On arms control

During the past few months, a host of analysts have freely commented on the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT), a subject of considerable legal and technical complexity. More recently, a wave of concern has swept across the print media over the prospect of Pakistan being forced to sign the treaty at the forthcoming session of the UN General Assembly in September this year. Dare one ask; which treaty? So far, the negotiations on FMCT have not started. In fact, the Conference on Disarmament, the forum assigned the task of negotiating the treaty, has not even been able to draw up its programme of work to enable consideration of the proposed treaty. A formal negotiating text is not on the table. In 2006, the US delegation had presented a draft which was so out of sync with the agreed framework of the FMCT that even its closest allies were averse to lending support.

How are international treaties on arms control and non proliferation promulgated? The established practice has been for the General Assembly to recommend/encourage the elaboration of a new piece of global legislation on an arms control/disarmament related issue. The concerned forum then prepares and approves the draft treaty which is then presented to the GA for formal adoption.

Since the establishment of the Conference on Disarmament in 1979, the task of negotiating such treaties has been assumed by the CD because of its designation as the single multilateral negotiating forum on arms control issues in which capacity it had formulated such landmark regimes as the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (although on CTBT complete agreement was not achieved on a few provisions)

In 1993, the General Assembly adopted resolution 48/75L calling for the elaboration, in the most appropriate forum, of a “non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty” banning the production of weapons grade fissile material. In pursuance of this recommendation, the CD initiated negotiations on the proposed treaty which for a variety of reasons could not take off. Be that as it may, it is resolution 48/75L that provides the legal basis for the drafting of the treaty by the CD. Any process conducted outside the CD would be a clear breach of GA resolutions on FMCT and therefore of questionable credentials.

So which treaty are we talking about? If some Western powers, in their wisdom, prepare a draft on banning fissile material production amongst them then that text cannot be considered a valid outcome of resolution 48/75. Any document which has not been drafted and approved by the CD would be of dubious legitimacy even if it is approved by the General Assembly by a majority vote. A treaty created in such circumstances and in circumvention of the original GA consensus decision would be devoid of universal appeal. Pakistan and many other countries would feel no obligation to sign it.

With the coming to power of the Bush administration, given its visceral aversion for multilateralism, the CD witnessed a prolonged period of paralysis. In the beginning of 2005, one or two Latin American delegations proposed that the body be wound up as it had failed to carry out its mandated functions. Most delegations, led by key Western countries, strongly opposed the idea since in their view the Conference on Disarmament offered an invaluable global forum for developing arms control regimes. Dismantle it today and it would have to be recreated tomorrow when the international environment might become more conducive. Thereafter, the motion for dissolution was not pursued

Creating a cut-off regime outside the Conference on Disarmament and in clear violation of the original General Assembly resolution would gravely undermine the CD. It would erode that forum’s authority to pursue its mandated responsibilities including, in particular, disarmament issues which are of critical interest to all nonaligned countries. The non nuclear weapon states parties to the NPT have already forfeited the little leverage they had for promoting disarmament within the NPT framework by agreeing to its extension. Despite internal divisions, CD remains the only credible global forum for pursuing the disarmament agenda.

One is hopeful that our Western friends will not make the mistake of presenting a text at the forthcoming General Assembly session which has neither been negotiated nor approved by the Conference on Disarmament. Such a text, in addition to the destructive impact on the CD, would be seriously controversial as it would be in violation of the original mandate of the Assembly. It also goes without saying that regardless of the arm twisting a legally binding instrument created through such dubious means will not find many takers. For Pakistan such a misguided approach, in the light of its current policy, might well turn out to be a blessing in disguise. Being a directly affected party, it would be perfectly within its right to refuse to adhere to a pact born of a flawed process from which “the most appropriate forum” was completely excluded.

The writer is Pakistan’s former Ambassador to the United Nations and European Union. He can be contacted at [email protected]