Not above bombing marriages and funerals, as they have shown time and again, the militants have targeted a peace Lashkar in Adezai, near Peshawar. The suicide blast, which was directed at the funeral of a wife of a lashkar member, killed 43 people and left over 50 injured.
The incident will open yet another floodgate of criticism of the government for not providing enough security to the pro-government lashkars. The criticism is well-founded. At least some of the lashkars are the stuff heroes are made out of, keeping the Taliban at bay in many villages. But the issue of state cooperation with these is not as simple as the liberati have made it out to be. For starters, the lashkars are not a unified cadre, and the lashkars in and around Peshawar are also not operating within an environment of tribal affinities as strong as, say, the Waziristans. This leads to much confusion as to what constitutes a lashkar and whether it should be supported the way states support and fund their security agencies. There have been many instances of the lashkars being involved in bloodshed and violence. If state support financial and otherwise is stepped up, could some of the criminal elements try to play the system and try to get some of the money? In addition to using arms, ammunitions and paramilitary backup to settle personal scores. Needless to say, the government must map out all such scenarios. Perhaps lessons could be learnt from other countries that have territorial armies. There is a need for a systematic approach here.
The development of indigenous militias is a good idea but only as a secondary force in aid of the permanent state employed security agencies. The state itself must step up and take proactive measures. Why the Frontier Corps hasnt made effective headway in the adjoining Khyber Agency, despite a number of operations, is one of the many glaring questions that need to be answered by the countrys security establishment.