The latest controversy about the blasphemy law raises, once again, the issue of the nature and direction of Pakistani society. Islamic political parties, militant groups and their sympathisers have threatened to launch street agitation if the blasphemy law is changed. They know it fully well that their disposition, shaped by Islamic orthodoxy and literalist interpretation of the religious scripture, is shared in varying degrees by a large number of other sections of population.
The PPP-led federal government will not be able to abolish this law because, not to speak of Islamic parties, the major opposition parties like the PML(N), PML(Q) and the Tehrik-i-Insaf will either stay neutral or oppose the change. All the PPP allies are not expected to support the federal government on this issue.
Pakistans predicament is deeper than the selfishness of the political leaders and the bigoted agenda of Islamists. It is the transformation of Pakistani society to such an extent that a very large number of people interact with each other or view the world at large in purely religious terms.
The widely shared visions in Pakistan of its internal security problems and socio-economic predicament are dominated by the growing trends of Islamic conservatism and orthodoxy that often produces softness for militancy, public display of religiousness, the role of the hidden hands, foreign interests and their agents, global conspiracies and a negative disposition towards the West, especially the United States. Though these perceptions have been articulated mainly by the Islamists, these are shared in varying degrees by others.
Some of these characteristics like the role of the hidden hands and domestic and international conspiracies are common with most developing countries. These notions become deep rooted in the countries where the dominant elite suffer from the crisis of legitimacy, internal politico-economic conditions are not settled and the society is dominated by strong belief systems rather than knowledge and it is unable to make a rational analysis of the society and the world around it.
In Pakistan, the term hidden hands covers a wide array of powerful interests ranging from the top echelons of the political and bureaucratic-military elite and the intelligence agencies on the one hand and powerful feudal and industrial/business interests, the organised crime, armed ethnic and armed groups and foreign interests on the other.
The increased references to the role of the vested interests are indicative of the growing power of the non-state players that can defy the state or weaken its determination to assert its primacy vis–vis special interests.
Orthodox Islamic religious perspective appears to be the most dominant influence on the disposition of most Pakistanis. This perspective views the world in black and while, i.e. Islam versus other religions of the world. Others may not share such a dichotomised view of the world but express strong distrust of the West and criticise the policies of the West, especially the US, towards the Muslim world in general and Pakistan in particular.
Global conspiracies against Pakistan are attributed to India, the U.S. and Israel. Most Islamists argue that the US wants to destabilise Pakistan in order to create a justification for taking over Pakistans nuclear programme an argument based completely on their beliefs.
The alternative political discourse that questions the deeply Islamic perspective is available in Pakistan. It is printed mainly but not exclusively in the English language press. It also finds space in the political talk shows and commentaries in the private sector and state television but most political talk show anchors and commentators either share the Islamic perspectives or the desire for better ratings compels them to adopt a combative disposition towards the rest of the world and project the issues in highly nationalistic-Islamic framework.
The preeminence of Islamic orthodoxy and Islamic discourse on the terrorism related developments can be traced back to the policies of the military government of General Zia-ul-Haq who employed the state apparatus and resources to promote Islamic orthodoxy and militancy in order to sustain his rule and to join hands with the U.S. to strengthen Islamic-Afghan resistance to the Soviet troops in Afghanistan. The subsequent civilian governments (1988-1999) were too weak to restrain the Army/ISI from supporting militancy.
General Pervez Musharraf abandoned the Taliban and joined the U.S. initiated efforts to eliminate transnational terrorism in September 2001. However, the exigencies of staying in power led Musharraf to compromise with the MMA, a coalition of Islamic parties that won the elections in NWFP in 2002, and consequently leave enough space for militant Islamic groups to survive and function. It did not challenge the Islamist critique of Pakistans counter-terrorism policy.
Currently, the PPP, the MQM and the ANP are openly opposed to religious extremism and militancy that has given some boost to the alternate political discourse on terrorism and the role of Islamic orthodoxy in Pakistan. However, their efforts have not reversed the tide because of a number of reasons. First, the PPP-led federal government and the ANP provincial government in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa suffer from the image problem due to poor governance and inability to address the socio-economic problems of the common people. They are not in a position to engage in a massive campaign in favour of countering terrorism.
Second, other major political parties, especially the PML(N), maintain an ambiguous position on countering terrorism. Islamic parties openly support the Taliban and accuse the Army of playing the American game in the region.
The divided political scene enables Islamic hard line and militant groups to sustain support. Third, softness towards militancy runs deep in the official civilian circles and lower echelons of the military. A good number of retired senior army officers and retired civil servants directly or indirectly take exception to Pakistans counter-terrorism policy and pro-U.S. disposition.
Pakistans official disposition towards various militant groups will continue to reflect ambiguities and contradictions because the state and the society have not been able to evolve a shared framework for dealing with different manifestations of orthodoxy and terrorism.
The alternate perspective that emphasises internal reforms to put the economic and political house in order rather than holding others responsible for Pakistans problems will challenge the Islamist perspective. However, it is not expected to become the dominant view in Pakistan in the near future.
The writer is a former foreign secretary.
