A leader wilfully ignores the will of his people. His security forces cut down protesting civilians in a hail of fire. His actions are condemned by his neighbours and the United Nations warns that the African country is on the brink of civil war. While this may describe the infamous Colonel Gaddafi of Libya currently being pounded from the air, it in fact refers to Laurent Gbagbo, the President of the Ivory Coast since 2000; he has ignored election results and defied the censure of the world. His hapless opponent Alassane Ouattara, the internationally recognised winner, has seen his followers being massacred by Mr Gbagos death squads.
The Wests diametrically opposite response to both crises has been highly duplicitous. While the situation in the Ivory Coast has kindled fears that the Ivorian civil war will not only be reignited but degenerate into a regional conflagration, the West has done little beyond hand wringing and backing the African Unions ineffectual efforts. The only commodity the Ivory Coast has the market cornered on is cocoa. It is doubtful that Nestle and Cadbury can marshal the same leverage and clout as Shell and Chevron in the determination of foreign policy.
Resultantly and in sharp contrast has been the reaction to Libya. Under the aegis of the United Nations, it is being subjected to heavy air attacks with the Security Council vowing to take all necessary actions. The Wests latest hardware is undergoing its baptism of fire with the Dassualt Rafale and the Eurofighter debuting for the worlds arms dealers over Libyas bleak skies.
Heavy aerial bombardment has wiped out the Libyan Air Force and air defence system; Gaddafis command and control centre has been demolished. These actions go well beyond the enforcement of a no-fly zone which is limited to air patrols over the disputed airspace. The gung-ho attitude towards air strikes is especially disturbing when placed in context of the Iraq debacle. Action may instead galvanise support for a tyrant, both internationally and domestically.
Intervention in another Arab, Muslim and oil rich country, what could possibly go wrong? There are nagging fears, especially in the Muslim world, of mission creep whereby the tasks the Western campaign assigns itself will continue to grow and eventually encompass boots on the ground.
Although Gaddafis offensive has been blunted by the aerial assault, there is no guarantee the tide has turned. His forces still outgun the lightly armed rebels. He has displayed utter brutality and callousness in the conflict. America has attacked him before, in 1986, and he is unlikely to be cowed now. An aerial campaign is no substitute for ground troops. But in the aftermath of Iraq, Western troops in Libya are an unattractive option.
Another possible scenario is in the offing. It is noteworthy that Egypt and Libya faced off in a 1977 border war that left scars. With the Egyptian army is in the driving seat after the toppling of Hosni Mubarak, it might be tempted to burnish its revolutionary credentials and pose as the guardian of the Libyan revolution, especially if it is egged on by Western powers. Gaddafis almost certain brutal suppression of the eastern regions bordering Egypt will provide suitable pretext. Such a move will likely earn international support, with both the West seeking to preserve its interests and the Arab League happy to see Arabs taking the lead in tackling Gaddafi. But it would, in essence, be an invasion by an army acting at the behest of the West.
There are other, more effective, solutions which avoid the mistakes of the not too distant past. By extending recognition to the opposition, the international community will allow access to badly sought armament. One of the costliest errors in the response to the 1994 Bosnian conflict was a blanket arms ban on all actors. The Muslims were hit hardest by this step as they sorely lacked the necessary weapons to take on the armed might of the Serbs and Croats who had monopolised the equipment of the former Yugoslav army.
While it is easy to be dismissive of the violence in Libya, there is clearly a moral imperative for action. Instead of foreign players becoming intractably involved, the Libyan people should be allowed to fight their own war of independence. Many soldiers defected to the resistance early in the uprising and could form the core of a professional army, they merely lack the means.
