Much of the change that follows any major crisis can be attributed to the learning curve of the various players involved. The Raymond Davis saga has, for the time being, only caused for Pakistan to revert to a tougher system of issuing visas, with individual cases being vetted by the intelligence agencies. Beyond that, the institutional framework of a client state doesnt really know much to do.
The US, meanwhile, is on a learning curve of its own. There are reports of the CIA reviewing the role of its intelligence operatives in not just Pakistan but the world over. This is not a mere rewriting of the handbook of protocols. The exercise appears to be reviewing the basic role of operatives in the first place and also to ascertain what their appropriate number should be. Though by Pakistani standards, this would be a prompt response to the problem, most American observers would say the review is long overdue. The bloated number of contract-hire employees in the American military apparatus would have been a cause for concern for any professional army, least of the most powerful military in the history of the world. As the Roman Empire found to its dismay, mercenaries an effective army does not make. Just as the soldiers of fortune fighting for Rome were given to much cruelty, the recent examples of Blackwater and Xe also serve as reminders of the necessity of warfare being monopolised by states alone. There is an air of unaccountability that surrounds contractors. You dont give the likes of those guns.
The US thinks the Pakistani establishments smoke-and-mirrors role in the war against terror should be countered by cloak-and-dagger intelligence and diplomacy. That clearly hasnt worked. And it is almost certain that if the same path is maintained, there is going to be another Davis-like crisis, one that the US would not be able to buy its way out of.
