The PPP decided to induct the MQM, JUI(F) and PML(F) into the ruling coalition after the PML(N) left the government in 2008. The decision looked odd to many as the PPP had identified the three parties with the establishment whereas it projected itself as a democratic force opposed to military rule.
The partners adopted by Zardari had remained a vital part of the Musharraf set up for six long years. The MQM, along with the PML(F) had joined the military controlled coalition hammered together by the agencies both at the center and in Sindh after 2002 elections. The JUI(F) on the other hand was a senior partner in the PML(Q) led administration in Balochistan and its government in the former NWFP enjoyed the blessings of the military government. The MQM, JUI(F) and PML(F) also provided the much needed support to Musharraf to get the 17th amendment passed. The amendment gave legal cover to the military ruler while it also validated the actions taken by him after the 1999 coup. The PPP had also blamed MQM for the mayhem in Karachi on the arrival of the Chief Justice leading to the deaths of several PPP and ANP workers. Many called it rank opportunism on the part of the PPP as it sought the support of parties having no affinity with its avowed ideals.
There was however a perception in the PPP leadership that the parties suited it better because unlike the PML(N) they were small parties, with each confined to a single province. It was concluded that it would be easier to satisfy their demands, which later on turned out to be an incorrect assessment. It was understood that once a part of the coalition, the parties would use their official position to raise their political influence. This however was not seen to be a challenge to a party commanding presence in all the four provinces. Smaller groups, it was understood, would always become junior partners of the larger parties. On the other hand, the PPP considered the PML(N) a traditional rival which posed a long term threat.
The PML(Q) was a different story. Like the PML(N), the party had a nationwide presence and thus posed a serious threat in the next elections. The advice by Zardari to Mian Nawaz Sharif not to boycott the 2008 elections was by no means altruistic. Had the PML(N) not participated, the PML(Q) was sure to bag all anti-PPP votes in Punjab. The PML(N)s participation ensured that the anti-PPP vote in the province remained divided. PML(Q)s presence in the ruling coalition was however seen to be undesirable on account of the claims it was supposed to make if inducted into the government.
The PML(N) was included in the ruling coalition with a heavy heart. The support of the party was required to face the dire problems that faced the country. What provided satisfaction to the PPP leadership was that its traditional rival had by and large been confined to Punjab. The PML(N) had won no seat in Sindh while its parliamentary presence in the other two provinces was only symbolic. It was thought that it would be easier to keep the party under control.
Soon after the PML(N)s induction into the cabinet, it was discovered that the party posed an immediate threat also. Its out-and-out support for the restoration of the independent judiciary was seen as a move aimed at targeting Zardari. As the opening of NRO later vindicated, this was by no means a long shot. The PPP leadership decided not to restore the deposed judges even if this was to lead to the parting of ways with Mian Nawaz Sharif.
Calculations regarding the demands of coalition allies later turned out to be totally unrealistic. Despite having a staunch party activist as Governor plus important portfolios in Sindh, the MQM continued to make more demands till it was found it was no more possible to satisfy them. Despite having three slots in federal cabinet, plus the status of a cabinet minister for Maulana Fazlur Rehman the JUI continued to demand more. Good governance was the foremost casualty as the PPP tried to placate the MQM and JUI(F). For Karachi it meant a descent into lawlessness. It was soon found that keeping the parties in the fold at the price they demanded was simply not possible.
In the event of the MQM deciding to sit on the opposition benches, a possibility shelved for the time being, the government would fall. The government has two options now. It can either bring the PML(Q) into the loop or join hands with the PML(N) to ward off any future challenge to its government. In both cases it will have to pay a price. The Chaudhrys are more interested in the post of the Chief Minister of Punjab than in representation in the federal cabinet. This would help them to consolidate their position in the province crucial for forming the next government at the center. This does not suit the PPP which also wants to hold Punjab.
The PPP finds it hard to accede to the demands contained in Nawaz Sharifs letter to Zardari. Despite this, the two can agree on a modus vivendi. It is possible for the two sides to reach an understanding based on principles rather than sharing of power as it suits neither. The two can sit down and hammer out a joint strategy to tackle the crucial issues facing the country. What is more, they can agree on another CoD that spelled out policies regarding the tackling of terrorism, establishing the rule of law, a jointly agreed foreign policy and the measures needed to strengthen democracy.
Any agreement of the sort should include guarantees from the PPP that it would pursue the commonly agreed policies in letter and spirit during the remainder of its tenure. The PML(N) should in return assure that, while sitting on the opposition benches, it will not allow the government to fall.
The writer is a former academic and a political analyst.
