The media reports suggest that a group of United States lawmakers asked a visiting Pakistani delegation “if Pakistan was with the US or not and if the US could trust Pakistan.” The same issue is being debated in Pakistan but the question in Pakistan is about trusting the US. Pakistan’s official circles, like the US officials, are cautious in selection of words for responding to this question. However, the non-official or semi-official circles on both sides do not feel restrained in blaming the other side for the problems in their bilateral relations.
In Pakistan, it is fashionable to be critical of the US. This sentiment runs deep in the official civilian and military circles that hold the US responsible for Pakistan’s internal and external problems, including terrorism. The anti-US sentiments are based primarily on a belief system and widespread acceptance of the conspiracy theories rather than on logical analysis of international and regional politics.
These views are integral to Islamist-Jihadi worldview in Pakistan that shaped up in the post-Nine-Eleven period. Pakistan’s Islamists worked closely with the US in the 1980s to expel the Soviet troops from Afghanistan. They have been hit hard by the new American policy since September 2001 and Pakistan’s decision to abandon the Taliban. These Islamic activists and groups were also perturbed when the government of Pakistan resorted to military action against the inmates of the Red Mosque, a major centre of militancy in Islamabad, in July 2007. This was viewed by the Islamic hardline groups as a declaration of war on them by the US-backed Pakistani state. Since then, the Islamist and jihadist elements have articulated a highly Islamic-radical ideological framework backed in varying degrees by Islamic parties, the political far-right and jihadi organisations, including Al-Qaeda. This is coupled with the targeting of Pakistani state and society in a more violent manner. The anti-US discourse is integral to this ideological mindset. The underlying assumption is to isolate Pakistan from the West, especially the US, which they think would neutralise Pakistan’s security operations against the militant groups and improve their prospects of overwhelming the Pakistani state.
The Islamic worldview has gradually become the dominant worldview in Pakistan. Its appeal has gone far beyond the Islamists and the political far-right. A large number of educated people, especially retired military officers and bureaucrats, subscribe to this view in varying degrees.
The federal government and the military top brass have failed to counter this worldview and faltered in mobilising popular support for an alternative discourse of what was happening in Pakistan and how far containment of terrorism served Pakistan’s interests. The civilian federal government was unable to contain this trend because its credibility was damaged due to its poor performance in addressing socio-economic problems of the people.
The military defends its counter-terrorism role by using the print and electronic media. A series of TV plays have highlighted the sacrifices made by the army and the paramilitary forces fighting against terrorist elements in Swat/Dir and the tribal areas. This generates sympathy for the military personnel but it hardly counters the Islamist propaganda.
The recent convert to this perspective is the PML(N), hitherto known for a soft corner for the militant Islamic groups. Its leader, Nawaz Sharif, and his close associates engage in massive propaganda against the military, the ISI and the US. They also express strong reservations on the handling of terrorism related issues by the military. This approach enables the PML(N) to cash on the current anti-military and anti-US sentiments to increase its support base but there is a total absence of long term perspective in the PML(N) worldview.
The ex-servicemen organisation, a conglomerate of angry ex-military officers who find themselves out of political and social limelight, has also adopted a political line similar to PML(N). This organisation surfaced with political agenda against General Pervez Musharraf. However, its activities declined after the change of government in 2008. Now, it has publicly taken up an anti-US stance and talks about the inadequacies of the military’s counter-terrorism policies. Its delegation headed by Retired Admiral Fasih Bokhari (Former Naval Chief) called on Nawaz Sharif on June 14, giving a boost to Nawaz Sharif’s strident approach towards the current army top command and the US.
In addition to the ex-servicemen organisation, a good number of retired military personnel express reservations about the military’s policy of countering terrorism and question the current relations with the US. It can be safely concluded that these ex-servicemen influence opinion inside the military as well as reflect thinking outside the military.
The younger officers and other ranks are more influenced by the Islamist perspective because of the growing religious conservatism and discreet support for militancy in the society. This manifests in anti-US sentiments which are safer to express than to support the Taliban or publicly oppose military’s counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency operations. At the high level in the military, the criticism of the US relates to specific policies only.
Such a state of mind reached a peak in society and the military after the May 2 Abbottabad operation. It does not reflect any love for Osama bin Laden but represents resentment against American unilateralism, generating the fear that the US could launch unilateral action to remove Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. This sense of anger and insecurity became more visible after the Taliban attack on the Mehran Naval Base in Karachi on May 22-23.
Pakistan’s military and intelligence establishment was confronted with sharp criticism and pressure from three quarters: the US narrative of the possible collusion between Pakistani military/ISI establishment and Osama bin Laden; criticism from within Pakistan for failure to respond in time to the unilateral US military operation on Pakistani territory; and pressure from within the military due to feeling of humiliation by the American action.
The shocked and bewildered Pakistan army leadership has decided to put its foot down to check US military unilateralism in Pakistan. The decision to resist unilateral military action on Pakistan soil also includes an end to CIA’s autonomous activities in Pakistan including their efforts to create a local network.
The meeting of the top most civilian and military leadership held at the presidency in Islamabad on June 13 showed that there was unanimity of views at the highest level for rejecting autonomous and unilateral American military and intelligence activities in Pakistan.
Next week, we will discuss the factors that contributed to strengthening Islamic political discourse in Pakistan and the sudden spurt of anti-Americanism.
The writer is an independent political and defence analyst.
There are misperceptions and misunderstanding on both sides. Harsh words are not going to help either side. Both parties need to understand each other’s feelings. Those who have studied Robert Jervis’ seminal work know that misperceptions can lead to greater misunderstanding and to a real conflict.
I agree with Professor Askari that there were no strong feelings in Pakistan (both inside and outside civil-military establishment) for OBL and his jihadist cohorts but there is widespread religious conservatism in and outside the military. It is because army itself comes from the society and brings with it the social values of society. The United States cannot do anything about it. It is Pakistan's responsibility to fix it.
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