An illiberal view

In recent weeks, the Pakistani Armed Forces have come under severe criticism. Political figures, the media, independent analysts and the civil society have outbidded each other in inveighing against the military for various blemishes including incompetence, harbouring of insidious non-state actors, subservience to the US, appropriation of disproportionate funds, interference in state policies, adventurism in Afghanistan and for, what is described as the root cause of all these ills, its obsessive preoccupation with the security threat from India. It is this last point that is intended to be discussed in this article, prompted as it is, by statements from important national leaders that Pakistan should no longer consider India as an enemy.

For those of us who had joined this country’s Foreign Service in a united Pakistan, delinking our security perspective from the Indian threat requires a gigantic leap of faith. Granted that the global political and strategic configuration is vastly different from what it was four decades ago. The Cold War ended with the demise of the Soviet Union and the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact. Our overstated relevance in the global power structures also dissolved with the conclusion of the Cold War. Pakistan’s clout would no longer be derived from its placement in the East-West rivalry but from its actual economic, political and military strength.

An earnest review of our entire security paradigm was required at that stage but we continued to operate on the premise that nothing had changed. We continued to believe, buttressed by an inflated assessment of our successful role in ensuring Soviet Union’s ouster from Afghanistan, that the world would continue to owe us a living. The imposition of American sanctions, exemplified by the infamous Pressler Amendment, was viewed simply as an act of imperial ingratitude instead of being seen as a signal of a changing world order. Not only the global order has changed; much has changed in our region as well. This reality is amply reflected in the respective economic and political indicators of the two countries as also in the debilitating frictions within our body politic.

The Indian Army Commander’s statement about their ability to launch Abbottabad-style intrusions into Pakistan signals a stark departure from established strategic thinking, heralding a new military doctrine that a localised conflict can be waged between two nuclear armed countries. This concept, though inherently lethal, should not be arbitrarily dismissed. The belief, given the unique character of the South Asian security environment, that nuclear capability provides us with a comprehensive deterrence against all categories of threats is as illusory as it is erroneous.

Equally questionable is the argument that the doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD), which constituted the bedrock of the strategic balance between the Americans and the Soviets thus obviating direct war, can be transplanted into South Asia. First, unlike the principal Cold War protagonists, India and Pakistan share a long international border and a volatile Line of Control in Kashmir.

Second, the nature of the two conflicts is fundamentally different. The East-West confrontation was essentially premised on ideological moorings. South-Asia is totally different. The tension between India and Pakistan is not actuated by any ideological competition. To the contrary their differences are real and ground-based offering several areas of potential conflict: Kashmir, Siachin, Sir Creek, terrorism and, the most ominous, water. Place this volatile brew in the backdrop of a thousand year historical narrative culminating in the anguish of Partition, and add to this the role, the reach and ambition of the non-state actor, the space for conflict becomes extensive. Both India and Pakistan would need to recognise the dangers inherent in this situation and use vigorous diplomacy to prevent conflict.

It would be wrong to assume that all decisions relating to war are invariably informed by objective reasoning. It was not a logical design which plunged Europe into the First Great War nor was it a calculated decision which caused the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. One has yet to identify the gains from the invasion of Iraq which was launched against the drift of global opinion. And quite frankly the wisdom of spending half a trillion dollars in the decade long conflict in Afghanistan remains undecipherable unless the stated objective masked an ulterior agenda .It is open to question that Al-Qaeda could not have been neutralised without unleashing the hounds of war. Efforts are now afoot to diplomatically engage those very people who, not so long ago, were denounced as demonic.

This is not meant to proclaim the inevitability of war between India and Pakistan, far from it. Nothing is more anathematic to the diplomatic mind than the sound of the war trumpet. In fact, statecraft was designed to prevent war and to enable states to mesh their interests through dialogue. The case against the wars in Iraq and possibly Afghanistan rests precisely on the argument that diplomacy was given a back seat in advancing American national interests.

But in South Asia, for over half a century the India-Pakistan dialogue has achieved almost nothing in terms of substance. A handful of confidence building measures is a dismal outcome when juxtaposed against the enormity of the effort and the stakes involved. Recent meetings have been particularly unproductive. Last year, I came across an Indian colleague, then retired, with whom one had exchanged some of the most vitriolic verbal duels on Kashmir, nuclear proliferation, terrorism etc. in various international fora. Nevertheless, he was amongst that rare breed of Indian diplomats who did not carry a personal animus against Pakistan. We talked about the current state of affairs and the possibility of a breakthrough in bilateral relations. He seemed deeply skeptical which I attributed to Mumbai. “No” he said directly “Mumbai has little to do with it. Put yourselves in our shoes and then decide whether you would be prepared to show the slightest flexibility given the state of affairs in Pakistan.” I responded that if that was the view of a moderate Indian diplomat, what one could expect from the Indian establishment. “Nothing,” he replied emphatically “absolutely nothing.”

The writer is a retired Ambassador and can be contacted at [email protected]