Pakistan faces a serious problem of perception at the international level. There is a wide divergence between how the political and societal leaders in Pakistan perceive and interpret terrorism and internal security issues and how these developments are perceived outside of Pakistan. The gap between the two is often so wide that two or more political discourses are available on what is happening in Pakistan and how to cope with these challenges. This has created a major problem of communication between a large number of Pakistan-based political analysts and leaders of public opinion and the especially the media on the one hand and how the international community and international media interpret the present and the future of Pakistan on the other.
Most political leaders and the political and societal activists in Pakistan condemn terrorist activities and suicide bombings. However, when it comes to the question of identifying the groups engaged in such activities, their opinion gets divided. In addition to Islamist groups that function as the political front for militant groups, most others are not prepared to blame the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan or any Pakistan mainland based group even when they claim responsibility for a violent incident.
The Islamist political parties and the Islamic clergy argue that the Taliban are friends of Pakistan and the genuine Taliban cannot resort to such violent activities. Violence is resorted to, they argue, by the agents of “enemies” of Pakistan who buy-off some people to engage in such activities under the garb of the Taliban or other groups. A somewhat divergent view of these militant groups comes from the activists of the Barelvi Islamic traditions who are perturbed by the attacks on sufi shrines by the militant groups subscribing mainly to Deobandi/Whabbi/Slalafi Islamic traditions. But the Barelvis share with other hard-line and militant groups the sharp criticism of the West in general and the United States in particular.
A related discourse explains the growing internal violence with reference to American drone attacks in the tribal areas. Though no Pakistani media person or a political leader, including those from the tribal areas, has ever visited the target of drone attack to check the facts given to them by the militant groups, they argue if you kill people, they are bound to turn into suicide bombers.
The common denominator of these Pakistani perceptions is that the sources of terrorism are described as being located outside of Pakistan. Either the enemies of Pakistan are said to promote violence in order to destabilise Pakistan or the periodic drone attacks are the cause of extremism and violence. Pakistan is thus described as the victim of international conspiracy aiming at undermining Islam and Muslims. There are a small number of people who emphasise the need of examining the question of “what has gone wrong with Pakistan?” They talk of internal sources of Pakistan’s current predicament.
Pakistan’s perception abroad is very different. The violent activities of hard-line militant Islamic groups are viewed as a threat to Pakistan’s internal stability and harmony but such groups are said to be Pakistan-based. Pakistan is viewed as both victim of terrorism and a source of terrorism beyond its borders. The other strong perception is that Pakistan’s security authorities are selective in targeting the extremist Islamic groups; some such groups are allowed enough space to survive and expand discreetly.
There is hardly any western government and credible analyst that favours increased internal chaos in Pakistan. It is generally accepted that if the Pakistani state goes under, no outside power will be able to control these extremist groups. Neither India nor the US would be able to cope with them. These militants can be controlled by Pakistan’s civilian and military authorities by determination and enhanced capacity to assert their primacy.
A recently held workshop at the Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore, addressed these issues. This workshop also included some Pakistani scholars who led the discussion on various aspects of Pakistani state and society. There was a consensus that Pakistan faces more serious internal challenges than the external threats. The most serious challenge is the faltering economy that manifests in the growing fiscal deficit, failure to increase revenue and reduce its expenditure, acute power shortages, increased poverty against the backdrop of high inflation, and the failure to tax the rich and affluent.
It was rightly argued that Pakistan’s other major predicament was growing religious extremism, social intolerance and proliferation of hard-line Islamic groups that use violence to pursue their religio-political agendas. They are not likely to succeed because of their internal conflicts and the efforts of the security forces to contain them. However, it is difficult to suggest if the Pakistani state authorities have mustered enough capacity and determination to contain all of them. Such groups are expected to survive for a long time not only because the state tolerates some of them but also because religious orthodoxy and sympathy for militancy has seeped deep into the society and civilian and military state institutions.
The on-going democratic experiment was viewed as being under pressure from various sources, including the overconfident military and overactive superior judiciary. The latter is attempting to free itself from the control of the elected institutions in the tradition of the military.
There was hardly anyone in the workshop who explained Pakistan’s current predicament with reference to international conspiracies. Rather, the focus of the discussion was on the internal dynamics of Pakistan’s multifaceted problems. All agreed that Pakistan had the potential to overcome these problems provided its civilian and military elite are clear as to what do they want to make of Pakistan. Does the future lies with Jinnah’s modern, democratic Pakistan that derives moral foundations from Islamic principles or a literalist, fundamentalist Islamic-religious state that is at war with itself and the rest of the world?
The international community is watching if Pakistani civilian and military elite are prepared to recognise the internal sources of trouble and move forward to control them. The international community can help Pakistan but it cannot and will not solve Pakistan’s problems.
The writer is an independent political and defence analyst.