Some more on Nasr…

Given much feedback and questions generated by my two articles in another paper on the Nasr short range ballistic missile test, perhaps some more is in order.
Let me consider one basic question put forward by readers: Is the security establishment stupid, as you have implied; don’t they know these things?
The answer is; they are not stupid. Some of them are, in fact, very smart. Yet, being smart has to be balanced with the culture of a large-scale bureaucratic organisation. Organisation theory is fairly clear on two consistent findings about bureaucratic organisations: bounded rationality and systematic stupidity. Then there is the problem of path dependence which broadly means that decisions taken at any point are limited by decisions taken in the past. But more than anything else, the course of action someone might take would depend on the premise he is using.
For instance, if I were to convince myself that there is a possibility that given the nuclear overhang my adversary may be trying to plan a short, sharp strike against me without crossing the red lines (we will not debate what those red lines are because they are rightly kept ambiguous) I could argue thus:
I have a deterrent in my strategic arsenal. But the adversary could strike me in ways that would make it difficult for me to resort to a strategic option. I could argue that the adversary would argue that I would not climb higher on the escalatory ladder, but by testing me at the sub-strategic level through such strikes spread over time and space he could force me to fight below the nuclear level and by doing so (a) dilute my strategic deterrent and (b) deprive me of my advantage. If, in theory, the adversary could do this, he would have gained a huge asymmetric advantage over me.
Based on this logic I could say, as some people have written, that even in the presence of the strategic deterrent it would make sense to add another “layer” against an “evolving threat”. In fact, this is precisely the language used in the Inter-Services Public Relations press release of April 19. If I were arguing along these lines, I could say the following:
By adding this “layer” I would be deterring any thought by the Indian security establishment to conduct any unilateral “conventional” offensive(s) against Pakistan without crossing Pakistan’s red lines. India’s Cold Start Doctrine (CSD) – Independent Battle groups (IBGs) to be employed against Pakistan in short, sharp blitzkriegs – needs to be challenged by introducing into the theatre the possibility of a response through a tube-launched short range ballistic missile. Cold Start would get cold feet not only because the Indian Army will have to cater to this factor in any operational planning but the Indian political leadership will be highly reluctant to permit any sub-strategic operations against Pakistan within the framework of the classic stability-instability paradox.
I could go one step further and even add a strategic layer to this theatre-level, operational argument. Since this kind of weapon system will necessarily be dispersed and held by units and sub-units in the field, given other factors, it could add a terrible element of instability which India will have to factor into both operational plans as well as any decision to meaningfully engage Pakistan. In other words, the move involves brinkmanship, and given that India will have to share the risk, would force it to avoid disaster. In the overall scenario that could lead to meaningful political engagement.
If I stick to my original premise, this trajectory sounds perfectly rational and smart. But then I can argue differently.
First, consider the question of when and how India might attack Pakistan. Given India’s growth, economic stakes, and global integration, a war, especially one that can get out of hand, is not in India’s interest. In theory, the only development that could get India to throw caution to the winds and think in terms of a hot conflict would be a string of Mumbai-style attacks. If this is accepted, and if it is also accepted that it is equally in Pakistan’s interest to prevent such attacks, it should be clear that there are multiple other options that can be tried to avoid the remote possibility of a conflict for which we require a weapon system that would add another “layer” to our defences – as argued earlier.
At this stage, I am not even arguing that Pakistan’s conventional capability may be sufficient to deter any operational plans under the CSD (that was the only ostensible reason for conducting the Azm-e-Nau III exercise last year); nor am I arguing here that CSD has failed to get off the ground both for conceptual and multiple operational reasons. But even if India were to stick to it and at some point in the future acquire the synergies required for the IBGs to be meaningful – they are welcome to do so, given deep pockets – Pakistan’s strategic deterrent would be enough to prevent operationalisation of Indian forces under that doctrine.
The point, let’s not forget, is that Pakistan’s strategic deterrent is enough to keep India at bay unless India was forced by Pakistan into finding military options to blunt Pakistan’s asymmetric deterrence.
My argument is that the instability we want to introduce into the theatre supposedly for the purposes of deterrence at the sub-strategic level – with possible dividends for higher political objectives – is to offset a threat that can more effectively be addressed through other strategies, both military and non-military. Also, how and when that threat may materialise would depend primarily on what kind of threat we can become for India rather than the other way round.
Quoting CSD and statements like the one delivered by former Indian Army Chief General Deepak Kapoor to justify threat-addressing responses like this without reference to the India-Pakistan dynamics only tells half the story. The other half lies at our end and we need to take that seriously. We have already seen how instability can turn upon oneself; there is no need to experiment with it once again especially when other, viable options are available.
This is not to say that India is a babe in the woods; far from it. But the issue relates to why we must only develop a particular response to the exclusion of other strategies. There is danger in this of scientists running amok in collusion with the faujis who seem to be only thinking in terms of military responses to “evolving” threats without putting those threats into context. This is a problem involving both civil-military relations and decision-making.

The writer is Contributing Editor, The Friday Times.