Karachi braces for change
By now, even the cynics who usually see through false claims of state intervention in the city are sitting up and taking notice. Perhaps the MQM chief’s direction to his followers in Karachi to stock a month’s worth of rations was the first clear indication that the scheme of things is changing. Another indication, and this really heats things up, is his endorsement of a military operation in Karachi. That, too, in a distinctly fatalistic tone. Could the words of caution by his host UK government also have had a role to play here?
Many within the media, especially those charitable to the MQM, used to liken a military operation to a mini-martial law. An incorrect analogy. Granted, it is always more suited to democratic dispensations to employ civil armed forces instead of the military but using the latter is still a prerogative of any sitting political government. If the stable, first world US can call its Coast Guard to quell riots, the military can be called in anywhere in the world. There has been a precedent – supported, incidentally, by the MQM – to carry out an operation in the provincially administered Malakand Agency. If the police cannot cope up with a particular solution, other measures have to be taken, all strictly within the control of the political government.
Which brings us to questioning the assumption about the inadequacy of the police. After all, don’t those who call for an operation in Karachi frequently cite the Naseerullah Babar operation (police, all of it) as the one to emulate? That might be the case; the police, despite the stark paucity of funds and the inefficiencies caused by political recruitment, maintain a far better intelligence network than the military can. But the police isn’t what it used to be. With the mafia-style killings of the officers involved in the ’96 operation and even the later ones, the police are much demoralised and have genuine concerns for their safety. If the throes of political desperation revive certain fortunes sometime in the future, these servants of the state know they will be left high and dry.
Who but the lunatic fringe would argue for a forceful state operation over political dialogue? But there are times when the former is unavoidable. The situation in Karachi has been reeking of Chamberlain-like complacency for far too long. Dialogue and political solutions have to follow at least the mere semblance of law and order.
