The question of Raymond Davis immunity, now that former foreign minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi has spelled out and spilled the position, should be a settled issue. Unfortunately, it wont be, given the binary polarisation in this country. The centrists, a near-extinct species in Pakistan, fall through the crack between the two ideological camps that call each other names like ghairat brigade and liberal extremists. The problem is that states rise and fall on the back of whether the centre (pun intended) is broad enough to hold. But that is a discussion for another time. Right now, the issue is Davis.
Question abound still, what Donald Rumsfeld called the unknown-unknowns. What was a former US Special Forces weapons sergeant doing in Lahore, armed with an illegal weapon? Why was he travelling so frequently between Pakistan and the US? Why was he in contact with some groups that are known to be attacking Pakistani security forces? What exactly happened on that day in Lahore? Why did he shoot to kill, a known-unknown, meaning that we know what he did but we dont know why he did it because, being a pro, he could have incapacitated them?
The issue of motive also remains unknown and it is vital. Allied with this are questions about the boys he shot dead. Who were they? Did they rob someone before they latched on to Davis? If they did, was that a cover operation? Or is that just a story? Were they tailing Davis? If yes, it seems to be what in the trade jargon is called obtrusive work; overt, not covert. In which case, the question is, was Davis trying to shake them off and failing to do that decided to kill them? Strange that would be, given he was a trained operative. What could have made him eliminate the threat? What was the nature of the threat? Was it immediate? Was the obstruction hampering his work over days which frustrated him?
One story quoted an unnamed intelligence official as saying that the dead boys were spooks. The story was contradicted by Inter-Services Intelligence that also said it reserved the right to proceed against the publication in a court of law. It is difficult to assess the veracity of the ISI position because agencies are not known, or even supposed, to spill the beans on their operations. Plausible deniability is a handy tool.
The Punjab law minister, Rana Sanaullah, while on a TV programme gave details on what Davis did, but was less than forthcoming on the boys ID and what they were up to, saying only that the issue could be discussed once investigations are concluded. Why? Why no interim report on the boys?
Why did the US change its statements on Davis? Why has Washington at all levels been so threatening? But even more intriguing, why has Pakistan, despite its reliance on the US, refused to blink on the issue of Davis?
Could it be that Davis was doing something which Pakistani security establishment thinks was against the countrys interests, interests that far outweigh the danger of a standoff with the US? If so, what interests could be in jeopardy?
This gives rise to another set of questions. Davis could not have just arrived in Pakistan. Someone gave him the visa. If he was a threat, why was he allowed in? Or is it that some institutions are operating out of sync with some others, with one part of the government dealing with the US plans and operations differently from another? There is some evidence, mostly non-attributable, that such has been the case. In which case, does one part of the government define the national interest differently from another? If that is correct, we have a bigger and graver problem than Davis and the incident is a reflection of that deeper problem.
When security agencies began apprehending Americans with arms in Islamabad and also intercepted some vehicles in Lahore one such incident had involved Davis on a previous visit I did a TV programme on it. Former DG-ISI, Lt-Gen Asad Durrani (retd) was on the panel and he clearly said that he would be surprised if some rogue groups had not been introduced into the current situation. I agreed with him because it would indeed be naive to think that what is happening here is all neat and clean in terms of who the good guys are as opposed to the bad ones.
Be that as it may, the issue is essentially related to the working of Pakistani institutions, the deals people whisper about but no one really knows. Bob Woodward in Obamas Wars: The Inside Story mentions the extraordinary intelligence coup scored by the US, the programme which blends humint (human intelligence) with technical intelligence input. The book says the programme heads the top-secret list. Human sources are needed to make the drones lethal and effective. Without spies, the video feed from the Predator might as well be a blank television screen.
How were these sources developed? Where are the handlers based? What are the means of communication, which must remain secure? etcetera.
There is another angle too. Pakistani security establishment is particularly keen to find out who is aiding and abetting the groups that are operating against Pakistans interests and attacking the countrys security forces as well as committing acts of terror in the urban centres. The conventional wisdom among the intelligence community is that in this game no one is entirely innocent, not the Indians, not Afghans and not the Americans.
There are not many answers but questions there is no dearth of. Would Davis be kept until some of the missing links have been found; could it be that the back channel negotiations are an attempt to work out things with one side informing the other that it is cleaning up its act? Truth will out, by and by, because todays world doesnt like too much cloak and dagger stuff.
The writer is Contributing Editor, The Friday Times.
