The Lahore Resolution has always baffled the overt and covert supporters of a strong centre and a polity based on religion. The establishment has consistently refused to implement it. Some have tried to minimise the Resolutions importance by maintaining that a typographic mistake is responsible for the term independent states, which they insist was rectified at a much smaller Legislators Convention of the All India Muslim League (AIML) by changing the plural states into a singular noun. This, however, does not weaken the stand of those who support maximum provincial autonomy as the rest of the sentence still requires constituent units of the proposed state to be autonomous and sovereign.
The words of the Resolution are carved in stone at the base of Minar-e-Pakistan and continue to defy strong centrists and obscurantists. The Resolution reads thus: No constitutional plan would be workable or acceptable to the Muslims unless geographically contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should be so constituted with such territorial readjustments as may be necessary. That the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in majority as in the North-Western and Eastern zones of India should be grouped to constitute independent states in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign.”
It further maintains, That adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards shall be specifically provided in the constitution for minorities in the units and in the regions for the protection of their religious, cultural, economic, political, administrative and other rights of the minorities, with their consultation. Arrangements thus should be made for the security of Muslims where they were in a minority.”
The Resolution has no vagueness about it. It aptly summarises the consensus that had been evolved about the new country by the AIML under Jinnah by 1940. While important matters about the new country were yet to be decided including its name, there was a total consensus over the federal structure and pluralist character of the new state.
It was no ordinary gathering which had passed the Resolution. Those who had come together at the Minto Park on March 23, 1940 were the topmost leaders from all over India. The Resolution was no casually passed document either.
Let us have a look at the way the Resolution materialised. The AIML had three decision making tiers. First, a 21-member Working Committee nominated by the President in exercise of his discretionary powers. Second, the AIML Council with about 500 members chosen on the basis of the ratio of Muslim population in each province. The third and the topmost tier was the conference of the delegates for the annual meeting of the AIML numbering about 5,000. The Lahore Resolution had been unanimously passed by all the three tiers. Thus, no other body of the AIML had the authority to change its wording.
The Resolution was no secret document. It was passed in the open annual session of the AIML attended by party representatives who had come from all the nooks and corners of India. The Resolution was proposed by prominent Leaguer Fazlul Haque, Chief Minister of Bengal. Those who supported it included Sir Abdullah Haroon from Sindh, Qazi Isa from Balochistan, Aurangzeb Khan from NWFP, Maulana Zafar Ali Khan from Punjab, I I Chundrigar from Bombay, Abdur Rauf Shah from CP, Abdul Hamid Khan from Madras, Abdul Mateen Choudhry from Assam and Nawab Ismail Khan from Bihar.
The idea of a separate country had appeared on the practical agenda of the AIML only after the 1937 elections. These elections had led to the formation of Congress governments in most Indian provinces. Soon, it was widely felt that the democracy practiced by Congress amounted to the tyranny of the majority. A Congress directive issued to its provincial administrations put a complete ban on the inclusion of any minority group in the government. Minority parties seeking a share in the government were required to first put an end to their separate entities and join the Congress. Reports started appearing about persecution of minorities within months of the formation of the Congress governments.
Jinnah had rightly understood that whereas there was a desire among the Muslim majority provinces to join hands to create a new country, they were highly concerned about the centre-province relations in any future set up. While the people of Muslim majority provinces were unwilling to allow those belonging to other religions to force their will on them, they were equally careful lest Muslims from any other province might appropriate their resources or opportunities. No province was willing to allow the centre or any other province to interfere in its internal affairs. So the creation of a new country had to be predicated on maximum autonomy. Had the provinces been told in 1940 that the new system would be characterised by a strong centre and weak provinces, none including Punjab would have been willing to join it.
After the creation of Pakistan powerful bureaucracy and military leadership with centralist mindsets created a polity where provincial autonomy was steamrollered. The creation of One Unit and the denial of rights to East Pakistan created grounds for the break up of Pakistan in 1971. Under Zia and Musharraf, denial of provincial rights led to a strong sense of deprivation in smaller provinces.
The 18th amendment has extended the sphere of provincial autonomy. It remains to be seen how this is implemented. Meanwhile, the way the establishment continues to micromanage Balochistan from outside creates doubts if it would allow the elected government to enforce maximum autonomy.
The writer is a former academic and a political analyst.