As I alighted from the plane at Quetta airport, the piercing wind the locals call Kandahari hit me. It was my fourth visit to Balochistan in as many months, and like previous visits this one too answered some questions and, as always happens with intractable problems, left me with many more questions.
Twenty minutes after I had left the airport, word came about the suicide attack on the chief minister. The next day, as I sat through the graduation ceremony for students of the Balochistan Institute of Technical Education (BITE) at the EME Centre, Nawab Aslam Raisani looked less shaken than one would have expected a man who had survived an assassination attempt just 24 hours ago.
BITE is an attempt by the army, in collaboration with the Balochistan government, to give free vocational training to the provinces youth. Set up in February 2007, the institute began with 244 students out of which 32 were girl-students. I was attending the fifth graduation ceremony, which brought the number of graduates to 1,653 out of which 280 were girls.
As acronyms go, it doesnt seem that anyone has really thought of the punning one can do with Bite. Is it something the Baloch would bite; or is it the biting response of the state to the Baloch insurgency? Sitting next to me was seasoned journalist and columnist Irfan Siddiqui. I asked him, Do you think this will work? His response was that it could if it became part of a holistic policy to address Balochistans problems.
The students at BITE are given a stipend and their boarding and lodging is free. The idea is to pull the Baloch youth into the mainstream. The army runs this programme parallel to another major attempt aimed at recruiting the Baloch youth into its various arms and services. A couple of months ago, 4,000 such recruits passed out with parades at four different stations, including Quetta. The army wants to raise the number in the next phase to 10,000.
At the ceremony, Raisani announced the release of a Rs 25 million tranche for BITE from the Rs 100 million his government has allocated for the programme so far. The ceremony was impressive and in keeping with how the army organises things, including, when required, the weather! But the sense of alienation runs deep and the same Raisani who spoke of the need to mainstream the youth had, in an interview with the BBC just a month ago, accused intelligence agencies of capturing and then killing Baloch insurgents.
This issue, among others, came up when I met the very suave and articulate Commander Southern Command, Lt-Gen Javed Zia. Gen Zia clearly understands the problems. What I found heartening was that he also realises that the armys contribution and it is doing much including running the Chamalang Education Programme forms just one side of the triangle. The other two sides belong to the civilian principals and the people.
At a two-hour meeting over tea, he conceded that the situation has reached a point where some people will not bite simply because the army is doing something, even if it brings much good to the province. Improving Balochistan at this point runs against the agenda of the insurgents. But neither is there any antidote to the poison of secession but to keep doing what must be done.
An important crossroads this, and where politics comes in. As the situation stands, political reconciliation in Balochistan often runs contrary to administrative efficiency. The trade-off, obviously, is difficult at times. Yet, it doesnt seem that the state has much choice but to accept inefficiency for a strategic objective. A good example, though just one of many, is the Reko Diq Project in the Chagai district.
The joint venture agreement was signed between the Government of Balochistan (GoB) and BHP Billiton in 1993. Under the agreement, the exploration license was issued to Tethyan Copper Co. The GoB was to get 25% while 75% was to go to BHP Billiton. This was a good deal, given the companys cost and overheads, though this has now been challenged.
In 2000, BHP sold out to a consortium of Antofagusta (Chile) and Barrick (Canada) for about US$ 200m. In 2010, TCC submitted the feasibility report for the mining lease and estimated the value of reserves at US$ 260 billion. The company has already spent US$220 million and is prepared to sink another US$3.1 billion into infrastructure for mining.
The GoB began agitating the issue and said it was not obliged to issue the mining license and the interests of the Baloch will be better served by cancelling the license and having the GoB develop the mine. Some days ago, ECNEC approved Rs 1billion for project in this regard. Currently, two cases are pending in the Supreme Court: an appeal from BHC and a suo motu notice of alleged irregularities (allegations of sale of assets for a song etc) based on a press report.
Legal experts I spoke with say that the GoB position, that it is not obligated to issue a mining licence, is wrong. Balochistan Mining Rules 2002 make it clear that subject to certain exceptions, the entity which explores an area is also entitled to get a mining lease, says one expert, adding: If not, this would make the mines policy unworkable.
They also point out that it makes no sense for a company to invest money (in this case, US$ 220 million) without any guarantee that it would get to benefit from a strike. It is interesting that when I spoke with a few engineering and mining experts, they agreed that the GoB would probably make less money by taking over the project. The GoB has no indigenous capability to develop the project and also does not have the funds (US$ 3 billion required) to develop the project, said one. Moreover, if the GoB does not give the project to TCC, the decision will result in litigation and delays.
There are many more technical and legal angles to the issue and the experts, for the most part, are right in their assessment. For instance, it is clear that theres nothing wrong with the agreement because the GoB is now considering a counter proposal by Metallurgical Corporation of China to mine. The MCC is also offering 25% in equity and 5% in royalties. This means that someone in the GoB is more interested in getting kickbacks than getting the project off the ground. Also, it makes no sense to put all the eggs in Chinas basket which is also now eyeing Gwadar.
However, the issue, as I earlier said, is a classical example of sacrificing efficiency over political considerations. Already, even though the agreements never involved the federal government, the propaganda has been targeting Islamabad and putting out the narrative about Balochistans riches being diverted.
This should give one a sense of how difficult it is to win the people, the most important side of the triangle that Gen Zia talked about. What is important to note is that any discussion of Balochistan must keep in mind the fuller picture rather than taking a snapshot view of this or that effort whether efficient, as the one the army is trying to do, or seemingly inefficient as the example I have quoted of the Reko Diq Project.
Meanwhile, whatever the hurdles, inaction is not an option and even bumbling efforts are better than inertia.
The writer is Contributing Editor, The Friday Times.
