The tail wags the dog. Back in the day, when the then government had made the decision to publicly test our nuclear program, the logic that was given to the public (though it needed no convincing) was that our nuclear devices were going to protect us. How ironic, then, that in the thirteen years since, our entire security paradigm has been centred around how to protect them. More ironic still, that this paradigm has been largely unquestioned in public discourse. We should support the US in attacking Afghanistan or else they’ll take out our nukes, pandered erstwhile dictator Musharraf to the people. This made all those opposing the alliance sit up and take notice. Such arguments continue till this very day and form the basis of our most primal fear.
The principal argument in favour of nuclear weapons (not without its detractors) was that since there is no way we could compete with India in conventional warfare, we could use them as deterrents, specially since the Indian nuclear test presented us with an opportunity to do so. Point taken. But did that mean that spending on conventional weapons would then be curtailed? It did. But that is not what happened. Since the tests of the 28th of May, 1998, the candle seems to be burning from both ends, with the taxpayers footing the bill not just for our nuclear program but also for other toys for the boys.
It is painfully clear to everyone but the boys club that Pakistan cannot afford to be a part of an arms race, nuclear or otherwise. If you fight a war with the laws of economics, the laws of economics will win. In principle, Pakistan and India need to be looking not at matrices of mutually assured destruction but the resolution of disputes to begin with. Nuclear weapons have a deterrent value but we should be looking at a future where deterrence won’t be needed to begin with.
The immense human potential of a fifth of humanity lies locked within two states that care more about symbols than their people.