Strategic vision involves a comprehensive recognition of politico-economic and security issues that impinge on the country’s present and the future. The key questions are the operationalisation of the strategic vision in terms of policies and options and how to pursue them in interdependent domestic and global contexts.
Sovereignty is an important feature of the state system but no state can be oblivious to the dynamics of global and regional politics and refuse to address the concerns of the international community about its policies. It has become increasingly difficult for a state to pursue the strategic vision of the future in isolation from the international environment. The success of the state depends on maximising its strengths and minimising its deficiencies through effective mobilisation of human and material resources in the domestic context and increasing diplomatic options at the global level.
The strategic vision cannot be pursued without undertaking a periodic dispassionate review of the domestic and external environment, the changing nature of the challenges and the efficacy of the existing strategies. The options and constraints may change over time.
Pakistan’s strategic vision of its future is articulated by the military-intelligence establishment, the top bureaucracy and the civilian federal government. They maintain a dual track relationship with the political class, societal groups and the media. On the one hand, they are influenced by the debate on key political and security issues at the societal level and especially in the media. On the other hand, the above policy makers manipulate the discourse in the media and the society though political and societal linkages.
Pakistan’s dominant elite talk of making Pakistan a secure, stable, democratic, pluralist and tolerant Islamic state that recognises its obligations to the international community. However, there are problems with this vision at the operational level. Despite Pakistan’s commitment to a tolerant and democratic socio-political order, Pakistan has drifted towards religious intolerance and violence and the progress towards the goal of democracy is lop-sided. In today’s Pakistan the major threat to democracy comes not from the state but from hard line and extremist Islamic groups that reject modern democracy or they accept it to the extent it helps them to impose an Islamic order based on their literalist and fundamentalist interpretation of the religious Islamic text.
The vision of democratic Pakistan has a strong overlay of military security that caused distortions at the societal level because of the failure to create a balance between the imperative of democracy and societal security on the one hand and the requirements of territorial security on the other. The balance of allocation of resources and diplomatic priorities favoured the latter.
It seems that Pakistan’s military and intelligence establishment is more confused about the means to realise the strategic vision of the future. It views the religious extremists and violent groups as its main adversary and vows to eliminate them to assert the primacy of the state. However, its strategies do not always support the achievement of the goal.
The military-intelligence establishment is selective in adopting a tough line towards militant Islamic groups and views no threat from a pro-militancy mindset that has become the dominant societal feature, although this mindset does not always manifest in open support to militant groups. Invariably, it talks of foreign conspiracies against Pakistan and avoids criticism of militant Islamic groups.
In the post-Osama period, the ISI was able to divert to focus of popular and media discourse from the criticism of Army-ISI to violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty by the US military operation. The civilian government supported this shift as it downplayed the “inefficiency” and “incompetence” charge against the Army-ISI and the civilian government. Such a strategy has facilitated the achievement of the military’s immediate goal of diverting the rage of the people. However, this strategy is counterproductive to the strategic vision of elimination of religious extremism and terrorism and making Pakistan a democratic state. This strategy strengthened Islamic conservative and far-right political forces that extend varying degrees of support to militancy. In other words, the Army-ISI establishment and the federal government invoked the cooperation of the groups that were opposed to their efforts to control religious extremism and militancy.
Another dangerous trend is military-state encouragement to ultra-nationalism that targeted the international system as a threat to Pakistan’s sovereignty and national honour. This sentiment has gripped the major sections of the society, including the official civilian and military circles. In addition to Islamic parties and the leaders of the right-wing political parties, the retired civilian and military officers are active in promoting ultra-nationalism. Some economists and political activists with past or present linkages with Pakistani establishment argue that Pakistan did not need foreign economic assistance and that the IMF programme should be done away with unilaterally. The federal government and the military authorities were unable or unwilling to counter ultra-nationalist discourse.
The kind of ultra-nationalism that has been witnessed in Pakistan during the last one month will make it difficult for the military and civilian policy makers to fulfill their obligations towards the international system and improve their interaction with the US. They will face more opposition than ever which is the result of their ill-conceived polices.
The current ultra-nationalism can cause discipline problems in the military-intelligence establishment and civilian government because unregulated ultra-nationalism can lead to free-for-all actions by individuals and groups. Ultra-nationalism also provides entry to pro-militancy elements into the civilian and military state apparatus or cause sensitive information leakage.
Pakistan’s salvation lies in pursuing the strategies that help to achieve the strategic vision of a stable, coherent, democratic and pluralist Pakistan that functions as a respected and active player at the international level. This requires a non-ambiguous approach for containing religious extremism and militancy. Pakistan’s power elite, especially the Army and the ISI, should in no way invoke the Islamic and political far right to serve their immediate agenda of sustaining their primacy. The military and civilian authorities should make it clear that religious extremism and militancy of any type is not acceptable.
There is a need to recognise the importance of international linkages and cooperation, including peaceful relations with the neighbours. Pakistan needs the support of all major players at the international level. Active diplomacy and engagement rather than isolation or defiance of the international system are rational options for Pakistan.
The writer is an independent political and defence analyst.