The Obama Administration has come out with its 19-page counterterrorism strategy document. The strategy is based on the concept of “targeted, surgical pressure” on militant groups which means striking them often and hard.
The strategy, which moves away from the more expansive one adopted by the Bush Administration, has already come under criticism from CT officials in the previous administration. Juan Zarate, a senior counterterrorism official under President Bush, is reported to have said that “by narrowing its counterterrorism focus to Al-Qaeda, its affiliates and individual followers, the Obama administration [has] underestimated the power of Al-Qaeda’s ideology.”
“To narrow the focus has the potential to inadvertently blind us to the underlying ideological struggle that still exists as well as to terrorist threats on the horizon that neither begin nor end with Al-Qaeda. This focus also inadvertently aggrandizes Al-Qaeda at a time when we want to emphasize its irrelevance,” Zarate told the US paper, The New York Times.
The fact is that both, the previous, more expansive one, and the new strategy that seeks to be more targeted, have their premise wrong. Neither is prepared to look at the causes of the phenomenon while trying to combat the effects. The Bush administration created chaos in two countries directly and in Pakistan indirectly in trying to keep the American mainland secure. Forget the external costs. Rights groups have already noted the cost at which that security has come within the US. And yet, there is no guarantee how long it will be before the calm is broken.
Obama’s point-man on CT, John Brennan, has said that “the administration would announce its approach this summer on combating violent extremism in the United States”. Simply put, it is an acknowledgement that trillions of dollars and much suffering later, the Al-Qaeda ideology is alive and spreading. It remains protean.
This is the report card, mostly, on the previous strategy. The current one creates its own problems even as it tries to shed the fat of the previous one and develop its own lean mass. It will rely on aerial attack platforms, special forces raids and deploying “unique assets” while creating synergies through satellite, electronic and human intelligence. At a minimum, we should be ready for further violations of those aspects of international law and the UN Charter that have come to be considered customary state practice.
The drone attacks already throw up legal problems of immense magnitude and jurists around the world are debating the moral and legal costs of using the platform. Add to that physical raids, likely to be unilateral, a la the Abbottabad one, and we have a veritable unlocking of Article 2 (a) of the UN Charter and also a clear violation of the UN’s legal regime on terrorism which has no provision for unilateral action by any state for the simple reason that there can be no application on such an action of the “limiting principle”.
But let’s leave aside the operational and legal aspects, though they are vital to the success of any strategy. This strategy too, not surprisingly and much in the same vein as the old one which it purports to implicitly criticise, only talks about the effects. There is no mention of causes: Al-Qaeda this and Al-Qaeda that; militant franchises which need to be fought and destroyed etcetera. No mention of the context in which these groups operate.
Any CT expert worth his expertise knows that the central strategy for any CT campaign is to dislocate the “terrorist” from the context in which he operates. The rest is tactics, including the fire-fighting. This document talks tactics and calls itself a strategy document. David Halberstam was right about the best and brightest in his book of the same title. It’s them who, in trying to untangle the complexities, miss out the obvious.
Here are just two paragraphs from the new strategy, beginning with the first of the two.
“In response to the attacks of September 2001, the United States embarked on a national effort against al-Qa‘ida, the transnational terrorist organization responsible for planning and conducting the attacks. As we approach the 10th anniversary of that day, we can look forward with confidence in our accomplishments and pride in the resiliency of our nation. We have prevented another catastrophic attack on our shores; our citizens have not let the spectre of terrorism disrupt their daily lives and activities; our Federal government has worked to become more integrated, efficient, and effective in its counterterrorism (CT) efforts; and we have placed our CT campaign in a context that does not dominate the lives of the American people nor overshadow our approach to the broad range of our interests.”
The emphasis is mine and shows clearly, if such proof were required, that it is okay to upend the lives of peoples outside until the lives of the American people are not dominated by such an effort and “our” approach does not overshadow “our” interests. There cannot be a more clear “the rest can go to hell” approach than this. But it’s better to say it as is than sugar-coat it, so thank you.
Here’s the second:
“Yet the paramount terrorist threat we have faced – al-Qa‘ida and its affiliates and adherents – has also continued to evolve, often in response to the successes of the United States and its partners around the world. Our efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan have destroyed much of al-Qa‘ida’s leadership and weakened the organization substantially. Meanwhile, in recent years the source of the threat to the United States and its allies has shifted in part toward the periphery – to groups affiliated with but separate from the core of the group in Pakistan and Afghanistan. This also includes deliberate efforts by al-Qa‘ida to inspire individuals within the United States to conduct attacks on their own.”
The threat has continued to evolve and often in response to the successes notched by the US and its allies. Isn’t this the biggest indictment of the strategy? Shouldn’t this force a rethink? How can a strategy that, in its successes, begets more of the same threat be called successful, unless of course the real strategy is not to address the threat at all but to keep it alive and kicking?
Pakistan needs to brace itself up for more to come. It’s already a ‘frenemy’ and it only requires the first two letters to go for the underlying thought and reality to burst out in the open.
The writer is Contributing Editor, The Friday Times.