Muhammad Farooq waits by his truck outside the Pakistani border town of Chaman, the main crossing into southern Afghanistan. He has driven several hundred kilometers from the port city of Karachi carrying supplies for NATO forces, along with a couple of dozen other tankers and trucks.
“We will start moving soon in a convoy,” says Farooq. “We are regularly attacked in this area. We are attacked with sticks, stones and even fired upon.” Indeed, many of the trucks have dents and broken windows, from stones that have found their mark. “This is my third trip here,” Farooq says, “and I have decided that this is the last time I’m coming here. It’s not worth it.”
Farooq’s calculation of whether his journey is worth it is a reflection of the larger assessments going on in Islamabad and Washington, which have sharpened since Osama bin Laden was found hiding in plain sight in a garrison town near Islamabad. Americans wonder if the billions of dollars in military aid they give Pakistan is being misspent or diverted to beef up Pakistan’s military capabilities against India, or possibly even to bolster its nuclear weapons capabilities.
Pakistan’s government and military believes it is paying a high price to fight America’s war against al Qaeda and the Taliban. More than 30,000 Pakistanis have been killed in the decade since the Sept. 11. 2001 attacks, including 5,000 soldiers, police and intelligence agents. Pakistan, for its part, has received $20.7 billion worth of US assistance over the past decade, about two-thirds of it military aid. What is clear is that both sides feel short-changed by an alliance they forged 10 years ago that is rooted in battling militancy, but which has largely ignored starkly different strategic interests.
TRADE-OFF: Pakistan has fought three major wars with India and fought countless skirmishes. This rivalry largely defines its policy. The United States has given Pakistan billions to flush out Taliban and al Qaeda militants along the Afghan border, but few doubt that Islamabad actually protects many of them, seeing them as collateral to ensure that it-and not India-has a key role in any settlement in Afghanistan.
Pakistan is also suspicious of the United States’ ties with India, a relationship it hopes to counter by cosying up to China. All that makes for an alliance that is, at best, half-hearted and one in which aid money is diverted towards what Pakistan sees as its strategic interest. In the 2009-10 budget, official defence expenditures amounted to $4.45 billion out of a total national budget of $29 billion.
A big chunk of the military aid has been spent on weapons systems that appear to have little to do with fighting terrorists in the mountain wilderness, including 31 F-16 fighters, anti-tank missiles and launchers, fast patrol boats, and the refurbishment of a frigate. “Possibly some of our monies are being diverted to help them increase their missile launch activities for their nuclear weaponry,” said Republican Senator Bob Corker, who along with colleagues received a closed-door briefing by CIA Director Leon Panetta about the bin Laden mission. “So, you know, I think this is a major reset button for us, time for us to really look at this relationship in a serious way,” he told CNN in an interview.
SUPPLY LINES: The convoys that carry non-lethal supplies for the US-led war in landlocked Afghanistan, through crossings in Chaman and Khyber Pass, are just one factor in the calculus. Lawmakers, angry over the US raid that killed bin Laden have warned that Pakistan may cut the supply lines if the United States continues to launch missile strikes against militants on their soil.
Several senior US Senate Democrats this week urged the Obama administration not to disburse any more security aid to Pakistan until it is sure Islamabad is not letting al Qaeda and other militant groups operate there. Blowing up the relationship, and the aid that comes with it, is an option the United States and Pakistan can ill-afford, because the stakes are so high.
MORE RIGOROUS ACCOUNTING: It has been widely assumed that some of the aid money is being diverted to well-connected pockets. Pakistan, in 2008, included $200 million for air defense radar equipment when the insurgents do not have air forces, and $30 million for roads and $15 million for bunkers that were not actually built. The navy received more than $19,000 per vehicle each month just to maintain and operate a fleet of 20 passenger vehicles.
Between 2004 and 2007, Pakistan billed the US government $200 a month per soldier in food costs-it fluctuated between $500 and $800 for sailors. That’s between 2.5 and 9.6 times Pakistan’s per-capita annual income, which was just over $1,000 in 2009. When the Office of Defense Representative-Pakistan (ODRP) began to more rigorously verify the Pakistani claims after that 2008 GAO report, the percentage of claims that were rejected doubled in six months to 6 percent and then more than tripled to 22 percent in the next six-month period.
The more rigorous accounting and slower disbursement has added another irritant to the uneasy partnership. Pakistan is at pains to point out that much of the money it gets is not really aid but a reimbursement of expenses it incurs in fighting the US-led war on terrorism. Pakistan is one of the top recipients of US aid along with Egypt and Israel, but it has not bought America much popularity. Opinion surveys show an overwhelming majority of the Pakistani public holds an unfavorable view of their ostensible ally. So, is US aid to Pakistan really worthwhile? Officials say only time can tell.
