“The burden of proof has shifted,” Cyril Almeida said with candid composure, at a talk attended by Islamabad’s intellectual elite at Kuch Khaas, titled “Pakistan after bin Laden”, on Friday. “If after a 10-year war the army has not been able to purge itself of radical elements, or get all to tag along, why do we assume there is no complicity at the higher echelons?” asked Cyril.
“I think our response to this question is emotional. We say, ‘surely not!’ But what has opened up in the recent weeks suggests there is a structural problem,” he said. “Think of it this way, if before the GHQ attack happened had you asked a retired or serving army officer, could someone attack the GHQ? They would say, ‘surely not.’ If you asked them after it, could PNS Mehran be attacked? They would say, ‘surely not.’ If you asked them, could Osama bin Laden be discovered in Abbottabad? They would say, ‘surely not!’” Cyril said. “Surely the problem is deeper,” he added.
THE WRONG QUESTIONS: “People have begun to attack the military but they have attacked it for the failure to spot Americans, but have not asked why Osama was here,” said Zahid Hussain, former editor of Newsline, when handed the microphone. “That there is radicalisation within the armed forces has been known for a while. Only that the military has chosen to either be ignorant about it or tacitly accept it,” he said.
Detailing radicalisation within the armed forces, Zahid said that in December 2003 the seriousness of radicalisation within the military became clear when attempts to assassinate former president Pervez Musharraf were traced to Pakistan Air Force. He said a similar situation being true of Pakistan Navy was also a known fact.
“There were radicals within it to the extent that a graduating batch in 1995 had called themselves the Taliban batch. The same batch had refused to see their female teachers and the teacher would teach from behind a curtain,” he said. “In the Zia era, navy officers were granted tableegh leaves. In 2002, four naval officers were killed fighting the US army in Afghanistan. The military appears to have remained in a state of denial,” he added.
‘COMPLEX ISSUES OF UNITY’: “This week has seen two assassinations. One which we all have spoken about: Saleem Shahzad. Another which we have all been silent about: University of Balochistan Professor Dr Saba Dashtiari,” said Declan Walsh, British newspaper the Guardian’s Pakistan correspondent. “Issues of nationhood in Pakistan are complex and the state of Pakistan is in deeper crisis. There are communities in Pakistan’s territorial bounds that feel alienated from the state, and they do not share the same crisis,” he said. “The idea of unity in Pakistan in complex,” he added.
PINNING RESPONSIBILITY: “There is a national state of denial,” Zahid said. “We are still unwilling to decide whether or not we have a united strategy on the rising militancy. The military is the architect of the problem. But now politicians have space and must assert their pressure.” Cyril, however, took polite departure, and said: “Let’s be sure that the attempt of the civilian government to assert pressure is still being sabotaged. The Abbottabad inquiry was re-named from ‘investigation’ to ‘inquiry’, since the earlier would have signalled military responsibility.”
“I have seen more politicians than military men willing to tackle the militancy, so the question to ask is: which of the two is in denial?” he added. At this point, Declan pitched in: “Let us step back. Let us ask why the military is in denial. Given that the military has been questioned, it is now having to come up with answers. And it is interesting that only today (Friday) Brigadier Shaukat Qadir wrote an opinion piece, which exposed the military’s strategic thinking quite nakedly.”
“The brigadier argued that an operation in North Waziristan must not be allowed because the Haqqani group, a strategic ally, would suffer,” Declan said. “And this rationale of thought shall continue if matters of strategic thinking do not become a matter of public discourse,” he added.