There were a number of key decisions taken in the past by military generals which amply indicate that the army lacks the capacity to look at vital issues in a comprehensive manner. These decisions subsequently had a highly negative impact on Pakistan’s security, social structure and economy.
Zia-ul-Haq and his generals simply failed to visualise the consequences when they decided to provide all out support to America’s proxy war against the USSR in Afghanistan. The ISI helped CIA bring in thousands of jihadis from all over the world and accommodated them in the tribal areas and in what is Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The involvement in the civil war brought in millions of Afghan refugees and tens of thousands of lethal weapons. The country was turned into a conduit for heroin trade and a big consumer of the drug. This original sin gave birth to a chain of negative consequences, some of which still continue to pester the country.
The military establishment ensured that the policy of support to the extremists and militants was not abandoned even after Zia’s removal. A number of top security officials got transformed into extremists as they groomed the international jihadi brigade.
Musharraf and the generals under him failed to realise the dangers of continuing to back the Taliban regime which was harbouring OBL and turning Afghanistan into a launchpad for the terrorists to destabilise the region. Thousands of Pakistanis were encouraged by extremist organisations to get training in bomb making, sabotage activities, guerilla warfare in camps run by Pakistani instructors. These elements were to subsequently turn their guns against their trainers and patrons.
Musharraf and the GHQ under him again failed to realise the long term implications of yielding to the US demands. In a misconceived attempt to ‘turn the calamity into opportunity’, Musharraf handed over bases inside Pakistan to the US, from which drones were to subsequently fly.
The army leadership is still taking vital decisions relating to security and foreign relations despite an elected government being in office. Instead of allowing the government to decide how to react to the Abbottabad affair, the generals issued a policy statement maintaining that another raid of a similar kind would prompt a review of military cooperation with the United States. The Prime Minister who had supported the US action earlier was made to look like a fool.
Meanwhile the decision by the parliament to conduct an independent enquiry into the Abbottabad failures has not been implemented for opposition from the powers that be. What appears is that the army wants the parliament to be no more than a body which takes responsibility for army’s decisions and lends support to it whenever the army faces the unhappy consequences of its faulty policies.
The policies have led to a point where over 35,000 civilians and about 5,000 security personnel have been killed by the terrorists; the economy is in tatters and, except for China, Pakistan is left with no friend.
Meanwhile, retired senior military officers and pro-establishment politicians and commentators have launched a barrage of criticism to malign the civilian government for a sellout to the US, maintaining that the war on terror is not Pakistan’s war but a US ploy to take away the country’s nuclear assets. The critics conveniently forget that the army leadership continues to remain, as before, the sole author of the policies regarding terrorism and relations with the US and Afghanistan. If the CIA has interrogated OBL’s wives, or the US helicopter destroyed in Abbottabad is being returned or the CIA allowed to scour OBL’s Abbottabad compound, this is happening courtesy the non-political powers.
The problem with the parliamentary leadership is partly lack of initiative and partly fear of the army. However, unless the parliament is ready to assert itself, policies will continue to be formulated by the off-stage players.
The work done by the parliament in modern times is both varied in nature and considerable in volume. A good deal of its business is, therefore, transacted by what are called the parliamentary committees.
The parliament has set up three committees to deal with security and defence. They however suffer from a number of shortcomings. As a recent PILDAT study points out, the absence of parliamentary leadership in defining policy and overseeing its implementation is most stark in the present national security scenario. It is time parliament demands its right to be informed on security related issues.
It is ironic that while the US Congress undertakes a periodic review of its strategy in Afghanistan, Pakistan chooses to remain confined to just responding to events.
The comparison with other parliamentary democracies, such as India and the UK, shows that our committees lag far behind in efficiency. They need to hold more meetings, publish more reports and send more recommendations to parliament than they have done so far. Sustaining democracy requires eternal vigilance by parliament which is presently lacking.
The writer is a former academic and a political analyst.
