Of outmoded paradigms

Like an action-packed Hollywood movie, events have moved at a fast and unpredictable pace since the Abbottabad episode. But the film is running without a director. Things are in such a drift that neither the civilian government nor the military seem to have a clue about how to arrest the inexorable slide.

There are a lot of people who feel that the present crisis is the worst since 1971 when the country was dismembered as a result of a protracted civil war and an ill-conceived military action by a military government against its own people. Things are a lot better than they were at the time but in some ways, a lot worse.

We have a free and proactive media, a fearlessly independent higher judiciary and a semblance of a civilian government whose legitimacy is beyond doubt. On the flip side, the crisis is closer to home this time. The scourge of terrorism is an existential threat eating away into the very entrails of the state.

Our nuclear programme, the fastest growing and the fourth largest in terms of missiles production in the world today, is perhaps our security from a war with India. But it gives jitters to the rest of the world, which despite frequent assurances from our defence establishment, feels a clear and present danger of our arsenal falling into the hands of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda.

The military as well as the civilian government seem to be in a state of inertia. A detailed press release by the ISPR after the corps commanders’ meet last week has raised more questions than answering them. Mian Nawaz Sharif was somewhat at the receiving end in the press release for being too critical of the army. He has somewhat toned down his rhetoric but has not deviated from his stance – the need for civilian control over the armed forces and transparency of the defence budget.

The government seems to be quite smug while all the army bashing is going on. Learning from past experience, it is not willing to stir a hornet’s nest by making any moves that might alienate the military and its intelligence apparatus.

The manner in which the issues of forming a commission on the Abbottabad incident and on the gruesome murder of journalist Saleem Shahzad have been handled is very pathetic. The modus operandi used in announcing both these commissions clearly points towards deliberate stonewalling.

Ambassador Hussain Haqqani has assured US lawmakers that a commission is being formed on the pattern of the 9/11 commission to probe how Osama lived in Pakistan for years in plain sight. It seems highly unlikely that such a powerful commission with clear terms of reference can be formed by our present dispensation.

The way in which the commission to probe the yet unexplained murder of Saleem Shahzad was announced was tantamount to sweeping the issue under the carpet. Now that the apex court has taken cognizance of the matter, it will be difficult for the government to wriggle out of its commitments.

However, the bottom line remains that no feathers should be ruffled in Aabpara, the headquarters of the ISI, or in the corridors of the GHQ. Intelligence failure or complicity at Abbottabad and the ghastly murder of a brave journalist, both point fingers towards our intelligence apparatus.

Unless the role of the ubiquitous security establishment is redefined, there is no way forward. There was a feeble attempt by the government after the Mumbai incident in November 2008 to bring the ISI under civilian control. The move was severely resisted and the government had to back off. Knowing the lay of the land, we can reasonably assume that this time, too, efforts to hold an independent inquest have been sabotaged.

As for the Abbottabad commission, it will be difficult to scuttle a joint resolution of the parliament indefinitely. Similarly, the journalists’ anger on the unexplained death of their colleague will be hard to keep resisting. The proactive role being played by the Supreme Court Bar Association (SCBA) and the belated cognizance of the matter by the Supreme Court render the formation of the probe commission inevitable.

It is time the ISI changes its mindset and cooperates with the probes. As Nawaz Sharif succinctly put it at SAFMA the other day, “It is 2011, not 1911.” General Kayani can play a pivotal role in changing this mindset if he wants to become part of the solution rather than the problem.

Another casualty of the present impasse is the state of our relations with Washington. While the US administration – for its own strategic reasons – is still engaging Pakistan, the Congress is becoming increasingly hostile.

Admiral Mike Mullen still considers General Kayani ‘a personal friend.’ In a briefing at the Department of Defense, he admitted to having a very strong personal relationship but also ‘a strong professional relationship.’ He added, “In my perspective, nothing has changed in terms of the criticality of the relationship.”

But what has intrinsically changed is the relationship between the ISI and the CIA. What had come to the surface when the CIA station chief in Islamabad was outed, and exacerbated by the Raymond Davis affair and the Abbottabad episode, has brought cooperation between the two agencies to a standstill.

In the wake of charges that the ISI tipped off IED factories in Waziristan, the US House Intelligence Committee Chairman Rep. Mike Rogers’ remarks that he considered Pakistan to be a military with a country and not a country with a military are ominous.

Some analysts have suggested a dialogue between the politicians, both in the government and the opposition, and the military to break the present impasse. They have even suggested that the army leadership should lead such a dialogue.

Actually, it should be the parliament or its committee formed for the purpose that should initiate such a dialogue. But in order for such parleys to be fruitful, the traditional mindset that has become outmoded and obsolete needs to be changed.

The military should be willing to outgrow its conventional strategic paradigm and the intelligence apparatus should put an end to its ideologically motivated strong-arm tactics. The civilians should also start to rule and govern rather than abdicating responsibilities mandated to them by their voters.

There has been talk in the foreign media of a ‘Colonels’ Coup’ or the army taking over in desperation (a la post-Kargil). Such a scenario is unlikely. But if at all it happens, it will be an unmitigated disaster for the country.

The writer is Editor, Pakistan Today.