The third round of the Strategic Dialogue between the United States and Pakistan, held on October 20-22 in Washington, provided an opportunity to their senior officials to expand their relations against the backdrop of the on-going differences on how to deal with the militant groups based in North Waziristan, Taliban activists in the Quetta area and Pakistans security concern in Afghanistan. The U.S. agreed to provide new military equipment to strengthen the Pakistan armys counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency capacity. They also agreed on new programs for Pakistans socio-economic development.
Both value this relationship but they have reservations about each others specific policies pertaining to counter-terrorism and stability in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Pakistan is perturbed by public denunciation of certain aspects of its policies by U.S. officials. Non-official circles are invariably more critical of Pakistan, arguing that Pakistan must fully satisfy the U.S. authorities on countering terrorism because the U.S. provides so much funding to Pakistan.
This argument treats Pakistan as a mercenary country and the Pakistan Army as a mercenary force that must fulfill the task in return for the money. Such comments let down American commitments to maintain long term relations with Pakistan that go beyond Afghanistan.
Pakistan and the U.S. need to work together to evolve shared strategies to cope with the menace of terrorism rather than the U.S. authorities deciding unilaterally what Pakistan is supposed to do. Pakistan and the U.S. have elaborate consultation arrangements that need to be utilized to get over the differences and misunderstandings. They need to evolve over-lapping rather than identical interests.
Pakistans concerns arise out of its geographic location; next door to Afghanistan and sharing borders with India. Pakistans security forces are pursuing counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency operations in the tribal areas keeping in view their capacity to pursue counter terrorism, Pakistans domestic considerations and its security interests in Afghanistan.
The Pakistan military is also performing other important tasks. It is extending assistance to civilian authorities in the flood-affected areas. The troops are expected to stay involved in these operations for next three-four months. Another major responsibility is the security of the border with India. The tension between India and Pakistan has been high since the Mumbai terrorist attack on November 26, 2008. India moved its troops from peacetime positions in order to resort to coercive diplomacy against Pakistan. The troubled nature of this relationship commits the Pakistan Army to stay watchful on this border.
Pakistans security forces evicted The Taliban from Swat/Malakand and South Waziristan in 2009. Currently, the army and the paramilitary continue to look after the internal security in these regions. The troops are also engaged in security operations in Bajaur, Khyber, Orakzai, Mohmand and Kurram regions of the tribal areas. The Army authorities want to consolidate their position in the above-mentioned tribal areas and reduce their security responsibilities in Swat before undertaking a security operation in North Waziristan where more powerful groups are entrenched.
What further restrains Pakistans counter-terrorism efforts is the new turn in the U.S. policy of encouraging dialogue between the Afghan government and some Taliban groups. Pakistan is currently helping the Kabul government to initiate a dialogue with different Taliban groups, including the Haqqani group based in North Waziristan. If the dialogue option is to be pursued, Pakistan cannot use force against the Taliban group in an indiscriminate manner.
The Haqqani group and the Taliban activists based around Quetta cannot be relied upon in the long run. Currently, they need a safe-haven in Pakistani areas and thus do not challenge the Pakistani state. However, the Balochistan based Taliban are involved in violence there. Other Taliban groups are likely to challenge Pakistan if they are able to consolidate themselves in Afghanistan. Therefore, all of them may prove to be a strategic liability for Pakistan. However, any stern action against them cannot be taken unless the dialogue option has been exhausted and Pakistan consolidates its military positions in other tribal areas.
A discouraging development for Pakistan is the absence of any significant American-NATO military success against the Taliban in Afghanistan. If American-NATO troops demonstrate noticeable successes against the Taliban, Pakistan will be encouraged to adopt a firmer approach towards all kinds of Taliban. If the Taliban stay entrenched in Afghanistan, Pakistan cannot be expected to pursue the eliminate all policy. The NATO and American problems in Afghanistan cannot be totally attributed to the cross-border movement of the Taliban.
The NATO-U.S. troops need to pay more attention to curbing cross-border movement. In August 2010, Pakistani check posts on the Pakistan-Afghan border numbered 821 against 112 check posts set up by NATO-US-Afghan troops on their side. Pakistan has lost 2,273 military and paramilitary personnel in the tribal areas and Swat.
Pakistan is also thinking of the DAY AFTER the American-NATO troops quit Afghanistan. It has four concerns. First, if internal stability and chaos prevails in Afghanistan, Pakistans security is threatened because the stability of Pakistans tribal areas and the frontier province is linked with what happens in Afghanistan. Second, more Pakhtuns live in Pakistan than in Afghanistan. Therefore, Pakistan is in favor of adequate Pakhtun representation in the power structure in Afghanistan. The current Afghan administration, police and the army are dominated by Tajiks and Uzbeks. There is a need to provide adequate representation to Pakhtuns in these institutions as the Pakhtuns constitute over 40 per cent population of Afghanistan.
Third, Pakistan will not favor a government in Kabul that is hostile to Pakistan, especially because Pakistan contributes to sustaining Afghan economy through transit trade and bilateral trade and smuggling of food and other items.
Fourth, Pakistan expects the U.S. to advice India to step-back from entrenching itself in Afghanistan and exploit Pakistans internal vulnerabilities, especially in Balochistan. Similarly, Pakistan would like the U.S. to use its growing influence in India to encourage its leaders to engage in meaningful dialogue with Pakistan and resolve differences. This will enable Pakistan to devote itself fully to countering terrorism.
These considerations shape Pakistans Afghanistan policy and counter-terrorism strategies which the U.S. policy makers need to take into account if they want Pakistan to be more responsive to their concerns.
The writer is an independent political and defence analyst.