The killing of Osama bin Laden (OBL) in Abbottabad raises a host of questions that need to be addressed in a dispassionate and professional manner so as to respond to the concerns expressed about the incident in Pakistan and abroad. Such a comprehensive exercise is needed to cope with Pakistan’s dilemma that despite its sacrifices for controlling religious extremism and terrorism, the international community has strong reservations about its counter-terrorism track record.
The politically active circles and the media in Pakistan have found it difficult to rise above their partisan and highly skewed worldview to deal with the multi-dimensional OBL episode. Each political party and group has approached the incident from its narrow party interest rather than adopting a comprehensive approach against the backdrop of Pakistan’s counter-terrorism policy and its problems at the global level. Therefore, the analysis of the OBL incident inside and outside the two houses of the parliament is dominated by a narrow and partisan perspective with a focus on point-scoring or building pressure on selective targets, i.e., the PPP-led federal government or the army and intelligence establishment.
In the tradition of the blasphemy law protest and the post-Raymond Davis street marches, the Islamist and militant groups joined together to target the United States, Pakistan’s federal government and the army/intelligence authorities. The Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD) that avoided involvement in domestic politics until the blasphemy law protest was again active in the OBL agitation, reflecting a major shift in its disposition. The JuD is now a domestic political player.
The PML(N) has turned more Islamist and politically rightist since the departure of Raymond Davis. It again joined the rightist parties, including the JuD, to stage an anti-US and pro-Osama march in Lahore.
Declaring OBL as the martyr, these political parties highlighted one aspect of the OBL affair i.e. US military operation in Abbottabad as a violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty, and targeted the US for criticism. The other major criticism focused on the PPP-led federal government that was accused of selling Pakistan’s national interests to the US for economic rewards. Interestingly enough, the Islamic parties were somewhat restrained in criticism of the Army and the ISI.
The PML(N) shared the above protest themes but it also engaged in strident criticism of the army high command and the ISI authorities. At times, the criticism bordered on slander. Ch Nisar Ali and other senior leaders led the onslaught. Nawaz Sharif was bitterly critical of the army. In a way, the PML(N) was attempting to achieve three objectives: target the federal government, strengthen its ties with Islamist/political right parties in their anti-US agitation and use the opportunity to vent its grievances against the army.
The PML(N), especially Nawaz Sharif, has not been able to overcome the trauma of losing power in the coup in October 1999 to the army led by General Pervez Musharraf. Nawaz Sharif takes on the army whenever some opportunity strikes. Further, the PML(N) refuses to acknowledge that the Sharif family left Pakistan in December 2000 under an arrangement with the military government of General Pervez Musharraf on the initiative of the Saudis and Saad Hariri, son of former Lebanon Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, who himself served as Lebanon’s prime minister. The army’s criticism helps the PML(N) argument that as a prisoner, Nawaz Sharif had no choice but to go into “exile” imposed by the army authorities.
Another interesting aspect of the post-OBL agitation is that it was limited mainly to Islamic/Far Right political groups and was more widespread in the Punjab than in other province. Islamic parties launched protest in other provinces but it remained weak and limited. The province of Punjab seems to have emerged as the main repository of Islamic/militant and far-right political disposition. Since 2010-2011, there is a clear drift in the Punjab towards Islamist worldview with discernable sympathy for militant groups. This manifests in anti-Americanism, greater emphasis on the defiance of the world by Pakistan a sovereign state and the talk of global conspiracies against “Islamic and nuclear-armed” Pakistan. This trend has been strengthened by the PML(N) decision to adopt a strident nationalist disposition with an emphasis on rejection of foreign economic assistance and protection of sovereignty and self-respect.
The OBL issue has become a “football” in Pakistan’s domestic politics, making it difficult to address it in a dispassionate manner. Even the federal government and the military find it difficult to realistically address the professional and technical issues arising out of the US military operation in Abbottabad and adopt a dispassionate diplomacy to cope with the international pressures. The internal inquiry by the army is a better approach than the appointment of judicial commission that will further politicise the matter. Pakistan needs less politics on this issue and more professional inquisition and realistic diplomacy.
The sovereignty issue has to be examined along with other aspects. There are technical and professional issues of intelligence gathering and the response by the army and the air force. Was it a lack of information or inability or a conscious decision to hold-back? Pakistan’s official and political circles should also dwell on the issue of militancy and sovereignty. Should the Pakistani state ignore the presence of foreign militants, Arabs and others, in Pakistan who use Pakistani territory to pursue their global agendas? How do a good number of people blamed for violent activities get traced back to Pakistan?
Further, there is a need to examine how far Pakistan’s sovereignty has become a fiction because the militant groups based in the tribal areas and mainland repeatedly challenge the Pakistani state authority and kill civilian and security personnel?
Unless Pakistan’s political and official circles, including the military, are prepared to address the difficult question of what has gone wrong with Pakistani society and state system they will continue to face external pressures and image problem abroad. All states are sovereign but they do not exercise sovereignty in the same manner. What matters most is the extent of internal social and political cohesion, the state’s ability to assert its primacy on its territory, the economy and a positive relationship with the international community. These factors help to turn the abstract notion of sovereignty into an operational strategy.
The writer is an independent political and defence analyst.
