Pakistan is integral to the US efforts to eliminate transnational terrorism. Pakistan and the United States share the goal of countering terrorism and stabilising Afghanistan and Pakistan but they diverge on the details of the strategies to pursue these objectives. These differences have been a cause of complaints against each other. The US pressures Pakistan to do more for countering terrorism and specifically suggests tough action against some groups. Pakistan feels that the US distrusts Pakistans commitment to countering terrorism and fails to appreciate Pakistans problems in countering terrorism.
Pakistan faces a host of problems which are in no way experienced by the US because it is situated several thousand miles away from the theatre of war against terrorism. Pakistans close proximity to and ethnic overlap with Afghanistan has a profound influence on its counter terrorism policy. Furthermore, around three million Afghan refugees continue to live in Pakistan. Their children are studying in Pakistani educational institutions. These factors do not affect the US
Pakistan has to contend with a host of militant Islamic groups, each with its peculiar characteristics. It is not possible to deal with them in the same manner by the use of brute force because of the differences in their composition, location and linkages with Pakistani society.
There are five types of militant Islamic groups. (i) The Tehrik-i-Taliban-i-Pakistan (TTP) is based in the tribal areas but it has developed links in mainland Pakistan; (ii) other local militant groups located in some tribal areas. There are an unspecified number of foreign militants and a small number of Al-Qaeda activists. (iii) mainland groups that have traditionally focused on Indian-administered Kashmir and India; (iv) mainland based sectarian militant groups that have an exclusively domestic Pakistani agenda; (v) small breakaway factions from the above mentioned groups that are more violent than their parent organisations.
The US military authorities make three types of demands on Pakistan. They demand tough military action in North Waziristan where some militant groups like the Haqqani group and Hafiz Gul Bahadur are based and are actively involved in the insurgency in Afghanistan. They are accused of killing NATO, US and Afghan soldiers. North Waziristan also houses the TTP elements and foreign militants. The second demand pertains to the presence of the senior Afghan Taliban leaders and activists in the vicinity of Quetta, described as the Quetta Shura. They are said to plan and launch operations in Afghanistan. Third, the US demands strong action against Lashkar-i-Tayyabya/Jamaatud Dawa (LeT and JUD) for its involvement in the Mumbai terrorist attacks. The US authorities and experts accuse Pakistans ISI of patronising some militant groups, especially the LeT/JUD and ignoring the activities of the Afghan Taliban on Pakistani soil.
Pakistan is currently focusing on the groups that directly challenge its writ. The Pakistan Army has undertaken successful operation in Swat/Malakand and South Waziristan in 2009 and dislodged the Taliban. Currently, it is engaged in sporadic military operations in five tribal areas, i.e., Khyber, Orakzai, Bajaur, Mohmand and Kurram. The army has registered varying degrees of success in these areas but the task is not yet competed. It may also be mentioned that the army and paramilitary forces continue to perform security duties in Swat/Malakand and South Waziristan because the civilian administration has not taken the full charge of the areas
The security authorities are not expected to extend military operation to North Waziristan without completing the current assignments. The security forces are already over-stretched and cannot risk a major operation in North Waziristan where highly entrenched and well armed groups are located.
Pakistan has also to be watchful on the eastern border with India that has kept the military option against Pakistan on the table since the Mumbai terrorist attacks on November 26, 2008. It is beyond the capacity of Pakistans security forces to open all counter terrorism fronts simultaneously at a time when India is not willing to relent security pressures on the eastern borders.
The mainland based militant groups cause an additional problem. As these have made strong inroads into society, these cannot be subjected to the kind of security operation launched in the tribal areas. The Islamic-denominational ties help them to obtain local support and melt into the society till they need to go for some violent mission. They can be tackled by a long term strategy of changing the orientation of the society to religious and cultural tolerance coupled with effective intelligence gathering and tough and trained police and other security forces for dealing with these elements.
Pakistan will find it relatively easy to take a firm action against the Afghan Taliban based in Pakistan, especially in North Waziristan, if the US-NATO forces achieve credible military successes in Afghanistan. As a matter of fact, Pakistans security forces have been more successful in pushing back the Taliban in Swat/Malakand and South Waziristan than NATO-US troops in Afghanistan. The perception that the Taliban have enormous resilience discourages Pakistan to pick up direct confrontation with every Taliban group.
If the US wants Pakistans total devotion to counter terrorism without reservations, it needs to work towards resolving India-Pakistan problems. If the tension between India and Pakistan is high and Indian strategists talk of limited war, surgical air-strikes and the capturing of some Pakistani territory by mobilising rapid moving battle groups, Pakistan will feel more threatened by India than the militant groups.
The Kashmir dispute holds key to stepping up Pakistans counter terrorism efforts. The easing of tension between India and Pakistan and especially the resolution of the Kashmir problem would decrease relevance of several militant groups for the Pakistani state and the society.
Similarly Pakistan has security concerns about post-US Afghanistan. There is a need to address these so that it does not seek a quiet partnership with some Taliban groups.
Pakistan is not playing a double game. The major constraints on its counterterrorism policy are the troubled relations with India, the fear of Afghan territory being used against it, societal linkages of some militant groups and the limited capacity to fight all these groups at the same time. The US needs to address these problems if it wants Pakistans unconditional and full cooperation.
The writer is an independent political and defence analyst.
