The violent agitation in Tunisia and Egypt and street protests in Yemen and Jordan are symptomatic of political predicament of a large number of Middle Eastern countries that were not touched by the democracy wave of the post-Cold War era.
An authoritarian and oppressive regime can last over a long period of time because its power base is narrow and the power elite are fully entrenched. It is not easy to shake them quickly. Such a regime often runs out of much of its steam and loses contact with the ground political realities after holding on to power over a long time. This provides an opportunity to its adversaries to challenge it for one reason or another. The number of alienated people and groups increases over time and if, for some domestic reason or due to some external development, they come on the same political wavelength, the authoritarian ruler faces massive agitation. If the agitators can withstand the initial wrath of the authoritarian ruler, his state-apparatus starts crumbling. Most of his allies and beneficiaries pull back, leaving the despotic ruler at the mercy of the unruly agitators.
The agitation gets such a momentum that one wonders why the authoritarian ruler lasted for such long time? The experience suggests that such rulers may last for years but their collapse comes quickly and in a dramatic manner because they block all avenues of normal and peaceful change and their administrative system and the co-option process, controlled by a small and vicious mafia, fail to respond to the participatory pressures and economic demands.
The Middle Eastern rulers generally stay in power for 20 to 30 years even in non-monarchical systems. The long years in power make them insensitive to the societal changes, especially the generational changes and the impact of new domestic and external socio-economic forces. The parliaments are hardly autonomous power centres, mostly comprising pro-ruler elements. The elections are manipulated by the state apparatus to the advantage of the pro-government candidates.
The power structure is dominated by the closely knit civilian and military elite who recruit new elements to the power structure through a carefully managed process of co-option. The highest premium is assigned to loyalty rather than professionalism. The loyalists are well-rewarded by the ruler who are allowed to emerge as the ruling class that dominates the state institutions, the economy and the key societal institutions and processes.
Political dissent is not generally tolerated or it is allowed a very restricted domain. The media is under state control. If private sector media is allowed, it does not have much freedom on political and state-related affairs. Political parties and groups may be allowed to function but they have limited freedom or opportunity to directly take on the government. The media, political parties and societal groups can focus on social and cultural issues but they should not question the credibility of the government. The genuine political dissent goes underground or, in some cases Islam becomes an idiom of dissent and Islamic institutions, especially madrassahs, are used as a cover to sustain dissent. Some of the dissenting political leaders have to leave for other countries and they operate from there. They rely on modern means of communication and technology to interact with each other and the rest of the world.
There is a wide gap between the life of affluence and abundance of the dominant elite and the common folks who face poverty, underdevelopment and deprivation. Those who cannot find some livelihood or cannot go to other countries for employment are alienated from the state system and are vulnerable to extremist appeals. It is they who come out in the street when and if the political and societal leaders decide to engage in street protest.
However, the Arab countries that have oil wealth can manage dissent by looking after the economic and social needs of the ordinary people, especially by providing jobs and making state funds available for education, health and other basic requirements. Such a populace is less vulnerable to appeals for confronting the government. The countries like Saudi-Arabia, Kuwait, the UAE, Iraq, Libya and Iran have greater financial capacity to cope with societal demands. The authoritarian regimes of these countries get a longer time span but even the rulers have to accommodate some political demands because educated and economically secure elite has a tendency to build participatory pressures, although at a slower pace. The affluent Arab countries have a large number of non-Arabic speaking foreign workers that are not likely to join an agitation for political change.
The countries like Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt, Jordan and Yemen are more vulnerable to popular revolts because these lack the capacity to cope with economic and financial pressures. However, this does not mean that there can never be mass and popular revolts in affluent Arab states or there cannot be a peaceful and orderly change in the relatively poor Arab countries.
The agitation against an entrenched ruler requires support across all major divides in the society. If the major sections of the public come out in the streets, like in Tunisia and Egypt, and withstand the pressure of the state apparatus, the regimes survival is not normally possible.
The major challenge of an agitation is how to sustain its momentum and make sure that it does not become unrestrained, directionless violence. The role of leadership and their capacity to manage the direction of the movement is crucial not only to pressure the authoritarian ruler to leave but also to make sure that there is an agreed way to set up an alternative system of governance otherwise the country can descent into chaos and civil strife.
It is not always sure that the overthrow of an authoritarian government by mass agitation will lead to democratisation. The ideological, ethnic and other divides can cause divisions after the exit of the target ruler. In Egypt, the chances of such division exist between the Akhwan-ul-Muslameen and other political forces, although they got together to launch the agitation against Hosni Mubarak.
The Middle Eastern countries are entering a new and uncertain phase. The present generation of authoritarian rulers in the relatively poor countries appears to be on the way out but it is premature to suggest that the new era of democracy and internal harmony is about to begin. The change will impact different countries differently.
The writer is an independent political and defence analyst.
