In an article captioned “An illiberal view” published in this space on July 9, I had conceptually attempted to underscore the inadmissibility of deleting India from our security calculus. This piece seeks to substantiate this view with a more concrete explanation.
A nation’s military doctrine, capability and deployment is premised on its threat perception. Undeniably, since our inception, India has been the locus of Pakistan’s threat perception. Putting aside the bitterness engendered by the bloodbath of Partition, the key question is whether the contemporary ground realities warrant an alteration in this perception.
Admittedly, post 9/11, a new threat has emerged on our Western border in the form of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan and its metropolitan affiliates. The stated reason for their assaults on our population centres and military installations is our alleged participation in America’s war. We are considered the enemy because of our support for their declared archenemy, the United States. What eludes comprehension is why punish the apprentice when the principal is within equal reach in southern Afghanistan (just an argument). This nation has borne the brunt of their fury for the past several years. The foreign forces will leave Afghanistan one day, as they always had in the past, but Pakistan is not going anywhere. So what do these forces hope to achieve by directing their guns at us?
The Indian Defense Review of September 2008 provides some insight. Its Editor, known to reflect establishment thinking, wrote that a stable Pakistan was not in India’s interest. Its collapse, due to massive internal and external contradictions, would bring “multiple benefits” to India including preventing China from acquiring a major port in the Indian Ocean, “which would also be in the US interest.” That, he explained, would deliver a severe jolt to China’s expansionist aims while opening up “India’s access to Central Asian energy routes.” The fact that such a development would entail disastrous consequences for India itself does not seem to matter so long as Pakistan is brought to its knees.
On July 13, just ten days before the commencement of the ministerial level talks between the two countries, Mumbai was rocked by serial bombings, causing considerable mayhem. Is it purely coincidental that the timing of such incidents tends to coincide with tenuous stirrings of hope in the bilateral relationship? The Indian government, to its credit, adopted a responsible stance but the Indian electronic media quickly abandoned its initial objectivity to return to the proverbial Pakistani connection. Advani and his ilk, unencumbered by any considerations of logic, immediately pointed the finger at the Pakistani intelligence agencies while voicing the futility of continuing talks with a terror sponsoring state. Most panelists, with a few honourable exceptions, echoed this refrain.
The immediate casualty of the blasts could likely have been the ministerial talks scheduled for later this month. Would that have been in Pakistan’s interest? Given the turn of events on our Western borders and our frayed relations with the US, increased tensions with India, unless insanity dictates our actions, is the last thing Pakistan would currently want. So, if someone tells me that these attacks were the handiwork of the ISI, already under microscopic global scrutiny and our military engaged on several fronts, my response will be, in the straightforward American vernacular, “Go see a shrink”
India’s military assets are preponderantly deployed along its border with Pakistan, in Kashmir and on the Line of Control. Following India’s nuclear tests in May 1998, Pakistan was threatened with the direst consequences. The Cold Start doctrine is Pakistan-specific. All bilateral disputes remain unresolved. In India’s perception and in the popular mind Pakistan remains the principal adversary. Under these circumstances, a change in our security perception would not appear to accord with the facts on the ground.
Undeniably, a new threat has arisen in the shape of extremist violence within our polity, sustained and orchestrated from beyond our territory, which needs to be addressed. This should not however compel the assessment that the threat from the East, in the absence of any change in its components, should be overlooked. For the foreseeable future Pakistan would find itself in the unenviable position of being straitjacketed between two threats. Strong internal cohesion, foresight and superior diplomatic acumen would be required to ensure that these threats do not flare up at the same time. Diplomatic efforts on both counts should proceed apace.
This is just an attempt to examine the appropriateness of de-linking India from our threat perception, taking into account the existing ground realities. It is neither an explanation nor an excuse for the several mistakes and aggravations we have committed that may have contributed to the present state of affairs. This would require a lot more space than is available in this column.
The writer is a retired Ambassador and can be contacted at [email protected]
"Undeniably, since our inception, India has been the locus of Pakistan’s threat perception. Putting aside the bitterness engendered by the bloodbath of Partition, the key question is whether the contemporary ground realities warrant an alteration in this perception."
I would like to interject that this only served the interest of the dying colonial power of Great Britain and later on West in the cold war against Russia. A lot of Pakistan's threat perception was also inculcated (in Pakistan's mind) by the West during the cold war era.
60 plus years since independence, the national leaders of these two countries needs to offer a different vision. A vision that would say, just between these two countries we represent nothing less than the European Union in terms of human progress and prosperity. And security is a non-issue in our part of the world.
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