Post-OBL fallout

The military and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) have adopted a multi-pronged strategy to cope with the security and diplomatic fallout after the Abbottabad episode of May 2. These strategies include an in-house investigation of intelligence related issues, a spirited defence of their counter-terrorism role in the past and a heavy reliance on nationalist/Islamist discourse to assure the people that the security agencies have the capacity to deal with any external attack or intervention. This highly nationalist idiom of the Foreign Secretary and the military spokesman had anti-American undertones with the objective of mobilising Islamists and the political right in favour of the military who are viewed as the traditional allies of the military.

The criticism from abroad has raised the spectre of collusion between Pakistan’s army/intelligence authorities and Osama Bin Laden. The criticism raised three issues: why did the intelligence agencies not know about OBL’s movement or some officials did not pass on the information to the relevant higher Pakistani authorities or did OBL enjoy direct and indirect official support?

The domestic criticism has focused on intelligence and security lapses. It is now clear that OBL stayed in different locations in Pakistan but his movement was not known to the intelligence agencies. Further, US helicopters were able to defy Pakistan’s air defence system (radars and other aircraft detection systems) managed by the Pakistan Air Force. Pakistan’s aircraft went up in the air when the US helicopters had gone after spending 2 hours in Pakistan (flying time and ground operation time). The Pakistan Air Force needs to do some explaining. The military and intelligence authorities faced sharper criticism within Pakistan after the Abbottabad incident than was the case in 2007 when the movement for the restoration of the judiciary targeted President General Pervez Musharraf and his senior colleagues in the Army. This time, the opposition parties, especially the PML(N), bitterly criticised the civilian leaders and military top brass for letting the US undermine Pakistan’s “sovereignty and honour and dignity.”

The military faced the major thrust of domestic criticism because it dominates Pakistan’s security policy and major areas of foreign policy. The hesitancy on the part of the civilian government to explain the official position on the Abbottabad incident can be attributed to the fact that the Foreign Office could not take a firm position on its own. The first statement by the Foreign Office was brief and vague. The Foreign Secretary talked to the press with hard hitting rhetoric on May 5 after the army top brass made up their mind about the ways to address the Abbottabad incident. The statements of the Foreign Secretary and the army spokesman after the Corps Commanders’ meeting were overlapping.

The US administration did not realise that its covert operation and a stream of charges against Pakistan military and intelligence establishment had negative implications for Pakistan in the region. This encouraged Afghanistan’s President Karzai to once again accuse Pakistan of harbouing terrorism. India’s military establishment claimed that they could also launch surgical air-strikes to dismantle terrorist camps in Pakistan. Naturally, Pakistan’s civilian government and security establishment were extremely angry because the US had, once again, disregarded Pakistan’s regional sensitivities while pursuing its global agenda.

The Army spokesman’s statement that “any similar action violating the sovereignty of Pakistan will warrant a review of the level of military and intelligence cooperation with the U.S” can be described as a morale boaster for the people and an attempt to show that the army authorities could take a tough position vis-à-vis the US. The Foreign Secretary also made several tough comments. One wonders if Pakistan’s military can really respond in military terms to American covert operations or drone attacks by using the aircraft and equipment obtained from the US without taking into account the economic and diplomatic implications of such an action.

Pakistan’s military establishment has developed populist orientations and it invokes emotive nationalism and appeals to rightist and Islamist circles when it feels that it is under political attack from abroad, threatening its interests and position in Pakistan’s political system. It invoked these groups and the media in September-October 2009 when the details of the Kerry-Lugar Bill became public. Its contents pertaining to the military and the intelligence agencies were viewed by the military top brass as an attempt by Pakistan’s civilian government to use American law to restrain and malign the military. The Army’s public denunciation of sections of the bill resulted in a massive propaganda campaign against the civilian government and the US in Pakistani media, spearheaded by Islamist and the far-right circles.

The Army Chief issued a hard hitting statement on the drone attack in South Waziristan on March 17 which opened the flood gates of condemnation of the drone attack by the civilian leadership and others. (Two drone attacks have taken place since the Army Chief’s statement but the Army stayed quiet). On April 30, the Army Chief employed the discourse of fra-right political circles when he said that “honour would not be traded for prosperity.” These political circles were happy that the Army Chief was speaking their language in the context of Pakistan’s relations with the US. They have regularly argued that Pakistan’s rulers have sold Pakistan’s self-respect and dignity to get economic assistance from the US.

A similar pattern of reliance on highly nationalist and Islamist/rightist discourse is noticeable in the military’s disposition after the Abbottabad incident. This strategy helps the military to obtain popular support but it becomes a constraint on its capacity to fully go after all extremists and militant groups because the political circles, sought after by the military, extend varying degree of support to militants and extremists.

It is not possible for OBL to move from place to place in Pakistan without some local support network. Even if the official circles were not involved there is a need to trace his support system in the civilian circles and search for other foreign fighters, especially any other top Al-Qaeda and Afghan Taliban leaders.

The official circles in the US and Pakistan should avoid public denunciation of each other. Instead they should take up these matters through the diplomatic channels. The unguarded American statements have multiplied domestic problems of Pakistan’s civilian government which creates confusion in Pakistan. Further, the military turns to Islamists and the far right to deflect pressure. These trends will not help to achieve the goal of the elimination of terrorism.

The writer is an independent political and defence analyst.