains to the entering sequence of ships. It is indeed a mystery as to why, out of the six ships planned for entry at that particular high water time, the one with the deepest draught, namely the Tasman Spirit, was the last one in. Resultantly, at the time the Tasman Spirit was rounding the bend to get to the inner channel and just prior to being grounded, not only was the ebb tide flowing southeasterly at it’s strongest, the under keel clearance of the vessel was also comparatively lesser. There are two possible reasons for the pilot’s decision to press on with the entry rather than agitate for a postponement- one that the pilot felt sufficiently confident or two that some sort of external pressure was at work.
Under such volatile conditions, ship handling aspects gained added significance. In order to keep the ship on track and prevent her bow from seeking the wind i.e. turning to starboard, a constant port helm of 10 to 20 degrees had to be applied. Drastic situations demand drastic measures. Evidence seems to suggest that the wheel and engine orders used by the pilot prior to and during the turn through the bend in the channel were anything but bold. So instead of the ship effectively countering the elements, the elements took charge of the ship and pushed it bodily to the starboard edge of the channel where the depth was less than what was needed. The pilot was experienced enough to know better. The only possible logical explanation could be that he was not fully certain about the timely availability of tugs and thus vacillated, as entering harbour without such assurance was like wading into shark-infested waters without a repellent. What compounded the problem was that the bottom where the ship grounded on the eastern edge of the channel, consisted of a hardened shoal patch, which not only ruptured the vessel’s cargo tank but also made subsequent re-floating efforts unsustainable.
LOCAL EFFORTS: At the time of the spill, what was strikingly noticeable was that no agency stepped forward to assume the lead role in spearheading the much-needed containment effort. Absence of a viable doctrine and operational plan as well as lack of expertise and resources came in the way of an appropriate response. In a bid to be seen doing something, workers of the KPT, the city government and the DHA could be seen manually cleaning up the beach without any joint coordination.
Later, working under the guidance of experts from the International Tanker Owner Pollution Federation Ltd and the Oil Spill Response Ltd UK and with salvage equipment sent in by the salvors, KPT tentatively commenced containment, skimming and dispersing operations.
To be continued…
The writer is a retired admiral and currently heading the National Centre for Maritime Policy and Research at Bahria University, Karachi.
