Operation

0
88

The deployment of the rangers in Karachi to troublespot Qasba colony and the relative calm that has followed it has again stirred that great debate over the city: is the simple use of more state force the key to the solution? This point of view certainly was endorsed by PML(N) chief Nawaz Sharif when he backed army action in Karachi.
Passionate arguments on both sides. But there have been some nuanced changes in the point of view of those against the deployment of the army in the city. Even the MQM supporters concede that no development would be possible without a state crackdown of one manner or the other. The fact that militant groups operate with impunity in their own fiefdoms is yet another testament to the fact that the state has lost its writ in large parts of the city.
All discussions about any such crackdown in Karachi inevitably lead to the Naseerullah Babar strike in the 90s. As opposed to the Asif Nawaz operation, this was not a military venture but a strictly civilian one, in which mostly the local police stations were used. It is also an operation the mere mention of which is a red rag for the MQM; perhaps more infuriating than the military operations.
The space for an operation of the sort has also gotten constricted. The Karachi police isn’t what it used to be. And a large number of the officers involved in the operation were killed – for lack of a better word – mafia style. This was more of a scare tactic than revenge.
Before even discussing a military operation, its status as a last resort should be clear. There is no aspect of statecraft except actual war with another nation where the military should be preferred over the civilian set up. Be it the collection of utilities bills, or the building of roads or the policing of tough areas.
But likening a military operation to a mini martial law is also incorrect. The forces would be answerable to the political civilian government, which would appoint a pointman, a commissar of sorts, for the job. There are, after all, military operations going on in the tribal areas and, previously, in the settled districts of Swat and Buner.
Invocation to all the concerned political parties to stop the bloodshed is well-meaning but flawed as an approach to end the conflict. At the end of the day, Karachi is a problem of the state abandoning its citizens and leaving them to fend for themselves. It is the state that should step up.