International relations are generally defined and driven by the states’ national interests which, however, appear to be ill-defined quite often. As they say there is no permanent enemy and permanent friend in international politics, only permanent interests.
It is because of this very concept that one would find the history of nation states impounded with innumerous illustrations where the biggest enemies of their time were seen turning into best friends or allies.
In international relations, nothing but the convergence of so-called national interest turns the yesterday’s diehard adversaries into today’s allies, mostly strategic and ideological in the post-9/11 era. Depending largely on the issue and situation, these interests might be political, economic, strategic, ideological and even legal in nature.
Same is the case with decades-old Pak-US relationship that may never be defined, comprehended and analysed objectively if the criteria used is based on the determinants other than convergence or divergence of the national interests of the two countries.
The unpalatable developments, like 1948 and 1965 wars with India, Afghanistan’s non-recognition of the 2000-kilometer long porous Durand Line as international border with Pakistan, the clandestine backing of India to the “Mukti Bahni” movement in East Pakistan and the eventual disintegration of Pakistan in 1971, always kept Islamabad paranoid about the security of its Eastern and Northern borders.
Then we have strategic ground realities like India being eight times bigger than Pakistan territorially with New Delhi, ultimately developed nuclear weapons to make its defense impregnable once and for all. To protect the northern side of its border, Pakistan has long been, and right in accordance with the prevailing international strategic trends, aspirant of a friendly regime in Kabul that was the most effective and sustainable way to not only allay its territorial concerns, but also provide it with the long-awaited “strategic depth” against a perceived Indian aggression directed at its nuclear arsenals.
The watershed development of 9/11 in the US has put national interests of Pakistan and the US on totally divergent path. Now whereas Pakistan’s interests were strategic in character, that of Washington were ideological against the so-called Islamic extremism that endangered the peace of, what US President George W. Bush used to call “the free world”.
Since then Pakistan has become a hot spot for this predominantly American war and has incurred unprecedented and irreparable human, political, economic, social, infrastructural and strategic losses.
The killing of Al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad has put Pakistan into a very complex situation with its Western allies, led by Washington, who are accusing Islamabad of harboring the terrorists on its soil. The world must recall that the US did the same for over a decade to contain its Cold War adversary, the USSR, in Afghanistan but no question of legitimacy was raised at that time.
One might recall that the stage for Pak-Taliban alliance was set decades ago by the Soviet Union’s disgraceful retreat from Afghanistan at the hands of US-backed Mujahideen, most of whom hailed from the Middle East or Pakistani tribal Pashtun belt.
Washington and Islamabad, seeing their interests converging in the face of their common enemy, the USSR, joined hands and turned the mountainous Afghanistan into Napoleonic Waterloo for the already broke Kremlin, sharing the super power status with the US in the then bipolar world.
Now while the international scenario has turned adverse to the then (1979 to 1991) Muslim heroes, Islamabad once again finds its strategic interests endangered in the region. Most of all there is a deep-rooted perception widely held by the civilian and military leadership of Pakistan that the Congress-dominated New Delhi and Karzai-ruled Kabul are inching closer to each other and their ongoing strategic honeymoon was set to somehow, overtly or covertly, endanger interests of Islamabad.
And Pakistan’s paranoia and a cautious foreign policy approach towards a proactive Indo-Afghan alliance seems to carry enough substance if analysed in the backdrop of rare and low-toned complains from Islamabad of cross border infiltration from the North and that of a “foreign hidden hand” involved in subversive activities on its greatly-terrorised territory.
At this juncture, the most disturbing phenomenon haunting the policymakers in Islamabad is that Washington not only wants to give a consequential free hand to New Delhi and Kabul to keep Pakistan on the run in pursuance of regional security, but also do away with its long-pursued “strategic depth” strategy.
Only this, the Americans now believe, would enable the Obama administration to secure a safe exit from Afghanistan, as he did in Iraq, under the slogan of “change” that he had raised during last presidential election to attract the psychologically war-ravaged American voters.
President Obama has declared his strategy to withdraw some 33,000 troops from Afghanistan during next three years, some 10,000 to leave by the end of this year. The American rulers might succeed in securing a face saving in the eyes of their voters in the forthcoming elections, but the prevailing geo-strategic conditions do not sit well with the interests of Pakistan, to whom a clear tilt of Karzai government towards New Delhi remains the most unpalatable reality.
What Pakistan, it seems, wants from American, is a post-Nato South Asian region where the balance of power is not exclusively tilted towards an anti-Islamabad Indo-Afghanistan alliance. This has achieved a greater importance now that the US has suspended Pakistan military’s aid citing some reasons that hint at its involvement with the Taliban and other militants.
On its part, Islamabad seems to have drawn at least three, unilateral, bilateral and multilateral, policy lines to deal with the geo-strategic challenges of post-Nato Afghanistan. The unilateral one is to keep onboard the strong, and more importantly, pro-Pakistan Afghan bigwigs like Haqqani Network, allegedly hiding in North Waziristan.
The formation of a peace council with Afghanistan is certainly Pakistan’s bilateral move to keep the things in its favour in prospect. Whereas Pakistan’s increased contacts with anti-American regimes in China, Russia and Iran are indicative of the multilateral approach Islamabad appears to have adopted to form a regional and diplomatic alliance to contain the likely hardships it might be facing in the post-US South Asia.
