The relationship between Islam and politics is not a new issue. However, this attracted a renewed interest after a large number of religious leaders based in mosques and madrassahs as well as associated with Islamic political parties justified the assassination of Salmaan Taseer and publicly defended his killer. Their discourse was extremist and provocative, at times threatening those not sharing their perspective on the blasphemy law. This type of extreme religious fervour was not limited to the madrassah students and their followers in the underclass. A good number of people with regular state education and serving in the lower and middle echelons of different professions and government jobs were either receptive to the perspective of the clergy on the killing of Taseer or publicly supported his killer.
The orthodox and conservative Islamic clergy used the incident to unify their divided ranks across the Barelvi-Deobandi divide on a shared agenda of protecting the blasphemy law and to assert their power over the state and society which they cannot do through the ballot box. They were joined by the Punjab based militant and sectarian organisations. However, no Shia clergy of standing joined their street protest or paid tribute to the killer; they hardly issued any statement in the immediate aftermath of the assassination. For some time, the federal and provincial governments and the mainstream political parties appeared overawed by their hard line and extremist discourse that threatened to take on any person, organisation and the government that challenged their contention of no changes in the blasphemy law and defence of the killer.
Though Islamic orthodoxy and conservatism was invoked by the Islamists and political far-right but they had a clear political agenda of forcing their choices on the state and the society. They wanted to re-articulate the relationship of the Pakistani state with Islam to create an in-built tilt in their favour in the political system. Pakistans Islamist circles are not unique in their desire to dominate the political and social order. The religious hardliners in all societies wish to re-order the state and society to their satisfaction but they do not always succeed.
If we make a comparative global study of the relationship between religion and politics, three major patterns or their variations are discernable.
1. The state controls religious practices and institutions.
2. Religious establishment commands the state and the government.
3. There are overlapping but autonomous domains of religion and politics. The state neither engages in advocacy of a religion nor interferes with the functioning of any religion except in public interest and civic order in a uniform manner.
The first two strategies are part of the political agenda of the dominant state elite or the religious elite respectively. The Communist countries used to control the religious establishment fully so that it does not function as an autonomous entity. The state ideology and the party were supreme and the people could quietly pursue their religion, if any. There is a resurgence of religion in the former Soviet bloc countries. China is now more tolerant towards religion.
There is no example of the religious establishment controlling political power after the advent of the modern nation-state with the exception of post-revolution Iran. Another example is the Ottoman Empire where the Khalifa represented the religious authority. However, it was not a state in the strict sense and it ended soon after World War I. Saudi Arabia and Iran come close to the notion of a religious state. However, Islamic clergy exercise varying degrees of influence on the political process in a large number of Muslim countries. They may share rather than dominate power.
The concept of two overlapping domains of religion and state emphasises mutual respect but no attempt to dominate each other. They may influence each other through the political process and the legal system but the state does not enforce a particular religion by decrees and the religious establishment cannot insist on establishing a religion based political system.
Pakistan started with the notion of overlapping domains and the founding fathers wanted to establish a modern democratic state that viewed the teaching and principles of Islam as an important source of law (rather than law) and the ethnic basis of the society. However, the religious leaders wanted to opt for the second model where they had a decisive say in determining the nature and direction of the state system.
The orthodox and conservative religious establishment partly achieved its objective during the years of the military government of General Zia-ul-Haq when the Pakistani state began to enforce Islam as articulated by the pro-Zia religious establishment.
Currently, the orthodox and conservative religious establishment wants to sustain the unity demonstrated recently in defence of the blasphemy law. Therefore, they would like to keep the momentum of the movement under the rubric of the Namoos-i-Risalat by continuing to hold public meetings and rallies and Friday sermons in the mosques linked with madrassahs and Islamic political parties so that they are able to create a political coalition to contest the elections, like the MMA in 2002 that was the by-product of the anti-America agitation launched by Islamic groups after the US attacked Afghanistan in October 2001.
However, the current protest is not expected to throw up any new coalition of religious forces because the current unity among the Deobandi and Barelvi groups is artificial. They are expected to revert to their separate denominational enclaves, especially if some sufi shrine is attacked by the Taliban or other militant group. Further, unlike 2002, the Pakistani establishment is not favourably disposed towards their enhanced role in domestic politics.
A number of religious scholars and people with far-right orientations (not associated with the movement) have started arguing now that no individual has the right to kill others in the name of Islam. Some emphasise the principles of tolerance and forgiveness and argue that the blasphemy law should not be allowed to be misused. Some go to the extent of suggesting that death for being disrespectful to the Holy Prophet is not a Quranic injunction.
The political leaders and societal elite should engage the religious elite to find peaceful ways to moderate the current societal tensions and how to ensure that the blasphemy law is not misused for settling personal and sectarian scores. Dialogue and moderation are the right strategies to evolve a constructive and inclusive relationship between religion and politics in Pakistan.
The writer is an independent political and defence analyst.
