The Islamisation of Pakistan

In my last piece, I highlighted four observations, which, because of one reason or another, give proof of increasing ascription to religion as the predominant marker of individual and national identity. Out of the four, (expansion on electronic, print, and social media, societal reaction to religious fanaticism, urban socio-religious movements, and anti-Americanism), three are ritualistic proclamations, while only the third one is based on concrete practice.
On the basis of what is observed, the collective left-of-center perception is now almost completely homogenous in terms of its situational appraisal: Pakistani society is becoming increasingly conservative.
Historically tracing the evolution of this conservatism has more often than not led to people looking at Bhutto’s pandering of the religious right, Zia’s Islamisation programme, and the security establishment’s strategic designs, coupled with their grip on public narrative. Such a view would suggest that prior to Zia, urban Pakistan was tolerant, more secular, and decidedly less conservative.
This, as history tells us, was not the case.
Urban Pakistan was much smaller back then but had borne the brunt of a partition, which, all things considered, was principled on communal differences. It had seen anti-Ahmadi riots as early as the 1950’s, and had witnessed the gradual strengthening of religious parties as electoral forces in both Lahore and Karachi. When you look at this from a historical perspective, we can’t be one hundred percent certain about new-born conservatism, but we can – empirically – argue in favour of two things: increasing urbanisation and capitalism, and historically embedded principles of communal differences.
The connection between urbanisation and perceived conservatism can be taken as, given statistical constraints, coeval. One has gone up for sure, the other has appeared to grow as well. The tricky bit is trying to prove causation, or at the very least correlation between the two.
One relatively simple way of looking at this is by observing at the question of identity for urban classes, and how this has been tackled in Pakistan.
For the former, academic work on identity formation links it very closely to the emergence of more widespread capitalism, especially of the print variety, and with issues of resource scarcity. As more claimants to power/resources emerge, collectivisation occurs around myths, ideologies, and figures.
For the latter, with the identity exigencies of a state like Pakistan, you can sort of understand why Islam gets thrown around in large doses, especially in urban centres where other identities are not prevalent (Lahore vs Karachi). Instead of looking at the rise of a public Islamic identity as a product of the 80’s, it’s probably a lot more useful to look at it as a direct consequence of the particular narrative adopted in 1947 by a newly-independent state, which has achieved fruition as urban-capitalistic developments become further entrenched.
At this point it is important to differentiate between terrorism, which is practiced on the margins, and conservatism, which is mainstream and might or might not give space to condone terrorism. The former is disconnected from the currently agreed rules of the game (functioning state, modernist capitalist economy), while the latter wants to work with religion within these very constraints.
This leads us to the second part of this argument. The four markers of increased conservatism mentioned at the start, are coupled with a parallel development: i.e., the adoption of a globally prevalent consumerist culture. Since Pakistan has increasingly submerged itself in the global economy, it has also become submerged, through default rather than design, in the culture associated with the world economy. A proximity to the US, both economically and in the media culture, has helped fashion this particular development, which now sees middle class youngsters juggle public proclamations of Islam vs the West, with a mouthful of McDonalds. Similarly, the demands and the culture of capitalism have encouraged female education and participation in the work force, dismantled biraderi/extended family networks giving way to individual voice and participation, and mainstreamed non-familial cross-gender relationships. All of these are, in essence, far removed from the increased conservatism that is taken as a given.
It is also this particular contradiction, between the markers on one hand, and increased submergence into the culture of the global economy, that could ultimately prove to be vital as far as the spread of Islamisation and conservatism in urban society are concerned. The debate now leaves us with three possible conclusions. The first is that these contradictions will continue to function the way they currently operate, leaving Pakistan stuck in a perpetual state of hypocritical public proclamations and consumption of global capitalism. The second is that we’ll see the rise of a more fascistic, and culturally more Islamic rise of capitalism (somewhat like Iran). The third is that as the entrenchment and dissemination of capitalism continues, religion will ultimately give way, both in politics and public voice, to the whole scale adoption of the global economic culture of capitalism and consumption.
While the first seems to be the most likely, the other two or any other result can also not be ruled out completely. What remains to be seen is how these various tensions play themselves out in the coming years, and whether a more desirable equilibrium can be achieved.

The writer works in the development sector, wonders about things, and then blogs at http://recycled-thought.blogspot.com. Write to him at [email protected]